BUILDING NEW TRANSMISSION
EXPERIENCE TO-DATE DOES NOT SUPPORT EXPANDING SOLICITATIONS

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Concentric Energy Advisors | i
MISO

SPP

NYISO

PJM

Appendix E: Order No. 1000 Background.
**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The value of electric transmission is significant and well documented. Transmission infrastructure provides customers with a reliable and resilient flow of power, integrates diverse and cost-effective energy resources, enables production cost savings, reduces amounts and costs of planning reserve margins, and increases competition among supply resources for the benefit of customers. Incumbent transmission owners ("TOs") have made the majority of the transmission investments in the U.S. and, more recently, a number of transmission projects have been subject to competitive solicitation processes ("solicitations") and awarded to non-incumbent transmission developers. Some argue that these solicitations should be expanded. Proponents of such an expansion, including the Brattle Group in an April 2019 Report ("Brattle Report" or "report"), assert that expanding the scope of such solicitations will yield significant cost savings.

The savings that will result from significantly expanding solicitations for new transmission projects, as claimed in the Brattle Report, are based in part on the assumption that transmission projects developed by incumbent TOs, as opposed to those selected through a solicitation, will experience significant cost escalations with final project costs exceeding initial estimates by 18-70%. This assumption is false and inconsistent with the empirical evidence. Concentric found that incumbent TOs in independent system operators ("ISOs") and regional transmission organizations ("RTOs") that track project costs develop reasonable initial cost estimates, with final and/or updated project cost estimates falling between -2.9% and 7.0% of initial estimates.

The methodological approach underlying the Brattle Report's recommendation that policymakers should expand solicitations also is fundamentally flawed. As such, there is no credible support for the claim that current transmission processes limit customer savings, or that expansion of competition will yield meaningful additional savings. The Brattle Report inappropriately compares different types of project cost estimates, fails to account for differences in scope between project cost estimates, and uses a limited and unrepresentative sample size of incumbent TO projects to produce its average historical cost escalation estimates, which are significantly overstated. Figure E1 below compares Concentric’s estimates to the Brattle Report.

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1 See e.g., Edison Electric Institute, Smarter Energy Infrastructure: The Critical Role and Value of Electric Transmission (March 2019).
2 The Brattle Group, Cost Savings Offered by Competition in Electric Transmission, (April 2019). ("Brattle Report" or "report").
3 Brattle Report p. 41, Figure 18, column 5.
Importantly, of the 15 projects that the Brattle Report used to calculate its cost savings estimates, the final cost of the majority of the projects is currently unknown. Although many of the winning bids have cost caps, many of the cost caps have exclusions and exceptions that permit the project’s final cost to exceed the cost submitted in the initial winning bid. Furthermore, the cost cap exclusions for some projects apply to the project cost components with the highest risk of cost increases (e.g., routing changes). Final project costs that exceed the costs in the winning bid could erode a significant amount of the savings claimed in the Brattle Report.

While the Brattle Report acknowledges some of these flaws, it nonetheless applies its estimate of cost savings to a much broader (and undefined) set of transmission projects and erroneously concludes that significant savings could be achieved by expanding solicitations to cover a larger portion of U.S. transmission investment, including investments made in regions that do not currently conduct solicitations for transmission projects.

Concentric also reviewed the implementation details of the 15 solicitations upon which the Brattle Report’s savings estimates are based and found that the solicitations were time and resource intensive. One of the most significant expenditures was time. For each solicitation, Table E-1 shows the time between the date the project need was first identified and final ISO/RTO Board approval of the winning bidder. The time involved to conduct solicitations with more than one bidder ranged from 113 days to 1,498 days.

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5 Brattle Report, p. 13.
Table E-1: Time involved in transmission solicitations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Days Between Identification and ISO/RTO Board Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Valley</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gates-Gregg</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sycamore Penasquitos</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suncrest</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delany Colorado River</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrella</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Allen to Eldorado</td>
<td>544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel†</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler Ridge</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff Coleman</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartburg-Sabine</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walkemeyer</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial Island</td>
<td>1,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP South</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NY Western Public Policy</td>
<td>820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>1,208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† The Miguel solicitation had a single bidder – San Diego Gas & Electric. See Table 12 for more details about the timeline of each solicitation.

Time is an important consideration because delayed project development denies customers the benefits of transmission investments, such as reduced congestion costs or increased reliability. Significantly expanding solicitations would also conflict with Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) precedent established in the Order No. 1000 proceeding. Furthermore, the time, money and resources these solicitations would require should not be overlooked because such costs could make conducting a solicitation for certain types of projects (e.g., upgrades) uneconomic. Concentric reviewed the claims in the Brattle Report as well as additional information about the solicitations held to date. Based on this review, we find the Brattle Report’s claims that the solicitations held to date have produced significant savings to be baseless. Claims that expanding the solicitations would yield up to $9 billion in savings are without merit and should not be relied upon to justify any expansion of solicitations for new transmission projects.

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6 Brattle Report, p. 13
1. INTRODUCTION

In 2011, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC" or "Commission") issued Order No. 1000. Among other things, Order No. 1000 requires jurisdictional public utility transmission providers to produce a regional plan to meet the region’s transmission needs more efficiently or cost-effectively.\(^7\) The six FERC-jurisdictional independent system operators ("ISOs") and regional transmission organizations ("RTOs") that are required to comply with FERC Order No. 1000 chose to select certain new types of transmission projects through solicitation processes.\(^8\)

More recently, proponents of expanded solicitations for transmission, including the Brattle Group in a recent report ("Brattle Report" or "report") have advocated that transmission solicitations should be significantly expanded because doing so will purportedly reduce customer costs by up to 30%.\(^9\)

Based on Concentric’s review, the savings claimed in the Brattle Report are inaccurate and do not provide a basis to expand the scope of solicitations in FERC-jurisdictional ISOs/RTOs or anywhere else. First, it is not possible to estimate potential savings from the solicitations held to-date because the final costs of most projects are not known and the cost caps in some of the winning bids are not guaranteed to contain final costs. Second, the savings claimed in the Brattle Report are without merit. The report’s lower bound savings estimates for the solicitations are flawed because Brattle uses an inappropriate benchmark to estimate savings from those solicitations. The upper bound savings estimates are also methodologically flawed and rely on over-stated “cost overrun” estimates for incumbent Transmission Owners ("incumbent TOs"). Concentric’s review of publicly available ISO/RTO cost tracking data suggests that incumbent TOs experience fairly modest cost changes, which are negative in some ISOs/RTOs, with final or updated project cost estimates varying from initial cost estimates by between -2.9% to 7.0%, in the ISOs/RTOs with publicly available cost tracking databases.\(^10\) Given the risks inherent with transmission development, in our view incumbent TOs have demonstrated an ability to develop reasonably accurate cost estimates that appropriately account for project risks.

The remainder of this report is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the Brattle Report’s claims that the transmission projects developed by incumbent TOs experience significant cost escalations and presents Concentric’s analysis of the same data that yields different results. Section 3 examines Brattle’s claims that the solicitations held to-date produced significant cost savings. Section 4 explains that transmission solicitations

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\(^7\) Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 136 FERC ¶ 61,051 (July 21, 2011) ("Order No. 1000").

\(^8\) Non-ISO/RTO regions that are FERC-jurisdictional are also required to comply with Order No. 1000 reforms, however, these non-ISO/RTO regions do not conduct solicitations for new transmission projects as part of their regional transmission planning process and are thus not discussed in this report.

\(^9\) Brattle Report, p. 13, Figure 4.

\(^10\) The ISO/RTOs with cost tracking database are: ISO New England, Inc. ("ISO-NE"); Midcontinent Independent System Operator ("MISO"); Southwest Power Pool ("SPP"); and PJM Interconnection ("PJM").
are time and resource intensive, a consideration that must be weighed before expanding the scope of such solicitations. Section 5 explains that Brattle’s recommendation to expand the scope of solicitations would be inconsistent with the Commission’s reliability and resilience goals and would require the Commission to revisit prior findings in Order No. 1000 and in other orders. Section 6 summarizes the report’s findings and concludes that, based on Concentric’s review of the evidence to-date and the claims made in the Brattle Report, there is no basis to expand the scope of transmission projects that are selected through solicitations at this time.
2. Incumbent Transmission Owner Initial Cost Estimates Are Accurate

The Brattle Report claims that transmission investments that are not selected through a solicitation, but instead developed by incumbent TOs in ISOs/RTOs, experience cost escalations ranging from a low of 18% in SPP and MISO to a high of 70% in ISO-NE.\textsuperscript{11}

Concentric first performed its own analysis using the same data relied upon in the Brattle Report to assess the accuracy and reasonableness of the claims about incumbent TOs. Where possible, Concentric also analyzed publicly available ISO/RTO transmission project tracking databases that provide more comprehensive information of initial and final and/or updated project cost estimates to produce our own estimates. Figure 1 and Table 1 compare the Brattle Report and Concentric estimates of the extent to which incumbent TO initial transmission project cost estimates exceed final costs and/or updated cost estimates. As described further below, Concentric’s analysis shows that the difference between the initial and final and/or updated cost estimates of incumbent TO projects is fairly modest or negative, ranging from -2.9% to 7.0% for four of the five ISOs/RTOs reviewed, and less than half of what the Brattle Report estimates for the fifth ISO, California ISO (“CAISO”).

\textit{Figure 1: Comparison of Concentric and Brattle Historical Cost Escalation Estimates for ISOs/RTOs with Cost Tracking Databases}

\textsuperscript{11} Brattle Report, Figures 21, 22, 24 and 25.
The methods used in the Brattle Report to estimate the “average historical cost escalations” of incumbent TO projects are flawed and produce inaccurate and misleading results. The Brattle Report’s “average historical cost escalation” estimates are based on a limited sample of projects that are not representative of the full portfolio of incumbent TO projects in each ISO/RTO. As discussed further below, for ISO-NE, SPP, and CAISO, the Brattle Report compared early high-level estimates that were made before the scope of the project was finalized, which is a meaningless comparison that is not informative about the accuracy of incumbent TO initial cost estimates. The Brattle Report also ignored a significant number of transmission projects in ISO-NE, PJM, and SPP. Thus, the Brattle Report’s estimated cost escalation results are based on a small sample that did not reflect the full portfolio of incumbent TO projects in these ISOs/RTOs or the ability of incumbent TOs to produce accurate initial cost estimates for their respective projects. Furthermore, many of the planning processes were intentionally designed to foster stakeholder involvement and collaboration, with early-stage, conceptual cost estimates refined over time based on stakeholder discussion and, eventually, proceedings before state regulatory authorities. In our view, the estimates of historical cost escalation in the Brattle Report should not be used to draw inferences about the accuracy of incumbent TO initial cost estimates. As discussed further below, it is more appropriate to examine the full portfolio of incumbent TO transmission projects in order to draw conclusions about the accuracy of initial cost estimates.

Using a broader sample, Concentric finds that the difference between initial cost estimates and final or updated project cost estimates are quite modest (see Table 1), and in some cases, final or updated costs are below initial cost estimates. As discussed further in Section 3, the Brattle Report used these flawed and overstated “historical cost escalations” to estimate that solicitations for new transmission projects will save 22% to 67% compared to designating the incumbent TO as the project developer.12

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12 Brattle Report, p. 43, Figure 19.
Before discussing our analysis of incumbent TO cost estimates, it is important to provide context for the nature of transmission development. Building transmission infrastructure, particularly large greenfield projects, involves a dynamic set of technical, economic, and regulatory assumptions that affect schedule and cost. Transmission developers review and report cost estimates throughout the project development cycle.

While the nomenclature of these estimates differs by ISO/RTO, the estimates broadly fall into the three stages: conceptual, planning, and engineering/construction. The development of a transmission project’s initial cost estimate takes place early in the planning process. For example, high-level conceptual and planning estimates are often used to compare alternative solutions and are more conceptual in nature. Because these estimates are based on conceptual plans or proposals rather than specific projects, they do not reflect detailed design or engineering considerations. As the project proceeds through its development cycle, updated estimates based on the latest information are developed and released.

The precision of these cost estimates differs by stage and increases as the project progresses from the conceptual stage to the design, engineering, and construction stages. For example, equipment cost estimates become more accurate once the developer learns more about the specifics of the equipment needed and obtains supplier quotes; and this information would be included in an estimate produced during the engineering and/or construction stage of development. For greenfield projects, the precision of the cost estimate increases as information about the transmission line’s route and design is refined during the permitting process, which enables the developer to produce more accurate estimates of construction and permitting costs. Such uncertainties are typically beyond the developer’s control – regardless of whether or not the developer is an incumbent. Given these uncertainties, transmission project developers frequently include contingencies in their initial cost estimates. Accordingly, great care must be taken in comparing different types of project cost estimates because comparing two different cost estimates without understanding the nature of each estimate could result in a meaningless or uninformed comparison. As discussed further below, we believe many of the conclusions and estimates in the Brattle Report are based on such inappropriate comparisons.

The remainder of this Section identifies the flaws in the Brattle Report’s comparisons of incumbent TO initial and final or updated project cost estimates in each ISO/RTO where such an analysis was possible. We then present our own analysis, which uses a broader sample of incumbent TO projects and, where appropriate, accounts for differences in the nature of the initial cost estimates, to assess the accuracy of incumbent TO initial project cost estimates. In our view, Concentric’s estimates are more accurate than the Brattle Report estimates because they are based on a more complete portfolio of projects, and thus are more representative of average incumbent TO cost performance.

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13 See Appendix B for more details.
The differences between incumbent TO initial and final and/or updated project cost estimates are noteworthy considering the iterative nature of estimating transmission project costs, which become more accurate over time as better information about the project becomes available. In an effort to be conservative and to be consistent with the Brattle approach, Concentric’s estimates of how incumbent TOs’ initial and final project costs compare do not adjust for inflation. Inflation accounts for some of the difference between initial and final cost estimates, so accounting for inflation would have reduced our estimates of historical cost escalations. Below we present our analysis of the accuracy of initial project cost estimates in ISO-NE, MISO, SPP, PJM, and CAISO.

2.1. ISO-NE

The Brattle Report claims that, on average, the actual costs for ISO-NE incumbent TO projects exceeded initial estimated costs by approximately 70%. The report only relied on 14 transmission projects that were developed by ISO-NE incumbent TOs, some proposed as early as 2002, to estimate the average historical cost escalation for all ISO-NE transmission projects. These 14 projects represent less than 2% of all projects placed in-service across New England since 2002. For 3 of the 14 projects, the Brattle Report relied on a publicly available cost tracking database and Concentric was able to validate the costs of these projects. For the remaining 11 projects, the Brattle Report relied on a 2015 presentation. Concentric examined these 11 projects and also conducted an analysis on the full portfolio of incumbent TO projects in ISO-NE using the ISO-NE project cost tracking database. Based on this broader and more representative sample of ISO-NE incumbent TO projects, Concentric found that final project costs in ISO-NE were actually 2.9% below initial estimates.

