Published: May 12, 2023
By: Danielle Powers, Chief Executive Officer
There is no question that expanding the electric transmission system is a key factor in achieving the nation’s clean energy goals. The most efficient way to ensure that this happens, however, is being strongly debated.
FERC Order 1000 established reforms in transmission planning and cost allocation, and eliminated the Right of First Refusal (ROFR) for those incumbent utilities involved in regional or inter-regional infrastructure construction, with limited exceptions.1 In Order 1000, FERC reasoned that by eliminating long-standing monopolies, competition would be created, and innovation and cost savings would result. In eliminating utilities’ monopoly over regional transmission, however, FERC expressly left it to states to enact their own ROFR laws.
Utilities in Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Mississippi, and Montana have successfully persuaded lawmakers to prioritize ROFR legislation. Indiana recently passed ROFR legislation, and legislation is anticipated in other midwestern states this year. States including North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Texas, Iowa, and Michigan have ROFR laws in place.
ROFR issues are also being re-examined at the federal level. Questions around the effectiveness of competition in transmission have prompted the FERC to consider giving incumbent utilities the right to build regional transmission if they partner with one or more unaffiliated, non-incumbent partners.
Critics of the ROFR argue that it can limit competition and innovation in the industry. By granting the incumbent transmission provider the first opportunity to continue providing service, it can create a barrier to entry for other providers who may be better suited to meet the needs of the market. Additionally, the ROFR can limit consumers’ ability to access alternative sources of energy and limit the development of renewable energy sources.
These arguments have recently carried the day in Iowa, where the battle over who should be able to build and own the regional transmission projects necessary to support grid reliability and the shift toward renewable energy is currently playing out.
The Iowa Supreme Court recently halted a 2020 order giving incumbent utilities in Iowa the right of first refusal to build proposed transmission projects. Stating that the 2020 law would stifle competition and harm the business interests of out-of-state companies, the Iowa Supreme Court sent the case back to the district court to decide whether the ROFR is unconstitutional. The temporary injunction affects five transmission projects totaling about $2.64 billion that ITC Midwest, MidAmerican Energy and Cedar Falls Utilities intend to build in Iowa. The projects are part of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator’s Long Range Transmission Planning Tranche 1 projects, approved last year.
The battle over who builds the grid of the future will continue to be fiercely debated. Protracted debate, however, risks the grid transformation necessary to enable a clean energy future.
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All views expressed by the author are solely the author’s current views and do not reflect the views of Concentric Energy Advisors, Inc., its affiliates, subsidiaries, or related companies. The author’s views are based upon information the author considers reliable at the time of publication. However, neither Concentric Energy Advisors, Inc., nor its affiliates, subsidiaries, and related companies warrant the information’s completeness or accuracy, and it should not be relied upon as such.
1 An incumbent utility is defined as an entity that develops a transmission project within its own retail distribution service territory or footprint.
Published: March 16, 2023
By: Danielle Powers, Chief Executive Officer
The Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources (“MA DOER”) issued the framework for its proposed Forward Clean Energy Market (“FCEM”) in January of 2023, and invited written comments on the proposal. Comments were submitted by numerous interested parties, including market participants, utility ratepayers, advocacy groups, and concerned citizens. A review of the submitted comments revealed some common themes.
One of the most consistently submitted comments was the desire for a robust stakeholder process. Many parties requested that the MA DOER work with other New England states to establish a formal public stakeholder process to consider, discuss and debate the FCEM proposal via technical conferences and public comment periods. The parties reasoned that this would allow the involvement of stakeholders not directly involved in the energy markets (e.g., ratepayers, community groups, and environmental advocates) and give a voice to those ineligible to participate in meetings involving the design and operation of the New England energy markets. An open and transparent stakeholder process is critical in moving a proposal forward and designing a market with the greatest chance of success.
In addition, several parties recognized that the proposed market design is highly complex. This complexity can potentially restrict competition by developers and clean-energy resource suppliers, and substantially limit the possible benefits of the proposed market. In addition, it will take years to resolve questions and details around jurisdiction, governance structure, interaction with existing wholesale markets, multiple products and multiple commitment periods, and the auction mechanism.
The existing capacity market took dozens of meetings among over 80 stakeholders for almost two years to finalize and implement, and the proposed FCEM is far more complex than the current market. It is reasonable to assume that this market would not be implemented until 2025 for a 2028 delivery period at best. This delay is a critical issue in achieving the objectives of the FCEM.
The comments submitted also recognized the importance of alignment between the FCEM and the existing regional wholesale markets. For the FCEM to successfully meet region-wide policy goals and reliability needs, the market must be compatible with the existing wholesale markets administered by ISO New England. While this does not require FCEM and current wholesale market integration, the need to consider the obligations, requirements, and revenues associated with the FCEM in the existing wholesale markets is unavoidable.
Finally, several comments on the proposed FCEM centered around the failure of the existing capacity market in New England in advancing the state’s climate mandates and integrating these mandates into the competitive markets. This criticism is unfounded. The competitive energy markets are designed to provide reliable wholesale electricity at competitive prices, not to address public policy mandates.
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All views expressed in this summary are solely the current views of the Author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Concentric Energy Advisors, Inc., its affiliates, subsidiaries, and related companies, and the clients of Concentric Energy Advisors. The Author’s views are based upon information the Author considers reliable at the time of publication.