As a first step in assessing incumbent TO project costs in ISO-NE, Concentric reviewed the construction costs of 11 of the 14 transmission projects the Brattle Report based its 70% cost escalation estimate on. The Brattle Report used the initial cost estimate published by ISO-NE at the time the project was first proposed but before a scope was fully defined or detailed engineering performed for the project. As noted above, estimates that are developed early in the planning process are, by definition, high-level estimates that are based on a loosely defined scope. Concentric’s analysis of the 11 projects used the same final project costs as the Brattle Report but a different and more appropriate initial cost estimate. For initial cost estimates, we used the estimated cost contained in the siting application of each project rather than the first estimates published (which were developed before key project decisions – such as overhead versus underground construction – were made). The cost estimate in the siting application reflects the project’s actual scope, which is much better understood at the beginning of the siting/permitting phase. At this point in time, the incumbent TO developers have enough detail to more accurately estimate the cost of the proposed projects. Figure 2 shows that if the project cost

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14 Specifically, the Scobie-Tewksbury, Wakefield-Woburn, and Mystic Woburn projects, which the Brattle Report obtained initial and updated cost estimate data from the March 2018 RSP tracking database. See Brattle Report, p. 57, Figure 25.
15 NextEra Energy Transmission, Greater Boston Cost Comparison, January 2015.
estimate contained in the project siting application is used, final project costs for the 11 projects examined exceeded estimated costs by 18%, which is far less than the 70% estimate in the report. See Appendix A for more details about the analysis described in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Recalculation of Brattle’s Cost Escalations with Corrected Cost Estimates

In our view, Concentric’s comparison is much more meaningful and produces a more accurate cost variance estimate because the cost estimate in the siting application is much closer in scope to the final project, and more in-line with an estimate that would be provided as part of a solicitation. Thus, Concentric’s analysis uses two estimates that are reasonably comparable, whereas the Brattle Report compares two figures that are not comparable in any useful or informative way. It warrants mention that ISO-NE processes have evolved since the 11 projects, some of which were initially proposed in 2002. ISO-NE incumbent TOs now use multiple cost estimates throughout the planning process that reflect varying degrees of scope definition at the time the estimates are developed.

In addition to inaccurately representing project “cost escalation”, the sample of projects the Brattle Report used to estimate historical cost escalations does not constitute a representative sample of incumbent TO projects in ISO-NE. The 11 projects, many of which were complex greenfield projects, have a much higher escalation risk – regardless of who develops the project.
In an effort to develop a more representative estimate of cost escalation for incumbent TOs in ISO-NE, Concentric used a publicly available ISO-NE transmission cost tracking database that tracks most significant transmission projects in ISO-NE. ISO-NE’s regional transmission planning document is called the Regional System Plan (“RSP”). The “RSP Project List” tracks cost information about reliability projects in the RSP (generally those with estimated costs above $5 million) and tracks how cost estimates for projects change over time.

Concentric used data on reliability upgrade projects from the March 2019 RSP Project list. We used the estimate from the time the incumbent TO received approval of its Proposed Plan Application (“PPA”) as an initial cost estimate. At this point in time, the necessary components of a project are generally defined with a sufficient level of detail to yield a reasonably accurate cost estimate. For an updated cost estimate/final cost, as applicable, Concentric used the cost estimate available in the March 2019 RSP Project List. As shown in Table 2, comparing the initial and current (as of March 2019) cost estimate shows that, in aggregate, incumbent TOs in ISO-NE had final/updated cost estimates that were 2.9% below the initial cost estimates in the PPAs.

Table 2: ISO-NE Incumbent TO Initial and Final or Updated Project Cost Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In-Service Year</th>
<th>Aggregated project cost estimates from Proposed Plan Application ($ million)</th>
<th>Updated cost estimates or final costs as of March 2019 ($ million)</th>
<th>Difference (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>$265.2</td>
<td>$248.2</td>
<td>-6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>$410.2</td>
<td>$411.1</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>$1,230.2</td>
<td>$1,165.3</td>
<td>-5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>$457.5</td>
<td>$440.6</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>$751.4</td>
<td>$716.3</td>
<td>-4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>$364.2</td>
<td>$377.1</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>$260.9</td>
<td>$271.0</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>$157.0</td>
<td>$153.8</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$3,896.7</td>
<td>$3,783.5</td>
<td>-2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table compares all reliability upgrade projects in service between 2010 and 2018 based on projects tracked in ISO-NE’s March 2019 RSP Project List tracking database. Figures reported in nominal dollars for all projects with cost information on both the Proposed Application Plan estimate and an updated estimate or final project cost. The RSP Project list generally contains only projects with costs above $5 million.

Concentric’s estimate is based on a sample of 150 projects - a much broader sample than the 11 projects reviewed in the Brattle Report - to estimate how ISO-NE incumbent TO initial cost estimates compare to updated or final project costs. The estimates in Table 2 are presented in nominal dollars (accounting for inflation would make the cost decrease even bigger), and are significantly below the 70% “cost escalation” estimate in the Brattle Report.
2.2. MISO

Brattle estimates that the costs of MISO’s incumbent TO projects have increased by 18% for the 2015-2018 planning cycles. Because Concentric could not replicate the figures shown in Brattle’s Figure 21, we are unable to review Brattle’s methodology. However, Concentric reviewed the same publicly available transmission project cost data relied upon by Brattle, which shows that cost escalations ranged from 0.5% to 7%, far lower than the Brattle results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Initial ($million)</th>
<th>In-Service ($million)</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MTEP 2014</td>
<td>$ 9,085</td>
<td>$ 9,747</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTEP 2015</td>
<td>7,292</td>
<td>7,615</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTEP 2016</td>
<td>6,304</td>
<td>6,675</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTEP 2017</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 23,159</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 24,517</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concentric reviewed the change between initial estimates and in-service costs for projects approved in the 2014-2017 MISO Transmission Expansion Plans (“MTEP”). This analysis is discussed further in Appendix A. In total, these projects have experienced a 6% cost escalation.

2.3. SPP

Brattle estimates that the costs of SPP’s incumbent TO projects developed from 2009 through 2019 experienced cost escalations of 18%. Concentric determined that this estimate is significantly overstated. Table 4 shows the Brattle Report’s cost escalation estimates for Balanced Portfolio Projects, Priority Projects, and ITP Portfolio Projects in SPP. In total, Brattle claims that costs have increased from $2,028 million to $2,391 million (without controlling for inflation), for a total cost escalation of 18%. However, upon closer review of each category of projects using the same data sources, Concentric determined that these projects actually experienced a “cost escalation” of negative 2%.
Table 4: SPP Incumbent TO Project Cost Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPP Portfolio</th>
<th>Brattle Initial TO Cost Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>CEA Initial TO Cost Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Latest Cost Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Brattle Estimated Cost Escalation</th>
<th>CEA Estimated Cost Escalation</th>
<th># of Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balanced Portfolio</td>
<td>$691</td>
<td>$832</td>
<td>$831</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Projects</td>
<td>$1,145</td>
<td>$1,416</td>
<td>$1,349</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITP Portfolio Projects with Final Cost Estimates (2012 to 2017)</td>
<td>$192</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$211</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITP Portfolio Projects Listed as Complete (2012 to 2017)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$1,349</td>
<td>$1,330</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brattle Total Comparison</td>
<td>$2,028</td>
<td>$2,249</td>
<td>$2,391</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentric Total Comparison</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>$3,597</td>
<td>$3,510</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As discussed further in Appendix A, the initial estimates used in the Brattle Report for the Balanced Portfolio and Priority Projects were based on initial project scopes that were revised at the direction of SPP. As such, most of the escalation the Brattle Report estimates for these projects is due to a change in scope rather than action or lack of cost discipline on the part of the incumbent TO developers. Thus, the Brattle Report estimates of historical cost escalations in SPP and ISO-NE are flawed for similar reasons – they inappropriately compare different types of project cost estimates and in both cases, compare projects of different scopes.

2.4. PJM

The Brattle Report estimates that the costs of PJM’s incumbent TO projects experienced escalations of 22% relative to initial cost estimates.16 To produce this estimate, Brattle appears to use data selectively that significantly underrepresents the PJM projects with cost tracking data. To produce an estimate for PJM, Concentric expanded the sample of transmission projects by including all projects that had both initial and updated cost information in the PJM cost tracking database and concluded that the updated cost estimates of PJM TOs only exceeded initial estimates by 7.0%.

Concentric first attempted to recreate the PJM estimate in Figure 24 of the Brattle Report, which analyzed Baseline Reliability and Network Upgrade projects in service or under construction during the 2014-2017 period. Concentric analyzed the data sources cited in the Brattle Report to support this estimate but was unable to reproduce the estimate. However, based on our review which is summarized in Table 5, it is clear that the Brattle Report estimate only included a subset of the Network Upgrade and Baseline Reliability projects. As shown in Table 5, the Brattle Report estimate included $4,520 million in projects while the Concentric estimate, which is based on all Network Upgrade and Baseline Reliability projects for which initial and updated cost

16 Brattle Report, Figure 24, p. 56.
information is available, includes $12,999 million in projects. For unknown reasons, the Brattle Report’s estimate for PJM cost escalation excluded about two-thirds of the incumbent TO Baseline Reliability and Network Upgrade projects, despite the fact that information was available for those projects. Concentric’s analysis of the full sample of Baseline Reliability and Network Upgrade projects (shown in Table 5) found that updated cost estimates for Baseline Reliability and Network Upgrades were 5.2% above initial estimates on average, which is a quarter of Brattle’s 22% “cost escalation” estimate.

Table 5: PJM Initial and Latest Project Costs Estimates for Baseline Reliability and Network Upgrade Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initial Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Latest Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Latest vs. Initial Estimate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>1,722</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-17 total</td>
<td>3,694</td>
<td>4,520</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concentric Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initial Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Latest Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Latest vs. Initial Estimate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2,818</td>
<td>3,075</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>4,331</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>3,471</td>
<td>3,581</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-17 total</td>
<td>12,352</td>
<td>12,999</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Source of Brattle Report Estimates: Brattle Report, p. 56, Figure 24. For Baseline Reliability Projects, initial cost estimates are from the PJM Transmission Cost Allocation Database (May 1, 2019 version) and latest cost estimates are from the Construction Status Database. For Network Upgrades, the initial cost estimates are from the 2014-2017 TEAC Whitepapers and the latest cost estimates are from the Construction Status Database. Project years are based on the Display Service Date from the Transmission Cost Allocation Database. The above figures only reflect projects for which both initial and latest cost estimate data are available and are not adjusted for inflation.

The Brattle Report estimates for PJM excluded Supplemental Projects, which constitutes the third category of transmission projects in PJM. In an effort to use a larger and more representative sample of incumbent TO projects in PJM, Concentric performed an analysis that also includes Supplemental Projects, which increases the sample of projects (as measured by latest project cost estimates) by 44%.

According to the notes of Table 15 of the Brattle Report, Brattle excluded the 72% of projects where the initial and latest cost estimates were the same, stating that “it is unclear whether these reported latest estimated costs in PJM’s database are appropriately reflective of actual cost changes in Projects’ cost estimates, therefore they have been excluded” from the Brattle Report estimate. However, we found no documentation or basis to exclude these data.
Table 6: PJM Initial and Latest Project Costs Estimates for Baseline, Network Upgrade, and Supplemental Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Initial Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Latest Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Latest vs. Initial Estimate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3,621</td>
<td>4,023</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>5,361</td>
<td>5,746</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>4,685</td>
<td>4,899</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3,858</td>
<td>4,087</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-17 total</td>
<td>17,525</td>
<td>18,755</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: see notes for Table 5 for the source of the Baseline and Network Upgrade project cost figures. Supplemental Project initial and updated project costs are from the PJM Transmission Cost Allocation Database (May 1, 2019 version).

Based on this expanded sample size, shown in Table 6, updated project cost estimates for PJM incumbent TOs exceeded initial cost estimates by 7.0%, significantly below the 22% estimate in the Brattle Report.

2.5. CAISO

Unlike ISO-NE, MISO, PJM, and SPP, CAISO does not publish a centralized and publicly available transmission project cost tracking database. (Neither does the New York ISO (“NYISO”).) As such, it is not possible to conduct a robust and accurate analysis of the initial and final and/or updated project costs for the full portfolio of transmission projects in CAISO or NYISO. Nevertheless, Concentric conducted an analysis to assess the reasonableness and accuracy of the Brattle Report estimate.

The Brattle Report claims, based on an analysis of 10 projects,18 that incumbent TOs in CAISO have experienced a 41% cost escalation on average.19 Concentric reviewed the methodology Brattle used to estimate cost escalation in CAISO and determined that, much like the report’s estimates for ISO-NE, the CAISO cost escalation estimate is inaccurate because it is based on a small and unrepresentative sample of projects. Concentric’s analysis, described further in Appendix A, demonstrates that the limited sample that Brattle used to calculate its estimate should not be used to draw inferences about incumbent TO cost escalations in CAISO as a whole.

Given the lack of data, Concentric cannot confidently perform an analysis of the accuracy of CAISO incumbent TO initial estimates by comparing them to final project costs. However, Concentric found that analyzing a larger sample of projects based on information that was available in the FERC dockets cited in the report, casts doubt on the Brattle Report’s estimates and suggests that CAISO incumbent TOs do not experience an average cost escalation of 41% as the report claims. Table 7 demonstrates the implication of expanding the sample to include all of the projects for which initial and final project cost information is available. Expanding this sample

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18 The Brattle Report analyzed 7 PG&E projects and 3 SDG&E projects. See e.g., Brattle Report, Figure 23.
19 Brattle Report, Figure 23, p. 55.
reduces the average cost escalation for PG&E from 52.7% to between 6.1% and 18.8% and increases the cost escalation estimate for SGD&E from 2.3% to 5.9%.

**Table 7: Concentric Review of Brattle Report Historical Cost Escalation Estimate for CAISO**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Projects</th>
<th>Initial Estimate ($)</th>
<th>Final Cost ($)</th>
<th>Final Cost – Initial (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Gas &amp; Electric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full available sample</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>$1,534.7-$1,718.1</td>
<td>$1,823.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brattle Sample</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>$668.6</td>
<td>$1,021.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego Gas &amp; Electric</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full available sample</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>$782.4</td>
<td>$828.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brattle Report sample</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>$199.1</td>
<td>$203.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: PG&E initial estimates were provided as a range to CPUC in Docket No. EL17-45-000 so the initial cost estimates are also provided as a range for these projects. For projects in Docket No. EL16-2330, the initial estimates were those PG&E submitted to CAISO, and not the high range of the “CAISO estimate” referenced in Figure 23 of the Brattle Report. SDG&E projects: *California Parties v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co.*, Docket No. EL17-45-000, Exhibit No 3 - SDG&E Response to CPUC Data Request, p. 7 (filed Feb. 2, 2017). Information provided for projects completed between January 2014 and November 2016.

The 41% escalation estimate for CAISO in the Brattle Report does not include any Southern California Edison projects despite the fact that it is the second largest incumbent TO in CAISO. Taken as a whole, Concentric found that the Brattle Report estimate for CAISO was not representative of the full portfolio of incumbent TO projects and inexplicably excluded certain transmission projects.

In conclusion, Concentric found the Brattle Report claims of 18% to 70% cost escalations in the ISOs/RTOs we reviewed to be inaccurate. After conducting a thorough review of publicly available information, we found a fairly modest margin, which is negative in some ISOs/RTOs, between incumbent TO initial project estimates and final project costs. As such, the Brattle Report estimates of incumbent TO cost escalations should not be used to draw inferences about initial and final transmission project costs in ISO-NE, MISO, SPP, PJM, or CAISO.

A simplistic and narrow focus on whether solicitations result in cost savings ignores the broader and important considerations of benefits associated with historical models of incumbent ownership and management of transmission systems. These benefits represent possible opportunity costs of competitive solicitations, which must be considered in addition to the direct costs, benefits, and uncertainties of the solicitations held to date.
3. Benefits of Transmission Solicitations Are Unknown

Concentric reviewed the methodology used in the Brattle Report to estimate the savings from 15 solicitations (see Table 8).20 As an initial matter, it is not yet possible to determine the cost impacts of these solicitations because only one21 of the projects selected through the solicitations is in service. Of the remaining 14, two have been canceled,22 and the rest are in various degrees of development, as the Brattle Report notes.23 In addition, the methods used in the Brattle Report to estimate savings from the 15 solicitations were flawed. As such, the final costs of the majority of the projects selected in these solicitations are unknown and unknowable at this time, and any resulting savings are also unknown.

MISO and NYISO have each held two solicitations, SPP has held one, and ISO-NE has not held any, although ISO-NE plans to hold a solicitation in the near future.24 However, Massachusetts, a state within the ISO-NE footprint, issued a request for proposals (“RFP”) for hydroelectric power or other clean energy and the transmission capacity to deliver it, and selected a developer in 2018.25 Prior to this solicitation, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island jointly conducted the Clean Energy RFP that included options for new transmission. These solicitations took place outside of ISO-NE’s regional transmission planning process.

### Table 8: Transmission Solicitations Through ISO/RTO Regional Planning Processes as of April 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISO/RTO</th>
<th>Number of Solicitations</th>
<th>Solicitations Included in Brattle Savings Estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISO-NE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brattle Report, Figures 10-14 and Table 6. Notes: Although Brattle estimates savings for 10 CAISO solicitations, it only includes 9 of these in its Figure 19 because the Gates Gregg project was delayed. In addition, Brattle only estimates the savings from solicitations awarded to non-incumbents, and therefore ignores solicitations in PJM.

As noted above, the methods used in the Brattle Report to estimate savings from the 15 solicitations were flawed. First, Brattle used inappropriate benchmarks to estimate the lower bound of the potential savings.

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20 Brattle Report, p. 28, Figure 10. Note that although Figure 10 references the AP South project in PJM and the Western NY project in NYISO, it did not rely on these solicitations in its analysis because both solicitations were won by incumbents. Additionally, the AC Transmission project had two segments (A and B) but NYISO sought proposals through a single solicitation.

21 SDG&E completed construction of the Sycamore-Peñasquitos project in August 2018. See e.g., https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Environment/info/panoramaenv/Sycamore_Penasquitos/index.html

22 The Walkemeyer project in SPP was canceled and CAISO delayed the Gates Gregg project indefinitely.

23 Brattle Report, p. 39. For example, the report states “[w]hile many of the winning proposals include cost caps or cost control measures, the completed costs of these projects are not yet known and may exceed the selected projects’ offer prices.”

24 ISO-NE anticipates conducting a solicitation for a transmission project to meet reliability needs in the Boston Area later this year. ISO-NE previously considered holding a solicitation for the Keene Road area but determined after performing a cost-benefit analysis that it was not beneficial to do so.

Second, the report used the overstated incumbent TO “average historical cost escalation” estimates discussed in Section 2 to estimate the upper bound of the potential savings. With these flaws, the Brattle Report’s estimated savings from the solicitations should not be relied upon for decision-making purposes.

The remainder of this section discusses Concentric’s review of the Brattle Report’s claims about the cost savings from the solicitations. Section 3.1 discusses the fact that the final costs of the projects are not known for the majority of the projects and describes the exclusions to the cost caps contained in some of the winning bids. Section 3.2 describes Concentric’s review of claims in the Brattle Report that solicitations saved between 18% and 67%. We identified significant issues with these savings estimates. Section 3.2.1 describes the inappropriate benchmarks Brattle used to calculate its lower bound of savings estimates and Section 3.2.2 explains why the upper bound savings estimates are methodologically flawed.

3.1. Final Project Costs are Unknown

Of the 15 projects that Brattle uses to calculate its cost savings estimates, the final costs of the majority of the projects is unknown, so it is impossible at this time to determine the actual cost escalations, if any, associated with the majority of the projects awarded through the solicitations. Nevertheless, Brattle claims without any evidence that “on average [competitively-developed] projects may not escalate as much as other regional transmission projects have historically” as a result of bidder due diligence and cost caps. This claim is speculative given the lack of final cost data and cost cap exclusions described below. Furthermore, as shown in Section 2, incumbent TOs experienced a fairly modest margin between their initial and final or updated project cost estimates on average, with final or updated project cost estimates falling below initial estimates, on average, in some ISOs/RTOs.

The Brattle Report argues, in part, that the solicitations will result in cost savings because the winning bids in some of the solicitations contained cost caps. However, any cost-savings associated with the projects selected through the solicitations held to date cannot be known until the projects are in service. In addition, as the Brattle Report notes, cost escalations are often unavoidable during the development process (e.g., uncertainties around materials and labor costs, or scope and routing changes due to regulatory siting and approval issues). Furthermore, some cost cap provisions have exclusions that permit the final cost of the winning proposal to exceed the cost of the developer’s bid.26

These exclusions tend to cover the costs that are the most likely to increase by the greatest amount during the development process (e.g., route changes, regulatory issues). For example, the Duff-Coleman solicitation in MISO resulted in 11 competitive proposals, 10 of which included at least one type of cost cap.

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The Duff-Coleman bids also included various exceptions to cost caps, or other concessions, as shown in the table below.

### Table 10: Duff Coleman Selection Report Cost Cap Exception Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exclusion</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Project Routing</td>
<td>Some proposals exclude routing changes due to unseen soil conditions, river crossings, etc. Combination of general outs and specific per mile cost values (with/without dead band).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Material Escalation Costs</td>
<td>Some proposals include exceptions for construction costs that arise above inflation rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Condemnation and Property Rights</td>
<td>Some proposals allow an increase to the construction cost cap for condemnation and property rights costs that exceed a specified percentage dollar value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Five Year or Initial Filing Commitments</td>
<td>Some proposals commit to a cap for condemnation and property rights costs that exceed a specified percentage or dollar value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Regulatory</td>
<td>Some proposals note exclusions for environmental permitting, remediation, and mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Non-Developer Driven Changes</td>
<td>Most proposals allow an increase to the construction cap for costs driven by changes from regulatory government agencies, local utilities, MISO, and Force Majeure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MISO, Duff Coleman Selection Report, December 20, 2016, p. 27.

As listed above, some proposals contained cost caps with several exemptions or exceptions. Such exclusions can have a significant impact on a project’s final cost, often include issues for which it is difficult to accurately predict costs, and substantially mitigate the developer’s risk. For example, a project routing change exemption significantly reduces risks for developers who propose a cap on total investment costs or revenue requirements. Failing to price the risk associated with significant cost changes could allow the developer to submit proposals with seemingly low and/or aggressive cost targets that may not materialize if the project experiences significant cost escalations (e.g., unexpected route changes).
The Designated Entity Agreement ("DEA") between PJM and Northeast Transmission Development ("NTD"), a subsidiary of LS Power, for the Artificial Island project provides an illustrative example. This developer agreement includes a non-standard provision that appears to establish a cap on “Construction Costs” at the lesser of actual costs or a Construction Cost Cap amount of $146 million, adjusted for escalation using the Handy-Whitman Index. However, the agreement contains several exceptions - including project scope changes directed by PJM (project scope is a significant cost driver) - to its construction cost cap:

Schedule E Section (e)

“Excluded Costs” means (i) any taxes, (ii) any financing costs, including any approved return on equity, Allowance for Funds Used During Construction, or similar allowance or financing cost or charge earned or accrued in connection with the Project during the period of development and construction of the Project (or thereafter), (iii) any costs and expenses associated with any PJM directed additions to or modifications of the Scope of Work (but only if and to the extent such costs and expenses are in excess of the costs and expenses that would have been incurred but for such addition to or modification of the Scope of Work), (iv) any costs and expenses incurred as a result of an Uncontrollable Force (but only if and to the extent such costs and expenses are in excess of the costs and expenses that would have been incurred but for such Uncontrollable Force) and (v) any costs and expenses associated with the operation and maintenance of the Project.27

Schedule E allows for cost recovery in excess of the stated cap under several conditions, many of which are classified as Force Majeure (or Uncontrollable Force).28 This “out” may be a commonplace in other Developer Agreements as well. In addition to the Force Majeure provision, the language quoted above also includes exceptions for all taxes, changes directed by PJM, and operation and maintenance costs.

FERC accepted all terms and conditions contained in the DEA between PJM and Northeast Transmission Development.29 These exclusions could create the impression that the winning project in a given solicitation has low costs, when in reality the final project costs can be higher than the winning developer’s bid and potentially higher than the final costs of a competing project that was not selected. With such cost cap exclusions, some of the risks of cost overruns rest with the customer, not the winning developer. And, not only do risks remain on the customer, but incentives are created for developers to remove the cost of that risk (contingencies) from project bids, artificially deflating estimated costs.

Additionally, some of the cost caps reviewed by Concentric only cap transmission revenue requirements during a subset of the project’s operational life. Such cost caps may unintentionally create incentives for developers to defer necessary investment in order to keep rates below the applicable cap. Several solicitations held to-date have included revenue requirement caps. For example, in the Suncrest project in CAISO, NextEra30 agreed to a project construction cost cap of $42,288,000 in 2015 dollars, and an operation and maintenance (“O&M”)
cost cap of $360,000 per year for the first five years of the project’s operational life.\(^{31}\) NextEra’s winning bid in MISO for the Hartburg-Sabine line also included a cap on O&M for the first 10 years of the project.\(^{32}\)

Capping items like O&M over a portion of a project’s life may not be in the best interest of customers; it can create incentives to spend less on O&M to maintain a desired return, which can impair reliability and may significantly increase O&M costs in later years if materials fail. Furthermore, capping O&M expenditures in the first years of a project’s life does not necessarily induce savings as O&M costs tend to be lowest in early project years given that equipment is relatively new. O&M costs tend to increase as the project ages, and the O&M related cost caps in the winning bids reviewed in Appendix C do not cap O&M late in a project’s operational life.

Finally, cost caps can also be complex and potentially difficult to enforce. Even if there were an effective and transparent mechanism to monitor the cost caps of a given project, enforcement could be challenging because the cost caps are included in an agreement that the winning developer executes with the ISO/RTO (e.g., Approved Project Sponsor Agreement in CAISO or Designated Entity Agreement in PJM) but the project’s annual revenue requirement and associated transmission rate is approved by FERC. In a recent paper regarding solicitations for transmission projects, Paul Joskow referred to this ambiguity as an “institutional gap.”\(^{33}\)

### 3.2. Brattle’s Cost Savings Estimates Are Flawed

#### 3.2.1 Inaccurate Lower Bound Savings Estimate

Table 8 above summarizes the total number of solicitations that have been carried out as of April 2019 in the ISOs/RTOs versus the number of solicitations the Brattle Report focuses on to estimate savings. The experience with solicitations for new transmission projects in the ISOs/RTOs has been limited, particularly outside of CAISO and PJM.\(^{34}\) The Brattle Report produced both lower bound and upper bound savings estimates for these solicitations.

This Subsection examines the “reference costs” Brattle used to estimate a lower bound on the savings Brattle claims have resulted from the solicitations.\(^{35}\) To estimate savings from each solicitation, the Brattle Report compared the winning bid to a benchmark referred to as a “reference cost”. The report used either an ISO planning estimate (CAISO, MISO, or SPP) or an incumbent TO bid (PJM or a third-party estimate of that bid in NYISO) as reference costs for the solicitations. Use of this reference cost methodology appears to have resulted in the Brattle Report not estimating savings for solicitations awarded to incumbent TOs in PJM and NYISO.

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\(^{34}\) CAISO plans to hold solicitations for the Gate 500 kV Dynamic Reactive Support and Round Mountain Dynamic Reactive Support projects in 2019.

\(^{35}\) Brattle Report, figures 18 and 19. Brattle uses all 14 projects to estimate upper and lower bounds but presents results for only 13 of the projects in figure 19, presumably because the Walkemeyer and Gates Gregg projects were delayed.
However, if a solicitation in and of itself produces the savings the Brattle Report claims, the nature of the winning developer, incumbent or non-incumbent, is irrelevant. As described further below, using the report’s reference cost methodology would have resulted in “negative savings” for the AP South solicitation in PJM.

### Table 11: Brattle Report Estimated Range of Potential Savings from ISO/RTO Solicitations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISO or Incumbent</th>
<th>Estimated Cost ($ million)</th>
<th>Winning Developer’s Project Cost ($ million)</th>
<th>Lower Bound Savings Estimate (%)</th>
<th>Upper Bound Savings Estimate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>$1,180</td>
<td>$833</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISONE</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>$181</td>
<td>$154</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>$232</td>
<td>$181</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>$692</td>
<td>$280</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>$17</td>
<td>$8</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brattle Report, April 2019, Figure 18, p. 41, see also Figure 19, p. 43.

The Brattle Report stated that it produced lower bound savings estimates by comparing the winning bid to either the ISO planning-level estimate for the project (CAISO, MISO, and SPP), or the lowest cost incumbent bid (PJM and NYISO).36

Given the nature of transmission project planning-level estimates discussed in Section 2, in our view, Brattle’s lower bound savings estimates for the CAISO, MISO, and SPP solicitations are unsound. As discussed in Section 2 above, the precision of transmission project cost estimates increases as a project progresses through the development process and more information about project costs becomes available. Early planning-level estimates produced by the ISO/RTO are expected to differ significantly from the final project’s costs because the ISO/RTO estimate is developed at a high level with general rather than specific estimates about the costs of various project components.

Therefore, comparing an early stage ISO/RTO planning-level estimate to the developer’s fully developed project bid in a solicitation, as Brattle did for CAISO, MISO, and SPP, does not demonstrate the expected savings from conducting a solicitation compared to using another process. Instead, the Brattle Report’s method provides an estimate of the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of the ISO/RTO’s planning-level estimate. Furthermore, Brattle’s use of the ISO/RTO planning estimate as a reference cost does not reflect the benefits from competition because the winning bidder is not competing with the ISO/RTO planning estimate but with the other bidders. As such, it would be more appropriate to compare the winning bid in a given solicitation to the bids of its competitors. Unfortunately, this information was not publicly available for CAISO.

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The Brattle Report claims that the 10 solicitations in CAISO produced savings of at least 29%. Concentric reviewed the winning bids and CAISO planning level estimates Brattle used to produce this estimate and confirmed that Brattle used the high end of CAISO’s planning level estimate for each solicitation when the CAISO estimate was a range (i.e., low and high cost estimates). Brattle’s use of the high end of the CAISO planning-level estimates maximized the CAISO savings estimates. As described further in Appendix A, Concentric attempted to recreate Brattle Report’s savings estimates of 7 of the CAISO solicitations and determined that using the low end of the CAISO planning-level estimate for each project yields “savings” of 3% and using the high end yielded estimated savings of 26%.

MISO has conducted two solicitations for new transmission projects and the Brattle Report claims that these solicitations produced savings of at least 15%. The Duff-Coleman solicitation was awarded to Republic Transmission, LLC, a partnership between Big Rivers Electric Corporation and LS Power, with a $49.8 million bid that was 15% below MISO’s $59 million planning-level estimate. The Hartburg-Sabine solicitation was awarded to NextEra for $103.9 million, which was also 15% below the MISO planning-level estimate. Because they are based on MISO planning-level estimates, we find that Brattle’s lower bound savings estimates for the MISO solicitations suffer the same flaws as the CAISO estimates.

SPP conducted one solicitation for the Walkemeyer project and the Brattle Report estimated savings of 18% from this solicitation that was awarded to Mid Kansas Electric Company. Brattle’s lower bound savings estimate from this solicitation was based on SPP’s planning-level estimate for the Walkemeyer project and thus, in our view, flawed for the reasons described above. Brattle’s estimated savings for this solicitation is included in Figure 18 of the Brattle Report but not in Figure 19, which summarizes the upper and lower bound savings estimates by ISO/RTO, presumably because the Walkemeyer project was canceled due to declining load projections.

The methodology the Brattle Report used to estimate cost savings from a solicitation in PJM is also flawed. Unlike CAISO, MISO, and SPP, PJM and NYISO employ a “sponsorship model” to solicit alternative transmission solutions during their regional planning processes. As such, PJM and NYISO do not release ISO/RTO planning-level estimates before each solicitation. Rather than solicit proposals for a specific transmission project (e.g., new substation), PJM and NYISO issue a more general transmission “need” and bidders submit potential solutions to satisfy that need.

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37 Brattle Report, Figure 19, p. 43.
38 See the CAISO section of the Appendix C for more details about the transmission solicitations in CAISO. Note that Concentric was not able to confirm the cost of the winning bid for three of the 10 CAISO solicitations.
39 Brattle Report, Figure 19, p. 43.
40 MISO Duff-Coleman Selection Report, p. 38.
42 Brattle Report, Figure 18, p. 41. As noted above, Brattle excludes its savings estimates for the Walkemeyer project from Figure 19, presumably because it was canceled.
In PJM, bidders are generally not restricted as to the scope of the proposals they submit in response to PJM (e.g., PJM could receive proposals that range from battery storage to greenfield transmission lines). PJM publishes the project costs from the submitted proposals, so it is possible to compare the bids with each other. However, this comparison is not very informative for the purposes of estimating cost savings from the solicitation because the scopes of the projects may be vastly different, which means they have different costs and benefits. Furthermore, the proposals submitted by developers do not include the full cost of integrating the project with the PJM system. Unlike a project-based solicitation, where project integration costs across proposals are generally the same because the ISO/RTO has defined the project scope, the integration costs of proposals submitted in a sponsorship model solicitation can differ significantly. As such, the stand-alone developer bids in each proposal do not constitute the full costs of that proposal and the proposals cannot be compared with one another without also considering integration costs.

The Artificial Island solicitation attracted a variety of projects to address the identified needs; the proposed costs of those projects ranged from the low $100 million range to $1.5 billion. Brattle compared two competing bids to estimate a lower bound savings estimate of 60% (or $412 million) for the Artificial Island solicitation. However the Brattle Report neglects to mention that the bids were from different points in time and for different project scopes. The Artificial Island solicitation was particularly complex. PJM first held a solicitation window for the project in 2013. PJM subsequently issued a supplemental solicitation in 2014. Prior to awarding the final project, PJM changed the project scope, the route and the RFP itself.

Concentric identified the sources of the data the Brattle Report used to estimate the purported savings for the Artificial Island solicitation. Brattle compared the costs of the winning bid, a proposal submitted by LS Power (though changed by PJM), to the costs of a project submitted by PSE&G at the very beginning of the solicitation process. This comparison is highly problematic and does not constitute a meaningful estimate of cost savings from the Artificial Island solicitation. In fact, because of all of the changes that PJM made during the 4-year pendency of the solicitation process, the ultimate LS Power “proposal” was not really its proposal at all, as the winning bid had a different terminus point from the one LS Power initially proposed, and PJM had in fact changed the RFP itself.

The Brattle Report did not use the AP South solicitation to estimate savings from solicitations in PJM despite the fact that the AP South solicitation was awarded to a non-incumbent – Transource, an affiliate of AEP. The Brattle Report estimates for PJM may have excluded the AP South solicitation from its cost savings estimate because the Transource project was not the lowest cost bid. As such, using the report’s methodology to

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43 Brattle Report, Figure 13, p 32.
44 PJM Interconnection, Artificial Island Project Recommendation White Paper (July 29, 2015) at p. 12 (Table 2.1). The Brattle Report appears to have used PSE&G’s $692 million proposal, submitted in 2013, for project “P2013_1-7E”, that included New Freedom-Deans 500 and Salem-Hope Creek 500 kV lines as major components.
45 See Appendix C for more details on the information used in the Brattle Report to estimate savings from the Artificial Island solicitation.
estimate savings for this solicitation would have resulted in a negative savings estimate. The fact that the lowest cost bidder wasn’t selected in the AP South solicitation doesn’t necessarily mean the solicitation wasn’t worthwhile. As described further in Appendix C, the PJM Board selected the Transource proposal because PJM staff found that the proposal had many desirable attributes and a favorable estimated cost-benefit ratio.  

NYISO has carried out two solicitations for new transmission projects – Western NY and AC Transmission. The Brattle Report only used a lower bound savings (22%) for the Western NY solicitation. The report did not estimate savings for the AC Transmission solicitation, presumably because one segment of the solicitation, which had two segments total, was awarded to an incumbent TO.

NYISO does not publicly release the costs contained in either the winning bid or bids that were not selected. Instead, NYISO releases project cost estimates produced by a third-party independent consultant based on the projects proposed in the solicitation. The Brattle Report compared these third-party engineering estimates and claimed that the difference between the estimates for two of the Western NY bids – one from two incumbents and another from a non-incumbent – represented savings from the Western NY solicitation. It is not possible to determine how these third-party estimates compare to the actual bids submitted, so the Brattle Report’s method to estimate savings from Western NY solicitation (22%) is highly speculative. Furthermore, given that NYISO uses a sponsorship solicitation model, the two proposals compared had entirely different scopes and differed on many dimensions other than cost, so limiting the comparison to third-party estimates of the two proposals’ costs alone is not informative.

### 3.2.2 Methodologically Flawed Upper Bound Savings Estimate

This Subsection addresses the Brattle Report’s upper bound savings estimates. We reviewed the upper bound savings estimates in the report and found that they were based on a methodologically flawed approach and used inaccurate assumptions about the historical cost escalations of incumbent TO projects in each ISO/RTO. Figure 3 presents a schematic that explains how Brattle produced its upper and lower bound savings estimates for the solicitations.

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47 Brattle Report, Figure 18. See also Table 12.
48 See Appendix C for further details.
As described in Subsection 3.2.1, the Brattle Report determined lower bound savings estimates by comparing the winning bid (with no cost escalation) with either an ISO/RTO planning-level estimate or the lowest cost of a competing incumbent TO bid (or third-party estimate of that bid in NYISO). Upper bound savings estimates were determined by inflating the ISO/RTO planning-level estimate or incumbent TO bid by the inaccurate “average historical cost escalation” figures discussed in Section 2.

The Brattle Report states that its upper bound savings estimates for the solicitations accounts for the fact that the final costs of the projects can escalate above the winning bids. As the Brattle Report notes, “the final costs of the competitively-awarded transmission projects may similarly increase beyond their proposed costs as some of the proposed project costs are indexed to inflation and as developers are able to make certain adjustments as they complete their final routing, siting, and construction.” Thus, as discussed in Subsection 3.2.1, even if the winning bid has a cost cap or caps, the final costs of a transmission project awarded through a solicitation can exceed the original submitted bid.

The Brattle Report asserts that the upper bound savings estimates account for the possibility of project cost escalation. However, rather than applying its “average historical cost escalation” estimates – which as discussed in Section 2 are significantly overstated – to the winning bids themselves, Brattle inexplicably applies its average historical cost escalation estimate to each project’s “reference cost” (i.e., the ISO/RTO planning-level estimate or a competing incumbent TO bid).

As shown in Figure 3 above, Brattle then compares the escalated reference cost – a figure the Brattle Report refers to as the “Expected Cost if Competitive Projects were not subject to Competition” – to the winning bid
with no escalation to produce an upper bound savings estimates for the solicitations in each ISO/RTO. This method is fundamentally flawed for two reasons.

First, Brattle applied its estimated cost escalation to the wrong figure, specifically the “reference cost” rather than the winning bid itself (i.e., the basis for Brattle’s claimed savings in the first place). As noted in Section 3.1 and in the Brattle Report, the final cost of a project awarded in a solicitation can exceed the winning bid, even if the bid included a cost cap. It is not clear what the upper bound estimate is supposed to represent because the figure Brattle uses bares no relation to the winning bid, and simply assumes, without any basis, that the ISO/RTO planning estimate or competing TO bid will incur significant cost escalation. Furthermore, this upper bound estimate assumes that the project will only experience cost escalation if it is developed by an incumbent and will not experience any cost escalation if developed by a non-incumbent. This assumption is clearly false because any project developer – incumbent or not – faces development risks due to factors beyond its control (e.g., routing changes, other regulatory or environmental permitting issues, input cost changes for greenfield projects, equipment cost changes, inflation, etc.).

Comparing Brattle’s inflated reference cost to the winning bid with no cost escalation does not provide a meaningful or informative upper bound estimate of savings and does not account for potential project cost escalation. This is evident by the fact that the Brattle Report’s attempt to account for project cost escalation actually increases the estimated savings from the solicitations. It defies basic logic to claim, as Brattle does, that the savings from a solicitation would increase if the project’s costs were to escalate above the winning bid. To properly account for potential project cost escalation, the Brattle Report should have applied a cost escalation estimate to the winning bid itself. Such an approach would have reduced rather than increased Brattle’s estimated upper bound savings from the solicitation.

The second flaw with the upper bound savings estimates is that the Brattle Report employed its inaccurate and overstated estimates of the cost escalation experienced by incumbent TOS to estimate this upper bound. We show in Section 2 that the report’s estimates of incumbent TO cost escalation is vastly overstated and inconsistent with empirical evidence. Thus, in addition to using a methodologically flawed approach to account for cost escalation, Brattle’s upper bound estimates also rely on inaccurate assumptions about incumbent TO projects.

Given these flaws, we find the lower and upper bound savings estimates in the Brattle report to be without merit. These estimates do not demonstrate significant savings as claimed in the Brattle Report and should not be relied upon for decision making purposes. As noted in Section 3.1, it is too soon to assess the cost impacts of the solicitations because the final cost impacts are only known for one of the 15 projects.

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53 Brattle Report, p. 42.
4. **Transmission Solicitations are Time and Resource Intensive**

This Section describes some features of transmission solicitations that are important for decision makers and other stakeholders to consider before expanding solicitations beyond their current scope. The first consideration is the type of cost caps included in solicitations and the extent to which they reduce costs. As described above, Concentric found that the Brattle Report fails to demonstrate that the 15 solicitations its savings estimates are based on have produced any savings. A second consideration is the “administrative cost” of conducting a solicitation for a new transmission project. A third consideration is bidder preparation costs.

The Commission stated that one of the core objectives of the Order No. 1000 requirements was to achieve more efficient or cost-effective regional transmission planning.54 The Commission did not specifically require regional transmission planners to conduct solicitations in the regional planning process.55 Instead, it chose to afford ISOs/RTOs flexibility in implementing the Order No. 1000 requirements, based on the expectation that an open and transparent process that involved multiple entities and considers the transmission needs of all customers would help regional transmission planners identify solutions that are more efficient or cost-effective.56 A narrow focus on solicitations for transmission development ignores the overriding purpose of Order No. 1000, which was to ensure all customers’ needs were considered and there was an opportunity for more efficient or cost-effective solutions to be identified.

All six FERC-jurisdictional ISOs/RTOs chose to conduct solicitations in their regional planning process, and some ISOs (e.g., CAISO) conducted solicitations before the Commission issued its third and final order on the Order No. 1000 requirements. Given that Brattle and others have advocated expanding the scope of solicitations in these ISOs/RTOs, it is important to examine the resources required to conduct these solicitations. These resources include, but are not limited to, the time it takes to conduct the solicitations, ISO/RTO costs to issue the solicitations, qualify bidders, review proposals, and select a winning proposal (“ISO/RTO implementation costs”), and bidder preparation costs. We refer to these as “administrative costs”.

This analysis is not intended to claim or otherwise argue that solicitations for new transmission projects are never worthwhile. Rather, the intent of this Section is to highlight the resources involved in conducting the solicitations that have occurred to-date and some of the complexities experienced with some of the solicitations. This information should enable policymakers and the public to make more informed decisions about whether to expand these solicitations.

The evidence below, which is based on publicly available information, demonstrates that conducting solicitations in ISO/RTO regional transmission processes is a time and resource intensive process. The fact that conducting a solicitation involves costs does not in and of itself mean that solicitations are not worthwhile.

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54 Order No. 1000, at P 2.
55 See Appendix D for additional details about the Order No. 1000 requirements and associated ISO/RTO compliance filings.
56 See e.g., Order No. 1000, at P 11.
Rather, it is generally worthwhile to conduct a solicitation for projects where the benefits expected from conducting a solicitation verses an alternative process (e.g., designating a specific developer to construct the project) exceed the costs of conducting that solicitation.

The Commission implicitly made such calculations in Order Nos. 1000, 1000-A, and 1000-B when it decided to exempt certain types of transmission projects from the Order No. 1000 requirements. For example, the Commission recognized that timeliness is a factor that must be considered in the transmission planning process and approved time-based exemptions from the Order No. 1000 requirement to remove the federal Right Of First Refusal (“ROFR”) in PJM, ISO-NE, and SPP for certain new transmission projects needed to address reliability.

Three types of administrative costs of conducting a solicitation – time-related costs, ISO/RTO implementation costs, and bidder preparation costs – are discussed in turn below.

4.1. TIME-RELATED COSTS

Time is arguably the most expensive resource associated with transmission solicitations. It is inherently difficult to assign a monetary value to time, and this report makes no attempt to do so. Instead, we summarize the number of days it took to carry out each solicitation, information the reader can use to make his or her own evaluation. Solicitations take time to prepare, review, issue, and administer. Bidders also spend time and resources preparing bids, and the ISO/RTO staff (which may include third party consultants) must review and ultimately select among the competing proposals. In addition, time delays may impact project implementation, denying customers the benefit of the project.

Table 12 summarizes the time involved to conduct the solicitations that have been carried out in Order No. 1000-compliant ISO/RTO regional planning processes as of the writing of this report. The time involved in conducting the solicitation and selecting a winning proposal delays a given project’s implementation, which also delays the benefits (e.g., lower congestion costs, increased reliability, etc.) of the project.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Date Need Identified</th>
<th>Solicitation Window</th>
<th>Date of ISO/RTO Board Approval</th>
<th>Days Between Identification and Board Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imperial Valley CAISO 2012-2013</td>
<td>Dec. 20, 2012- Feb. 19, 2013</td>
<td>Jul. 11, 2013</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sycamore-Penasquitos</td>
<td>Apr. 16 - Jun. 16, 2014</td>
<td>Jan. 6, 2015</td>
<td>174</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delany Colorado River</td>
<td>Apr. 16 - Aug. 18, 2014</td>
<td>Mar. 11, 2015</td>
<td>238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrella</td>
<td>Jan. 30 - Apr. 30, 2015</td>
<td>Jan. 11, 2016</td>
<td>544</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel†</td>
<td>Apr. 16 - Aug. 18, 2014</td>
<td>Mar. 11, 2015</td>
<td>238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring</td>
<td>Apr. 16 - Aug. 18, 2014</td>
<td>Mar. 11, 2015</td>
<td>238</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartburg-Sabine MISO MTEP-17, Dec, 1, 2017</td>
<td>Feb. 6.- Jul. 20, 2018</td>
<td>Nov. 27, 2018</td>
<td>361</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC Transmission+ NYISO - Dec. 17, 2015 NYPS Order</td>
<td>Feb. 29, 2016 - Apr. 29, 2016</td>
<td>April 8, 2019</td>
<td>1,208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†The Miguel solicitation had a single bidder – San Diego Gas & Electric.
‡PJM staff made an initial selection in the Artificial Island solicitation on Jun. 16, 2014. The PJM Board made an initial selection on Jul. 29, 2015, suspended the project in August 2016 for further consideration, and approved a revised scope in April 2017. See the case study in Subsection 4.2 for more details.
+The NYISO Board revised NYISO staff’s recommendation for one segment of the AC Transmission solicitation.

Once a need is identified, the next step is to solicit proposals, which are RFPs for specific projects under the project model (e.g., CAISO) and more broadly defined transmission needs under the sponsorship model (e.g., PJM). The next step is the solicitation window, which typically lasts between 60 and 120 days. As indicated in Table 12, the ISO/RTO may choose to amend the solicitation requirements, or seek additional information from bidders, which adds time to the solicitation window. Next, the ISO/RTO staff, sometimes with the help of independent consultants, evaluates the proposals according to the metrics specified in the tariff and prepares a recommendation. This selection process and the recommended selection (i.e., the winning proposal) are typically described in a selection report. ISO/RTO staff then submits the selection report and makes a formal
recommendation to the ISO/RTO board. The board typically accepts staff’s recommendation, although this is not always the case (e.g., the AC Transmission solicitation in NYISO).\textsuperscript{57}

As shown in Table 12, solicitations in ISO/RTO regional planning processes with more than a single bidder can take a significant period of time, ranging from 113 to 1,498 days. The longest solicitation was for Artificial Island in PJM, where PJM staff made significant amendments to the proposed project scope during the staff evaluation phase and subsequently amended the submitted proposals.\textsuperscript{58} The case study below describes the issues PJM and its stakeholders experienced during the Artificial Island solicitation.

**Artificial Island Case Study**

PJM identified system performance and voltage issues in the “Artificial Island” area surrounding the Hope Creek and Salem nuclear units in New Jersey during its 2012 and 2013 transmission planning cycle. On April 29, 2013, PJM issued a problem statement and opened a 60-day proposal window to address the Artificial Island issues. Bidders submitted 26 separate proposals with cost estimates ranging from approximately $100 million to $1.55 billion for a wide array of projects including, but not limited to, greenfield transmission lines, new substations, system reconfigurations, and dynamic reactive devices.\textsuperscript{59} At a Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee (TEAC) meeting in May 2014, PJM staff explained to stakeholders that it changed technical specifications within the proposals.\textsuperscript{60}

In a June 2014 presentation to the TEAC, PJM staff indicated that it would recommend that the PJM Board approve the PSE&G proposal, which involved a 500 kV transmission line between Hope Creek and Red Lion 500 kV substations and associated substation work.\textsuperscript{61} After the close of the bidding window, LS Power amended its bid to include a cost cap. Additional stakeholders also submitted comments on PJM staff’s recommendation. As a result, the PJM Board decided to defer action on Staff’s recommendation. The PJM Board also sought further information, through a supplemental proposal, from a shortlist of projects.\textsuperscript{62}

On August 12, 2014, PJM requested supplemental information on the final terms of the proposed project costs from the shortlisted bidders and asked for responses by September 12, 2014.\textsuperscript{63} In August 2014, PJM also requested the assistance of FERC’s Alternative Dispute Resolution office to assist in PJM’s discussions with the shortlisted bidders. PJM announced at an April 2015 TEAC meeting about Artificial Island that it would recommend that the PJM Board approve the LS Power proposal, which also required integration work that would be carried out by Public Service Electric & Gas (PSE&G) and Delmarva Power Light. PJM summarized its revised recommendation in a July 29, 2015 whitepaper.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{57} See Appendix C for details of NYISO’s AC Transmission solicitation.
\textsuperscript{58} See Appendix C for details of PJM’s Artificial Island solicitation.
\textsuperscript{59} PJM Interconnection, Artificial Island White Paper, July 29, 2015, at 11.
\textsuperscript{60} In an Answer to a complaint filed by PSE&G, PJM explained that the modifications included: (1) the construction of a static VAR compensator (SVC), as proposed by some bidders, at a substation where it would be built and owned by PSE&G, in order to improve stability performance; (2) the relocation of the connection point within a substation in two proposals to eliminate a critical fault; (3) the removal of breaker schemes proposed in some proposals in favor of a ring bus modification proposed by one of the bidders; and (4) the removal of certain transmission lines from several proposals because, with the construction of a SVC, the additional facilities were not needed to pass applicable reliability criteria testing and therefore their removal would reduce costs and improve constructability. Public Service Electric and Gas Company, Order Denying Complaint 151 FERC ¶ 61,229 (June 16, 2015) at n. 28 (citing PJM’s March 11, 2015 Answer at 12-13).
\textsuperscript{61} PJM Interconnection, Artificial Island Recommendation, at 36, presented at the June 16, 2014 TEAC meeting. As explained above, PJM ultimately changed its mind and removed the SVC from the project scope when it awarded the revised project to LS Power in response to concerns about total project cost.
\textsuperscript{62} PJM Board Letter to TEAC members, July 23, 2014.
\textsuperscript{63} PJM, Artificial Island Supplemental Proposal Request, August 12, 2014.
\textsuperscript{64} PJM, Artificial Island Recommendation White Paper, July 29, 2015.
The PJM Board approved the Artificial Island Project in July 29, 2015. However, PJM initially underestimated the cost of integration work at the terminus PSE&G substation. PJM’s revised estimates raised the estimated total cost, reflecting inclusion of the integration costs with the PSE&G system, of the LS Power Proposal.\(^{65}\) This cost increase, in part, led the PJM Board to suspend the project in August 2016, and the Board directed PJM staff to conduct a more comprehensive analysis. During the reevaluation, PJM staff eliminated certain project elements (including the construction of an SVC) to lower cost, amended its RFP to reflect the elimination of these project elements and changed the terminus point of the new line from the Salem Substation to the Hope Creek Substation.\(^{66}\) As a result, the project ultimately awarded was substantially different from both the PSE&G project that was initially recommended by PJM Staff in 2014 and the PJM Board approved project in 2015 that was awarded to LS Power. The table below, an excerpt from a March 2017 PJM staff presentation to the TEAC, shows how the cost estimates from the Artificial Island project changed over time as PJM changed the project scope and updated cost estimates for various components of the proposal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>230 kV Line and Silver Run Substation</td>
<td>$146</td>
<td>$146</td>
<td>$146</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salem Interconnection</td>
<td>$61-74</td>
<td>$152</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hope Creek 2B Interconnection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$132</td>
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<td>OPGW</td>
<td>$25</td>
<td>$39</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Freedom SVC</td>
<td>$38</td>
<td>$81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE Interconnection</td>
<td>$2</td>
<td>$2</td>
<td>$2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Total</td>
<td>$272-285</td>
<td>$420</td>
<td>$280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


On April 6, 2017 the PJM Board lifted the suspension on the Artificial Island project and approved PJM staff’s recommendation to retain LS Power as the developer of the revised Artificial Island 230 kV transmission line under the revised project scope and route.\(^{67}\)

Given the significant irregularities associated with this solicitation, it is not clear why the Brattle Report relied on the Artificial Island solicitation to draw any conclusions about the benefits of or cost savings of transmission solicitations. Indeed, we are surprised the report appears to present Artificial Island as a successful solicitation. In our view, the time required to conduct these solicitations (see Table 12) validates the Commission’s findings in Order Nos. 1000, 1000-A, and 1000-B and in the ISO/RTO compliance filings that it may not be feasible to conduct a solicitation for a transmission project that is needed within a fairly short timeframe (e.g., reliability project).\(^{68}\)

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\(^{65}\) PJM, Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee Artificial Island Recommendations to the PJM Board, PJM Staff White Paper, April 5, 2017, p. 4.


\(^{67}\) PJM Board letter to PJM Stakeholders, April 6, 2017. This letter also noted the cost allocation issues associated with the project.

\(^{68}\) See e.g., *PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., et al.*, Order on Compliance Filings, 142 FERC ¶ 61,214 (Mar. 22, 2013) at P 247. Section 5 and Appendix E discuss Order No. 1000 precedent regarding transmission projects needed to address reliability.
4.2. ISO/RTO Implementation Costs

ISO/RTO staff time and resources represent another cost of conducting a solicitation. Specifically, the time, money, and resources spent preparing, issuing, reviewing and evaluating, and selecting a winning proposal. These costs are allocated to the bidders rather than to load, but they are still incurred and likely to be recovered from load and thus should be considered when evaluating whether to conduct a solicitation in the first place. Some ISOs/RTOs have documented the implementation costs incurred to conduct a solicitation while others have not. Publicly available information about these implementation costs is summarized in Table 13 below.

Table 13: Summary of ISO/RTO Costs Incurred to Implement Solicitations in Regional Transmission Planning Processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project/Window</th>
<th>ISO/RTO</th>
<th>Cost Incurred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suncrest</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>$260,572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaney to Colorado River</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>$530,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrella</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>$206,104</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harry Allen to Eldorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>$434,703</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wheeler Ridge Junction</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>$151,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel*</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>$15,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 230 kV Substation</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>$165,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff-Coleman</td>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>$1,331,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartburg-Sabine</td>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>$1,137,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walkemeyer</td>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>$522,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 Windows 1-3</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>$457,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016/17 Long Term Window</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>$902,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 Window 1</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>$328,287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The accounting the ISOs/RTOs employed to produce these estimates is somewhat unclear and the ISO/RTO figures may include different cost categories. The Miguel solicitation had only one bidder. PJM costs only refer to proposal evaluation costs. See Appendix C for data sources.

The ISO/RTO’s direct implementation costs alone should be considered to constitute a lower bound on the actual costs expended on competitive solicitations because several stakeholders, such as the bidders, incumbent TOs, and other interested stakeholders (e.g., load advocates, state regulators) also expend resources by participating in a competitive solicitation. There is also an opportunity cost of conducting a competitive solicitation because ISOs/RTOs generally have limited resources with an obligation to operate the system and administer markets as well as comply with FERC regulations. The CAISO implementation cost estimates in Table 13 appear quite conservative when compared to the costs incurred to conduct competitive solicitations.
in MISO and SPP. For example, CAISO carries out a process that involves the same general steps as MISO and SPP, where it first issues technical specifications and selection criteria prior to each solicitation, and subsequently prepares a selection report that describes how CAISO staff evaluated the proposals and selected a winning bid (CAISO selection reports are about 100 pages long).

MISO estimates that it incurred $1,331,940 to select the winning developer in the Duff-Coleman solicitation. MISO recovered these costs from the 11 bidders through a combination of an initial $100,000 deposit from each bidder and an additional invoice of $21,086. MISO estimated that about 26% of the Duff-Coleman solicitation implementation costs were associated with the cost estimate, while the balance of costs incurred were associated with issuing the RFP (13%), assessing the design (17%), project implementation (13%), operations & maintenance (16%) components of each proposal, and the administrative and management and selection report costs (15%).

MISO estimated a similar cost to conduct the Hartburg-Sabine solicitation.

After conducting the Walkemeyer solicitation, SPP and its stakeholders evaluated the competitive solicitation to identify “lessons learned”. SPP explained in a filing with FERC the costs SPP incurs to “contract, retain, and train” the group of third-party industry experts it hires to evaluate the proposals submitted in competitive solicitations – referred to as the Industry Expert Panel. SPP estimated it incurs a minimum of $300,000 per solicitation to select and retain the Industry Expert Panel. Furthermore, SPP’s $300,000 minimum cost estimate does not include any recoverable SPP time involved in selecting and retaining the Industry Expert Panel.

SPP reported that the full cost of administering the Walkemeyer solicitation was $522,196, consisting of $87,468 for SPP staff expenses, $322,058 for the Industry Expert Panel, and $112,670 for the Industry Expert Panel consultant. On September 20, 2017, SPP referenced the Walkemeyer review costs it incurred in a proposal with FERC to revise its tariff and only hold a competitive solicitation through the SPP regional transmission planning process for projects with an estimated cost of at least $3 million. The Commission rejected SPP’s proposal without prejudice on grounds that SPP failed to sufficiently explain the proposed $3 million threshold or demonstrate that it was just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.

Finally, ISO/RTO presentations and stakeholder materials suggest that it can be difficult for ISO/RTO staff to evaluate and compare multiple proposals that contain various cost caps. For example, PJM notes that each

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70 SPP, Order Rejecting Tariff Revisions, 161 FERC ¶ 61,199 (November 17, 2017), at P 6. See also SPP Transmittal Letter, Docket No. ER17-2523, p. 4-5.
proposal from a given solicitation involves project-specific (e.g., constructability and associated risk factors), legal, and financial risks that must be evaluated and compared against other proposals. PJM plans to implement a new process to assess these risks and the new process will require PJM to hire independent consultants to conduct feasibility studies and a separate financial consultant to assess the proposals’ financial risks. PJM states it will adjust its fee structure upward to account for these additional evaluation costs, which will be assessed to bidders.74

4.3. **Bidder Preparation Costs**

Bidders also incur costs to prepare proposals for ISO/RTO solicitations for new transmission projects. For example, Southwestern Public Service Company75 sought a Declaratory Order from the Public Utility Commission of Texas to prevent SPP from issuing a competitive solicitation for the Potter – Tolk line because the company estimated it would cost at least $750,000 to respond to the solicitation.76 Although the load does not pay these costs directly, they are still incurred by market participants and ought to be considered. Additionally, bidder preparation costs can be aggregated over time and converted into a regulatory asset that can later be recovered in transmission rates if the winning bidder becomes a transmission owner in a given ISO/RTO. For example, in March 2017 Republic Transmission, which won the Duff Coleman solicitation in MISO, petitioned FERC for certain transmission rate incentives related to the Duff-Coleman project, including the deferred recovery of prudently incurred pre-commercial costs through creation of a regulatory asset.77 Bidder preparation costs are largely undocumented, but the limited publicly available information about such costs (e.g., Potter – Tolk line) suggests they are not trivial. The Brattle Report claims that these costs will decrease over time as bidders gain experience,78 which may be true on a project-specific basis, but bidder preparation costs, which can involve detailed engineering estimates and securing financial guarantees, will never be driven to zero, and if solicitations expand so too will the number of bids.

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74 See e.g., PJM, Cost Containment Status and Next Steps, presented to the PJM Planning Committee on May 16, 2019.
75 Southwestern Public Service company serves retail electric customers in the Panhandle and South Plains areas of Texas (entirely outside of ERCOT) and in southeastern portions if New Mexico.
78 Brattle Report, p. 39.
5. No Basis to Expand Order 1000 Solicitations

This section explores the regulatory implications of Brattle’s proposal to expand solicitations for new transmission projects beyond the scope the Commission required when it issued Order No. 1000. Brattle’s savings estimates simply assume that a significant expansion is feasible and the report states that “if only 25% of U.S.-wide investment was subjected to competition and competitively developed projects yielded 20% cost savings”, customers would save between $4.4-$6.6 billion over five years. Brattle also estimates that if solicitations were held for 33% of all U.S.-wide transmission investment, savings would increase to $6-9 billion over five years. However, Brattle does not specify what types of new transmission projects would be included or how such an expansion would be carried out.

Another issue with the Brattle Report’s claims that potential savings of up to $9 billion are possible is that Brattle applied its flawed historical cost escalation estimate to all transmission projects (or at the very least a much broader group of transmission project types). However, the types of projects that would necessarily be included in such an expansion – such as local reliability projects, asset management projects, and upgrades – generally face much lower cost escalation risks than the subset of incumbent TO projects that form the basis of the Brattle Report’s estimates.

For example, Brattle’s analysis of ISO-NE projects included only 14 major projects, many of which were greenfield projects. Greenfield projects face considerably more risk than the full gamut of transmission projects. For example, a relatively modest upgrade to an incumbent TO’s substation does not generally involve risks associated with right-of-way and may not require a certificate of public need and necessity.

Significantly expanding the scope of transmission projects selected through solicitations to achieve the purported savings claimed in the Brattle Report, especially to 25% or 33% of total US investment, would also require a shift in FERC policy about regional and local transmission planning and would involve revisiting several key decisions in Order No. 1000, 1000-A, and 1000-B. An expansion would also be inconsistent with recent Commission precedent about local transmission planning where the Commission generally found that Order No. 890 does not require local transmission planning to be conducted through the ISO/RTO regional planning process. The Brattle Report offers no basis to revisit this precedent and we find that the Commission’s reasoning in the Order No. 1000 proceedings was sound and remains sound based on the experience of the solicitations held to-date. Expanding the scope of solicitations throughout the US would also likely require changes in state law with respect of rights of first refusal, which the Brattle Report acknowledges. Given the issues Concentric identified in the Brattle Report, we find no basis to do so.

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80 Brattle Report, p. 13. Brattle assumes that US transmission investment over the next five years will be $100 billion and applies a 20% savings associated with conducting solicitations for new transmission projects. See Brattle Report, Figure 4, p. 13.
81 Monongahela Power Company et al. 164 FERC ¶ 61,217 (September 26, 2018), at P 13.
82 Brattle Report, p. 21.
The Brattle Report recommends that stakeholders and policymakers review and “potentially modify the criteria” used to determine the transmission projects eligible for solicitation under existing Order No. 1000-compliant planning processes in FERC-jurisdictional ISOs/RTOs. The report concedes that changing the scope of projects eligible for solicitation “may require modifying the requirements of Order No. 1000.”\(^{83}\) Given that the Commission has already found the regional transmission planning processes in these ISOs/RTOs to be just and reasonable and compliant with Order No. 1000, Brattle’s recommendation would most certainly require revisiting some of the key findings in Order No. 1000, and recent Commission precedent about local planning.

In light of the Brattle Report’s recommendation to expand the scope of transmission projects in ISO/RTO regional planning processes that are eligible for competition, Concentric reviewed the rationale the Commission used in Order Nos. 1000, 1000-A, and 1000-B to determine the applicability of those reforms. We also analyzed the Commission’s reasoning and determinations in the individual ISO/RTO compliance filing orders where the Commission determined that the current planning processes in the ISOs/RTOs are just and reasonable and comply with Order No. 1000 requirements. Our review of Order No. 1000 precedent is contained in Appendix E.

Based on this review, we found that the Commission consciously targeted Order No. 1000 reforms to apply to a subset of new transmission projects that were selected in a *regional transmission plan* for purposes of *regional cost allocation*.\(^{84}\) We believe that the Commission’s choice to exclude certain types of transmission projects from the requirements of Order No. 1000 was appropriate at the time and remains appropriate. Given the flaws we identified in Brattle’s “cost savings” estimates, we do not believe Brattle has demonstrated that expanding the scope of the Order No. 1000 requirements would produce the savings Brattle claims. Nor are we persuaded that the Commission’s determinations in the Order No. 1000 proceeding or the subsequent ISO/RTO compliance filings are no longer just and reasonable.

As discussed in turn below, and in further detail in Appendix E, Order No. 1000 requirements do not apply to certain categories of transmission projects: (1) upgrades; (2) local transmission projects with costs that are not shared regionally; and (3) certain reliability projects. Each category and the rationale the Commission used to exclude such projects from Order No. 1000 is discussed in turn below.

### 5.1. Upgrades

The Commission affirmatively found that certain Order No. 1000 reforms only apply to *new* transmission facilities selected in a regional plan for purposes of cost allocation, and not upgrades.\(^{85}\) As such, under Order No. 1000 reforms, incumbent TOs could retain a federal ROFR to upgrade their own transmission facilities. For example, the Commission stated that the Order No. 1000 reforms “do not affect the right of an incumbent

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\(^{83}\) Brattle Report, p. 22.
\(^{84}\) Order No. 1000, p. 1.
\(^{85}\) Order No. 1000 at P 319 and Order No. 1000-A at P 357. See also Order No. 1000-B at P 41.
transmission provider to build, own and recover costs for upgrades to its own transmission facilities". The Brattle Report notes that, consistent with the Order No. 1000 reforms, upgrades are excluded from solicitations in current ISO/RTO regional planning processes but suggests that “a vague or overly broad application of this clause” or “favoring upgrades over potentially more valuable transmission...limits the region from realizing the additional cost-efficiencies” that the report claims are possible from solicitations.87

In fact, there are often many good reasons to pursue upgrades to existing facilities in lieu of building a new transmission facility, including lower costs, minimal impacts to customers and landowners, and more efficient siting and permitting processes. In addition, in Order No. 1000-A, the Commission explicitly defined an upgrade as an “improvement to, addition to, or replacement of a part of, an existing transmission facility” and clarified that the term upgrade does not refer to an entirely new transmission facility.88 Based on our review of the ISO/RTO Order No. 1000 compliance filings, the Commission carefully reviewed the proposed ISO/RTO tariffs to ensure that the ISO/RTO tariffs defined the term upgrade in a manner consistent with the definition provided in Order No. 1000-A.

5.2. LOCAL PROJECTS

Brattle argues that the determination the Commission made in Order No. 1000 to exclude local projects from the reforms has "greatly limited the scope" of competition in MISO.89 Brattle recommends reviewing this exclusion and others. However, Order No. 1000 did not require ISOs/RTOs to eliminate an incumbent TO’s federal ROFR to construct “local transmission facilities,” where the Commission defined a “local transmission facility” as a “transmission facility located solely within a public utility transmission provider’s retail distribution service territory or footprint that is not selected in the regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation.”90 The Commission would have to revisit this precedent to adopt Brattle’s recommendation, but the report provides no basis or evidence to do so.

The Commission would also have to revisit more recent precedent that was not related to the Order No. 1000 proceeding. In August 2018, the Commission addressed applicability of Order No. 890 and expounded upon its view of local versus grid expansion projects when it rejected a complaint filed by California parties (“CPUC et. al.”) against PG&E. Specifically, the Commission found that PG&E’s “asset management projects”, which were local transmission projects that were not selected through CAISO’s regional planning process and not allocated regionally, were not subject to Order No. 890 requirements because such projects did not expand the transmission grid.91

86 Order No. 1000 at P 319. See also Order No. 1000-A, P 426.
87 Brattle Report, p. 21.
88 Order No. 1000-A at P 426.
90 Order No. 1000 at P 63.
91 “[t]he transmission planning reforms that the Commission adopted in Order No. 890 were intended to address concerns regarding undue discrimination in grid expansion. Accordingly, to the extent that PG&E asset management projects and activities do not
In the same order, the Commission made a distinction between PG&E’s asset management projects, which did not incrementally expand the grid but may incidentally do so, and grid expansion projects, which did incrementally expand the grid. As such, expanding solicitations beyond the current scope (i.e., new transmission projects selected through a regional transmission plan for purposes of regional cost allocation) as Brattle suggests, would run contrary to recent precedent that found that local projects, such as asset management projects in PG&E, do not constitute grid expansion. Brattle also expressed concerns with the fact that some transmission investment occurs outside of the ISO/RTO regional planning process. The Commission’s determination in the CPUC et. al. complaint suggests that the Commission finds such an arrangement just and reasonable, and compliant with Order No. 890.

The Brattle Report’s proposal to require that a greater proportion of transmission projects be coordinated through the ISO/RTO regional transmission planning process is also inconsistent with recent Commission precedent in PJM. In September 2018, the Commission found that Order No. 890 did not require incumbent TOs in PJM to transfer their local planning process over to PJM. Instead, the Commission found that incumbent TOs retain primary authority over planning local or Supplemental Projects. Specifically, the Commission explained that "[w]hen transmission owners participate in an RTO, the Commission did not require them to allow the RTO to do all planning for local or Supplemental Projects... The PJM Transmission Owners therefore may retain primary authority for planning local Supplemental Projects..." The Commission would have to revisit this finding to adopt the recommendation to conduct more local transmission planning through the ISO/RTO-coordinated regional planning process, yet the Brattle Report presents no compelling evidence to do so.

### 5.3. Reliability Projects

Based on our review, we found that the Commission carefully weighed reliability concerns in the Order No. 1000 proceeding. For example, the Commission explicitly recognized an incumbent TO’s need to maintain reliability within its local area:

"We clarify that our actions today are not intended to diminish the significance of an incumbent transmission provider’s reliability needs or service obligations. Currently, an incumbent transmission provider may meet its reliability needs or service obligations by building new transmission facilities that are located solely within its retail distribution service territory or footprint."

In Order No. 1000 compliance proceedings, the Commission recognized that there may be insufficient time to carry out a solicitation if a project is needed to maintain reliability. For example, the Commission approved,
with modifications, PJM’s proposal to forego solicitations for certain reliability projects that needed to be in service by a certain date to address reliability concerns: “We agree with PJM that there may be instances in which it may not be feasible to hold a competitive solicitation process to solve a reliability violation. Thus, to avoid delays in the development of transmission facilities needed to resolve a time-sensitive reliability criteria violation, we find that it is just and reasonable to include a class of transmission projects that are exempt from the competitive solicitation.”95 The Commission approved similar tariff provisions in ISO-NE and SPP.96

We believe the experience with the solicitations that have been held to date have proven the Commission correct. For example, Table 12 in Section 4 shows the timelines of the solicitations with more than one bidder ranged from a low of 133 days to a high of 1,498 days. Given the amount in of time involved, conducting solicitations for transmission projects needed to address a reliability issue may conflict with Commission’s recent interest in enhancing the reliability and resilience of the transmission grid.

5.4. **State Granted Rights-of-First Refusal**

Finally, as explained further in Appendix E, the Commission clarified in Order No. 1000-A that the requirement to eliminate a federal ROFR in certain circumstances does not affect or preempt state laws regarding ROFRs that state or local governments might grant to incumbent TOs because the Order No. 1000 requirements were “focused on Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and agreements, and are not intended to preempt state or local laws or regulations.”97 Accordingly, as the Brattle Report notes,98 expanding solicitations, especially by a significant degree, would also require changing state or local laws.

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97 Order No. 1000-A, at P 379.
6. CONCLUSION

Based on Concentric's review, the results of the Brattle Report are inaccurate and as such, provide no basis to expand the scope of competitive solicitations in FERC-jurisdictional ISOs/RTOs. First, Concentric found that incumbent TOs do not experience the cost overruns claimed in the report. To the contrary, publicly available data from ISOs/RTOs with cost tracking databases suggests that incumbent TOs experience insignificant to very modest changes, ranging from -2.9% to 7.0%, between initial cost estimates and final or updated project cost estimates.

Second, it is not possible to estimate potential savings from the solicitations because the final costs are not known and the cost caps in some of the winning bids are not guaranteed to contain costs. Furthermore, Brattle’s savings estimate for the solicitations are inaccurate because Brattle uses an inappropriate benchmark to estimate lower bound savings from the solicitations. The upper bound estimates are also methodologically flawed and rely on over-stated "cost overrun" estimates for incumbent TOs.

Third, expanding the scope of transmission projects selected through competitive solicitations could be inconsistent with the reliability and resilience goals the Commission expressed in recent orders and would require the Commission to directly contradict recent precedent regarding the applicability of Order No. 890. Expanding the scope of solicitations for new transmission projects would also require the Commission to revisit several of its findings in Order No. 1000 as well as more recent orders.

The Brattle Report does not present any credible evidence to suggest that the scope of solicitations for transmission projects should be expanded. However, if there is interest in expanding solicitations for transmission projects, we advise policymakers to wait until more of the projects selected through such solicitations have been placed in service. At such a time, more information will be available about the actual costs and operational performance of these projects and policymakers would be in a position to make better informed decisions about whether or not to expand such solicitations.
APPENDIX A: REVIEW OF INCUMBENT TO COST ESTIMATES

This appendix describes Concentric's analysis of the extent to which incumbent TOs’ initial transmission project cost estimates compared to final or updated cost estimates. Concentric conducted this analysis to assess the accuracy of Brattle’s estimates of the same figures. A discussion of the data and methods Concentric used to assess the Brattle estimates and produce its own estimates are described below for ISO-NE, MISO, PJM, SPP, and CAISO. Given the limited information about initial cost estimates for incumbent TO projects in NYISO, Concentric did not attempt to produce estimates for NYISO (consistent with Brattle).

ISO-NE

As noted above, the Brattle Report relied on the ISO-NE RSP cost tracking database for three of the 14 incumbent TO projects the report based its 70% cost escalation estimate on (Scobie-Tewksbury, Wakefield-Woburn, and Mystic Woburn).99 Concentric was able to validate these estimates for the 3 projects that relied on the RSP database, but was unable to validate the Brattle Report’s cost escalation estimates for the remaining 11 projects. As noted above, we believe the report inappropriately compared final project costs to early planning-level estimates that were developed before the scope of each project had been defined. For the 11 remaining ISO-NE projects, the Brattle Report relied on a February 2015 NextEra presentation for initial and final project cost figures.100 Concentric analyzed the siting board decisions to determine the incumbent TO’s initial project cost estimates and a February 2015 Eversource and National Grid presentation that responded to the NextEra presentation.101 For example, the final siting approval order for National Grid’s Worcester Reliability project included a range of cost estimates that varied depending on the project route and whether the new transmission lines would be overhead or underground. The lowest cost estimate National Grid provided for the Worcester project was $33.53 million based on a single overhead line and the highest estimate was $70+ million based on two underground lines.102 In an effort to be conservative and permit the greatest “cost escalation”, Concentric’s analysis in Table 2 used the lowest cost estimate ($34 million) for the Worcester Reliability project. As shown in Table 2, Brattle used a $7 million initial cost estimate for the Worcester project which resulted in Brattle estimating a 377% escalation – 355% if adjusted for inflation – for this project, compared to Concentric’s estimate of 2%. Using the same approach for the Greater Springfield project, the estimated project cost in the September 2010 siting approval for this project was $714.2 million,103 but the

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99 Specifically, the Scobie-Tewksbury, Wakefield-Woburn, and Mystic Woburn projects, which the Brattle Report obtained initial and updated cost estimate data from the March 2018 RSP tracking database. See Brattle Report, Figure 25, p. 57.
100 NextEra Energy Transmission, Greater Boston Cost Comparison, January, 2015, available at https://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2015/02/a2_nht_greater_boston_cost_analysis_public.pdf. See also Brattle Report, Figure 25, p. 57.
Brattle Report assumed a $350 million initial cost estimate. The inflation-adjusted installed cost of the Greater Springfield was $676 million. Given the different initial estimates for the Greater Springfield project, the Brattle Report estimates a 117% escalation and Concentric estimates a -5% escalation. Table 14 below compares the Concentric and Brattle estimates of the cost escalations of the 11 projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Brattle Initial TO Cost Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Concentric Initial TO Cost Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Installed Cost ($ million)</th>
<th>Brattle Cost Escalation Estimate</th>
<th>Concentric Cost Escalation Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stoughton Cable</td>
<td>$213</td>
<td>$213</td>
<td>$317</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwest Connecticut</td>
<td>$690</td>
<td>$993</td>
<td>$1,274</td>
<td>105%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwalk Reliability</td>
<td>$128</td>
<td>$128</td>
<td>$234</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester Reliability</td>
<td>$7</td>
<td>$34</td>
<td>$34</td>
<td>377%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower SEMA</td>
<td>$107</td>
<td>$107</td>
<td>$105</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millstone DCT Elimination</td>
<td>$22</td>
<td>$27</td>
<td>$39</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEEWS – Greater Springfield</td>
<td>$350</td>
<td>$714</td>
<td>$676</td>
<td>117%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEEWS – Rhode Island Reliability</td>
<td>$150</td>
<td>$264</td>
<td>$330</td>
<td>110%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merrimack Valley/North Shore Salem Cables</td>
<td>$43</td>
<td>$62</td>
<td>$63</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEEWS – Interstate Reliability</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>$542</td>
<td>$542</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stamford Reliability</td>
<td>$49</td>
<td>$47</td>
<td>$37</td>
<td>-15%</td>
<td>-21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Brattle Estimates: Brattle Report, Figure 25, p. 57. Concentric Estimates: See research above in Appendix A.

**MISO**

Brattle estimates that the costs of MISO’s incumbent TO projects have increased by 18% for the 2015-2018 planning cycles. Because Concentric could not replicate the figures shown in Brattle’s Figure 21, we are unable to review Brattle’s methodology. However, Concentric reviewed the same publicly available transmission project cost data relied upon by Brattle, which shows that cost escalations ranged from 0.5% to 7.3%, far lower than the Brattle Report estimate.

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104 Brattle Report, Figure 25, p. 57.
Concentric reviewed the change between initial estimates and in-service costs for projects approved in the 2014-2017 MISO Transmission Expansion Plans ("MTEP"). Concentric examined the MTEP Appendix AB Projects List from each of the 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 MTEP planning cycles. Concentric understands these tracking files represent projects that have been approved by MISO in a given planning cycle. The MTEP quarterly tracking reports, in contrast, represent updates to some project cost estimates, if they are known. The quarterly tracking reports therefore do not necessarily provide a complete cost status in any given quarter.

Concentric used MISO's "MTEP In Service Projects" list for final cost estimates. This In-Service Projects list was updated by MISO as of April 29, 2019 at the time of Concentric’s analysis. Concentric then compared the total project dollars approved in each of the MTEP 2014-2017 planning cycles to those projects’ final in-service costs, to the extent they had been placed in service and reported to MISO as of 4/29/2019. Concentric excluded any projects for which there was no cost estimate, or a zero-dollar cost estimate, for either the initial or the final project costs. This analysis includes projects that had estimates provided in multiple MTEP Appendix AB tracking reports. As shown in Table 15, these projects have experienced a 6% cost escalation.

Finally, Concentric notes that the MISO data can be more difficult to track than other ISO/RTOs. For example, Concentric notes an Entergy Lake Charles Transmission Project had a project cost of $28 million as listed in the 2015 MTEP quarterly tracking reports, but is listed in the 2018 MTEP quarterly tracking reports with a project cost of $181 million for a perceived cost escalation of nearly 550%. Upon closer review, the approval for Entergy’s Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity ("CPCN") notes that the Company’s actual initial cost estimate was $187 million. In addition, it is apparent that project cost estimates in the MTEP Appendices are not listed in consistent dollar year terms, nor are they reported with consistent levels of estimation confidence (i.e., some projects list planning level estimates while others list engineering level estimates).

Table 15: MISO Project Cost Change Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Initial ($million)</th>
<th>In-Service ($million)</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MTEP 2014</td>
<td>$9,085</td>
<td>$9,747</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTEP 2015</td>
<td>$7,292</td>
<td>$7,615</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTEP 2016</td>
<td>$6,304</td>
<td>$6,675</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTEP 2017</td>
<td>$478</td>
<td>$480</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$23,159</strong></td>
<td><strong>$24,517</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.9%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Concentric examined total projects, as opposed to individual facilities, of which there can be many under a given project’s heading. Projects placed in-service indicate that all facilities are in service for the listed project.

105 Concentric examined total projects, as opposed to individual facilities, of which there can be many under a given project’s heading. Projects placed in-service indicate that all facilities are in service for the listed project.
106 https://www.misoenergy.org/planning/planning-test/mtep-quarterly-status-reports/#t=10&p=0&e=&&sl=
107 Louisiana Public Service Commission, Order No. U-33645, December 16, 2015, p. 3.
PJM

The Brattle Report claims that Supplemental Projects in PJM are not tracked by the PJM Transmission Construction Status Database. However, Supplemental Projects are tracked in the PJM Transmission Cost Allocation Database, which contains both initial and “latest cost estimates” for these projects. The Concentric estimates thus include project cost tracking data for Supplemental Projects as well.

SPP

Brattle estimates that the costs of SPP’s incumbent TO projects developed from 2009 through 2019 experienced cost escalations of 18%. Concentric determined that this estimate is significantly overstated. Table 16 shows the Brattle Report’s cost escalation estimates for Balanced Portfolio Projects, Priority Projects, and ITP Portfolio Projects in SPP. In total, the Brattle Report claims that costs have increased from $2,028 million to $2,391 million (without controlling for inflation), for a total cost escalation of 18%. However, upon closer review of each category of projects using the same data sources, Concentric has determined an overall cost escalation of -2%.

Table 16: SPP Incumbent TO Project Cost Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPP Portfolio</th>
<th>Brattle Initial TO Cost Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>CEA Initial TO Cost Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Latest Cost Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Brattle Estimated Cost Escalation</th>
<th>CEA Estimated Cost Escalation</th>
<th># of Projects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Balanced Portfolio</td>
<td>$691</td>
<td>$832</td>
<td>$831</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Priority Projects</td>
<td>$1,145</td>
<td>$1,416</td>
<td>$1,349</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>-5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITP Portfolio Projects with Final Cost Estimates (2012 to 2017)</td>
<td>$192</td>
<td>$211</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITP Portfolio Projects Listed as Complete (2012 to 2017)</td>
<td>$1,349</td>
<td>$1,330</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>150</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brattle Total Comparison</td>
<td>$2,028</td>
<td>$2,391</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentric Total Comparison</td>
<td>$3,597</td>
<td>$3,510</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

108 Brattle Report, p. 56. See notes in Figure 24.
109 See e.g. https://www.pjm.com/planning/rtep-upgrades-status/cost-allocation-view.aspx
Balanced Portfolio Projects

Brattle relied on the 2017 Q2 SPP Quarterly Tracking Report to estimate the historical cost escalations of Balanced Portfolio Projects. These projects were part of an SPP initiative “to develop a group of economic transmission upgrades that benefit the entire SPP region and allocate those project costs regionally.” The figure below reports how estimates of the cost of this portfolio of projects have evolved over the 2009-2017 period.

Figure 4: SPP Balanced Portfolio Cost Estimate Trend

As shown in Figure 4, within 6 months of the original estimate, the cost estimate for the portfolio of Balanced Portfolio projects was revised upward by nearly $150 million. This increase was due to changes that SPP directed to promote a more consistent extra high voltage planning design. This is an example of how estimates change significantly if the scope changes. Concentric believes the cost estimate from 2010 Q1 is a more accurate starting point from which to measure cost increases or decreases because the projects were re-scoped in the intervening months. The result is a 0% cost escalation figure for Balanced Portfolio Projects.

110 SPP 2017 Q2 Quarterly Project Tracking Report, p. 12.
111 SPP 2010 Q1 Quarterly Project Tracking Report, p. 2.
**Priority Projects**

Brattle relies on the 2017-Q4 SPP Quarterly Tracking Report to represent the cost escalations of Priority Projects. These projects were approved as “priority” high voltage electric transmission projects with large estimated regional benefits. As seen in Figure 5, within six months of the original cost estimates, SPP approved additional costs “due to line rerouting and addition costs for reactive compensation.” These types of adjustments could occur with any transmission project, regardless of its developer or the process by which it is selected. The total cost estimate for the SPP Priority Projects after the variances were approved was $1.42 billion.

![Figure 5: SPP Priority Project Cost Estimate Trend](image)

SPP 2017 Q4 Quarterly Project Tracking Report, p. 12.

Given the scope changes directed by SPP, Concentric believes the second reported data point is a more accurate starting point from which to measure cost increase or decreases. This results in a -5% cost escalation for Priority Projects.

**ITP Portfolio Projects**

Brattle relies on the 2019 Q1 SPP Quarterly Tracking Report, Appendix 1 data to represent the cost escalations of ITP Portfolio Projects. Concentric examined the 2019 Q1 tracking data and determined that Brattle did not consider the full sample of completed projects. This means Brattle has filtered the tracking data and only considered 42 projects, excluding over 100 completed projects. In our view, including the larger sample of projects is reasonable as the ultimate project costs are largely known. Including these projects also expands...
the project sample size from 42 to 150, which is more broadly representative of the portfolio of projects completed in SPP during the timeframe Brattle considered (2012-2017) and increases the total value of the transmission projects in the sample from $192 to $1,349 million. The change in costs between the initial estimate to the latest cost estimate tracked by SPP is -1%.

In summary, Concentric has examined each of the SPP documents the Brattle Report referenced to better understand these claims. Upon review, Concentric can determine that the Brattle Report’s SPP estimates are significantly overstated, and do not necessarily provide the full context of how transmission project costs have evolved in SPP.

CAISO

Figure 23 of the Brattle Report presents estimates of the “historical cost escalation” of incumbent TO projects in CAISO. Figure 23 examines 18 transmission projects and notes that the projects are “not the complete universe of CAISO projects”.\(^{113}\) Figure 23 states that in aggregate, final costs of 18 projects exceeded initial estimates by 33%. However, Figure 23 also states that CAISO only published initial cost estimates for 10 of these projects (the other initial cost estimate data for the other projects was provided to the California Public Utilities Commission). The Brattle Report only used the 10 projects that also had CAISO estimates to calculate CAISO incumbent TO historical cost escalation, which the report estimated was 41%.\(^ {114}\) Limiting this already small sample of projects from 18 to 10 increased the estimated historical cost escalation in CAISO from 33% to 41%.

Concentric reviewed the same sources the Brattle Report cited in Figure 23 to assess the CAISO estimate and determined that the 41% cost escalation estimate is highly sensitive to the sample of projects selected. However, as noted above, we caution that this sample of projects is too small and unrepresentative to constitute a reasonable estimate of how final and/or updated project costs compare to initial incumbent TO estimates in CAISO. Nevertheless, we conducted our analysis to assess the reasonableness and accuracy of the Brattle Report’s CAISO estimate.

1. PG&E

Concentric reviewed information about PG&E’s initial and final project costs that was available in the FERC dockets referenced in the Brattle Report. Rather than limit the analysis to a subset of projects with initial and final cost estimates, Concentric analyzed all of the PG&E projects that had initial and final project cost information that was available in the FERC dockets referenced in Figure 23 of the report (Docket Nos. ER16-2320-000 and EL17-45-000). Concentric expanded the PG&E sample in two ways. First, the Brattle Report only relies on seven of the eight PG&E projects referenced in FERC Docket No. ER16-2320 while the Concentric

\(^{113}\) Brattle Report, Figure 23, p. 55.

\(^{114}\) Brattle Report, Figure 23, p. 55, at column 6.
analysis included all eight projects. Second, Concentric included initial and final project cost information for 47 additional PG&E transmission projects (Substation and Line Capacity projects) that PG&E provided in response to a California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) data request.

As shown in Table 17 below, expanding the sample results in a PG&E cost escalation estimate ranging from 6.1% to 18.8%. In total, this portfolio of PG&E projects experienced an “average” cost overrun of 12.6%. Concentric uses the initial estimates that PG&E provided to CAISO and not the "CAISO estimate" that the Brattle Report used, as such the figures are comparable to column 5 in Figure 23 of the report.

**Table 17: Concentric review of Brattle’s Historical Cost Escalation Estimate for PG&E**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Docket No. EL17-45-000 projects</th>
<th>CAISO Approved Cost ($)</th>
<th>Final or Updated Cost ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Substation Capacity</td>
<td>358,499</td>
<td>485,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Line Capacity</td>
<td>317,600</td>
<td>373,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>676,099</td>
<td>859,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Docket No. EL16-47-000 projects</td>
<td>858,600</td>
<td>1,046,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Estimate</td>
<td>1,534,699</td>
<td>1,823,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final or Updated - CAISO Approved ($)</td>
<td>288,797</td>
<td>105,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final or Updated - CAISO Approved (%)</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2. **SDG&E**

To estimate average historical cost escalations for SDG&E, Brattle Report relied on initial and updated project cost estimates that SDG&E provided to the CPUC. However, rather than use information for all 17 of the projects supplied, Brattle excluded seven projects in column 5 of Figure 23, without explanation, and estimated an average cost escalation of 19.7% for SDG&E. Brattle then limited the sample further to 3 projects with a “CAISO estimate” (column 3 of Figure 23), which results in an estimated escalation of 2.3% for the 3 projects. If Brattle had used all 17 projects, the average cost escalation would be 5.9% as demonstrated by Concentric. Although the sample of 17 is still limited and not necessarily representative of SDG&E’s overall portfolio of projects, it provides a better estimate than the three SDG&E projects the Brattle Report used to estimate historical cost escalation in CAISO.

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115 Exhibit CPUC-001, Prepared Direct Testimony of Geneva Looker, Docket No. ER16-23-20-000, p. 24, Table J (filed July 5, 2017). Table J references Docket No. EL16-47-000, where PG&E sought abandoned plant recovery for certain transmission projects. The Brattle Report sample for PG&E excluded a project that had final costs that were below PG&E’s initial estimate.

116 This information was included as an Exhibit to a February 2017 complaint filed at FERC (Docket No. EL17-45-000). See California Parties v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., (filed Feb. 2, 2017) Docket No EL17-45-000, Exhibit 2 - PG&E Response to CPUC Data Request, pp 4-6.
It warrants mention that most of SDG&E’s final project costs were below the initial cost estimates. One project - the East County (“ECO”) Substation project referenced in Figure 23 of the Brattle Report - experienced significant cost overruns due to an unplanned routing change directed by the CPUC. During the permitting process, the CPUC required undergrounding a portion of the line. As a result, the final project cost for the ECO Substation was $410 million, a 50% increase above the initial cost estimate $273 million. We note this to reiterate that greenfield transmission projects face significant cost risks due to factors beyond the developer’s control, such as regulatory siting and permitting issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Initial Project Cost Estimate ($)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Final Project Cost ($)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Difference ($)</strong></td>
<td><strong>%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL 637 CRE-ST SW Pole Replacements</td>
<td>45,000,000</td>
<td>39,570,571</td>
<td>-5,429,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mira Sorrento 138/12KV Sub &amp; Cirs. 1442 Thru 1446</td>
<td>50,300,000</td>
<td>18,733,717</td>
<td>-31,566,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECO Substation</td>
<td>273,000,000</td>
<td>409,839,624</td>
<td>136,839,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poseidon Project-Modify Cannon Sub &amp; Install 2 Ckts</td>
<td>14,500,000</td>
<td>11,332,962</td>
<td>-3,167,038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New TL ES-Ash #2</td>
<td>21,600,000</td>
<td>4,661,923</td>
<td>-16,938,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV West Generator Interconnection (Q608)</td>
<td>2,114,000</td>
<td>1,114,439</td>
<td>-999,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL694A Melrose Loop-In Project</td>
<td>41,363,000</td>
<td>33,788,430</td>
<td>-7,574,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL6914 Los Coches-Loveland SW Pole Replace</td>
<td>40,000,000</td>
<td>23,929,019</td>
<td>-16,070,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talega-Add Synchronous Condensers</td>
<td>64,400,000</td>
<td>80,840,653</td>
<td>16,440,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shunt Reactor on Suncrest 500kV Bus</td>
<td>10,900,000</td>
<td>9,834,023</td>
<td>-1,065,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnyside 69/12kV Rebuild</td>
<td>164,460,000</td>
<td>97,800,217</td>
<td>-66,659,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pico Pico Energy Ctr.</td>
<td>9,422,000</td>
<td>9,584,640</td>
<td>162,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wabash Substation Rebuild</td>
<td>6,100,000</td>
<td>9,777,332</td>
<td>3,677,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocate South Bay Substation</td>
<td>129,200,000</td>
<td>120,732,727</td>
<td>-8,467,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talega Bank 50 Replacement</td>
<td>5,500,000</td>
<td>2,138,852</td>
<td>-3,361,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TL13821 and TL13828-Fanita Junction Enhancement</td>
<td>41,400,000</td>
<td>35,318,965</td>
<td>-6,081,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encina Bank 61</td>
<td>11,156,000</td>
<td>7,873,169</td>
<td>-3,282,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full sample (17 projects)</td>
<td>782,401,000</td>
<td>828,851,263</td>
<td>46,450,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brattle sample (10 projects)</td>
<td>568,692,000</td>
<td>680,824,576</td>
<td>112,132,576</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*SDG&E indicated that this cost estimate was provided at the time the project first appeared on the AB970 report to the CPUC.

See e.g., CPUC proceeding for SDG&E CPCN application for the East County Substation (Application A.09-08-003).
3. SCE

The Brattle Report did not use any Southern California Edison (SCE) projects to estimate historical cost escalation of CAISO incumbent TO projects despite the fact that SCE is the second largest incumbent in CAISO. However, Figure 23 of the Brattle Report references a single project – the Tehachapi project that was completed in 2014. The Tehachapi project constitutes another example of the fact that transmission projects, particularly projects that require a new CPCN, face risks that are beyond the developer’s control.118 The Tehachapi project was a complex greenfield project and, as a result, faced significant and unexpected citing issues that other projects (e.g., upgrades don’t typically require a CPCN) are unlikely to face. As such, the cost escalation experienced in the Tehachapi is not representative of the risk that the full portfolio of SCE projects will face.

The Tehachapi project was a large greenfield project designed to interconnect approximately 4,500 MW of generation capacity to the SCE system. Construction was split into 11 segments. SCE’s preliminary cost estimate for segments 4-11 of the Tehachapi project was $1.72 billion (in 2009 dollars).119 In December 2009, the CPUC issued a CPCN for these segments, which included an overhead route in the City of Chino Hills, California area (segment 8A). However, parties in the Chino Hills areas sought rehearing of this decision regarding segment 8A and in January 2010, 22 months after issuing the initial CPCN, the CPUC issued a stay on the construction of segment 8A, and SCE ceased construction activities on that segment, despite the fact that segment 8A was almost completed in an overhead configuration. In July 2013, the CPUC reversed its initial December 2009 decision of the CPCN for segment 8A and directed SCE to construct about 3.5 miles of segment 8A in the Chino Hills area underground. SCE also had to remove newly constructed overhead transmission structures and substation facilities it had constructed in accordance with the initial 2009 CPCN for the segment.120 In 2014, FERC granted SCE’s request to recover $14.445 million in abandoned plant to recover the costs of project support, engineering, environmental monitoring, and mitigation activities; direct material and construction costs; removal activity; and certain overheads associated with these expenditures.121

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118 See e.g., Southern California Edison Company, Order on Abandonment Cost Recovery Filing, 148 FERC ¶ 61,126 at PP 2-7 (Aug. 15, 2014).
119 Southern California Edison, Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity Concerning the Tehachapi Renewable Transmission Project (Segments 4 through 11), Opening Brief, Application No. 07-06-031 (June 28, 2007), at ix. This estimate excludes Allowance for Funds Used During Construction.
121 Southern California Edison Company, Order on Abandonment Cost Recovery Filing, 148 FERC ¶ 61,126 at P 10. (Aug. 15, 2014). Specifically, the $14.445 figure includes: (1) $11.667 million in direct expenditures for construction of the overhead structures and substation, facilities that are now abandoned; (2) $3.595 million in costs for the removal of the overhead facilities; and (3) $38,000 in additional expected removal costs. SCE reduced its overall expenditures by $645,000 for reusable structures and by $210,000 for salvageable items.
**APPENDIX B: ESTIMATING TRANSMISSION PROJECT COSTS**

Estimating the cost of transmission projects is an inherently difficult task, as is the case with any large capital project. Most large transmission projects face risks to schedules and budgets at every step—from feasibility, siting, permitting and design to construction and operation. While there are many factors that can impact schedule and budget, they generally fall into three categories: i) economic and commercial risks; ii) regulatory issues; and iii) public opposition. Together, all of these elements have the potential to significantly impact project costs by altering project scope, prolonging project timelines and adding uncertainty to already complex financing processes, contributing to cost variances from the preliminary budget estimate.

Economic and commercial considerations are a fundamental part of the justification or rationale for planning and constructing a transmission project. Transmission planning often involves a host of economic assumptions and supporting analytic activities to demonstrate that a project is warranted. All economic and commercial considerations and associated cost forecasts are anchored to the time when they are made. As time passes, the assumptions upon which these considerations rest can change. For example, the price of steel may fall (or rise) between the time a project is conceived and the time it is built. In some instances, for example if the project is not needed for reliability, these changes may be so large that they undermine the economic or commercial viability of the project, and the project may be cancelled. The long lead times associated with development of transmission projects increases their exposure to these factors.

In addition, regulatory risks can threaten project budgets and schedules. States generally hold authority to issue a CPCN for construction and operation of a transmission line; this authority is most frequently under the jurisdiction of a state public utility commission. A CPCN is typically required for a transmission developer to construct facilities to transport electricity at transmission (and sometimes lower, sub-transmission) voltages within a state's borders. Issuance of a CPCN is based on a finding by the state authority that the proposed project is in the public interest. The public interest standard is typically measured by assessing the cost incurred by ratepayers against the expected economic impacts of a project within the state. For projects that involve more than one state, differences among the involved states’ CPCN policies and processes must also be addressed. The risk of protracted regulatory processes to assess the public benefit of proposed transmission construction can threaten both cost and schedule estimates.

Finally, public opposition can play a significant role in a developer’s ability to meet project cost thresholds and schedule milestones. Organized public opposition to proposed transmission lines has frequently had a material impact on project development by adding time to siting and routing processes, and it has sometimes led or contributed to the cancellation of projects or to the addition of mitigation measures that have increased the project developers’ costs. For example, as described in Section 2, many of the projects Brattle used to estimate cost escalations in ISO-NE experienced such issues. Project developers frequently attempt to reduce these costs
and associated time requirements through up-front information sharing and joint (and early) development of mitigation approaches. The success of these activities has hinged largely on the extent to which they lead to meaningful engagement and tangible commitments to address public concerns over line routing. For transmission line projects involving federal lands, compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") involves a sequence of open processes: scoping meetings, public reviews of both a draft and final EIS, and issuance of a Record of Decision. Because of their geographic scope, multi-state transmission projects can entail coordination among more than one federal agency, multiple state offices, and also related state, tribal, and local agencies during the approval process. Approval processes involving multiple agencies raise many institutional issues that sometimes result in significant mitigation costs and time requirements to obtain final approval for a route involving non-private lands.

A good example of the impact these factors can have on schedule and budget was demonstrated in Texas. The Competitive Renewable Energy Zones ("CREZ") initiative was a multiyear effort to connect wind from West Texas to cities in the eastern part of the state that demanded more power. The new transmission projects cost Texas ratepayers over $6.8 billion, far higher than the $4.9 billion projection in 2008.\(^{122}\) Inflation drove some of the increase. However, the increased scope of the project was a bigger factor. In calculating the original estimate, early cost estimates assumed the transmission lines would follow the most direct routes. As the process played out, however, regulators minimized intrusion by redrawing the routes to follow fences or roads. Those decisions added more than 600 miles of power lines that weren’t originally planned.

In addition to the factors impacting the cost and schedule of transmission build noted above, the process used to develop the cost estimate does not lend itself to accurate cost variation analysis. First, many of the initial cost estimates, on which variances are frequently measured, are based on planning level information. These conceptual estimates often lack detailed engineering or design detail and are typically prepared from historical data and used for screening purposes only. However, as discussed further below, the precision of the ISOs/RTOs initial cost estimates, often measured by a percentage confidence level, varies.

For example, in SPP, once a project passes the conceptual screening criteria, a study estimate is prepared that is a more refined estimate of the cost of the transmission project. This project estimate often establishes the baseline for the project cost variance going forward. According to the SPP cost estimate guidelines, the project development stage has a direct impact on the precision of the cost estimate as shown in Table 1 below.

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\(^{122}\) See e.g., The Texas Tribune, $7 Billion Wind Power Project Nears Finish, October 13, 2013, available at https://www.texastribune.org/2013/10/14/7-billion-crez-project-nears-finish-aiding-wind-po/
The precision of the cost estimate increases as the project progresses from the concept and study phase to the design and construction phase. The project’s cost estimates become more precise as the developer acquires more information about the specifications of the project and updates the estimates accordingly. For example, equipment cost estimates become more precise after the developer learns more about the specific technical needs of new equipment. It is common practice to obtain multiple quotes for various project components. For a greenfield transmission project, better information on the route allows a developer to get a better sense of the construction costs and the equipment required to construct the project.

MISO uses different definitions for the various estimates it instructs developers to produce for cost tracking purposes. Table 20 shows that the precision of project estimates increase over time as more information becomes available, shown in the table as an increase in the “maturity level of project definition deliverables”.

### Table 19: Southwest Power Pool Cost Estimate Stage Definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimate Name</th>
<th>Level of Project Scope Definition</th>
<th>Precision Bandwidth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conceptual</td>
<td>0% - 10%</td>
<td>-50% to +100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Study</td>
<td>10% - 20%</td>
<td>-30% to +30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional Notification to Construct or Notification to Construct</td>
<td>20% - 40%</td>
<td>-20% to +20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design and Construction</td>
<td>40% - 100%</td>
<td>-20% to +20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table 20: MISO Cost Estimate Stage Definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Maturity Level of Project Definition Deliverables</th>
<th>End Usage</th>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Expected Accuracy Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class 5</td>
<td>0% to 2%</td>
<td>Concept screening</td>
<td>Capacity factored, parametric models, judgment, or analogy</td>
<td>H: +30% to +100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4</td>
<td>1% to 15%</td>
<td>Study or feasibility</td>
<td>Equipment factored or parametric models</td>
<td>H: +20% to +50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3</td>
<td>10% to 40%</td>
<td>Budget authorization or control</td>
<td>Semi-detailed unit costs with assembly level line items</td>
<td>H: +10% to +30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2</td>
<td>30% to 75%</td>
<td>Control or bid/tender</td>
<td>Detailed unit cost with forced detailed take-off</td>
<td>H: +5% to +20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1</td>
<td>65% to 100%</td>
<td>Check estimate or bid/tender</td>
<td>Detailed unit cost with detailed take-off</td>
<td>H: +3% to +15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: [a] The state of process technology, availability of applicable reference cost data, and many other risks affect the range markedly. The +/- value represents typical percentage variation of actual costs from the cost estimate after application of contingency (typically at a 50% level of confidence) for given scope.

Source: MISO, Transmission Cost Estimation Guide – MTEP19, March 9, 2019, p. 4. Note: MISO described the different types of project cost estimates as follows: Class 3: MISO scoping cost estimate; and Class 4: MISO planning-cost estimate; Class 5: MISO exploratory cost estimate.

It is important to note that the category of estimates shown in the table above do not include any contingency amounts. Contingency is added to a project estimate to allow for uncertain or unexpected events which will likely result in additional costs. Contingency for transmission projects can range from approximately 5% to 50% of total construction costs, and contingency amounts tend to be highest during the early stages of a project’s development process. In addition to the improper comparison of different types of cost estimates, e.g., use of a baseline cost estimate, other factors can lead to perceived cost variances that are only due to inflation, a cost escalating factor that the Brattle Report also notes.
APPENDIX C: ORDER NO. 1000 SOLICITATION DETAILS

This appendix describes the transmission solicitations reviewed in the report in more detail. As of the writing of this report, solicitations have been carried out through the ISO/RTO regional transmission planning processes in CAISO, MISO, NYISO, PJM, NYISO, and SPP, and these solicitations are discussed in turn in the remainder of this appendix.

CAISO

As of the writing of this report, the California ISO (CAISO) has had ten solicitations, but the last solicitation occurred in 2015. After CAISO selects a winning proposal from a solicitation, it executes an Approved Project Sponsor Agreement ("APSA") that specifies, among other things, the project’s capital cost, operating and maintenance, and other terms the project developer included in its proposal that affect the annual transmission revenue requirement associated with the project. Below is a summary table of Concentric's research to recreate the figures in the Brattle table that purportedly summarized the cost savings associated with competitive transmission solicitations in CAISO. Concentric was only able to locate the APSAs of seven of the CAISO solicitations. Specifically, Concentric was not able to locate the costs of the bids of three projects of CAISO investor-owned utilities PG&E and SDG&E.

Concentric determined that the "cost savings" estimates for CAISO in figure 18 of the Brattle Report compare a CAISO planning-level estimate with the winning bid. The table below summarizes Concentric's recreation of the CAISO figure in Figure 12 of the Brattle Report. If the CAISO planning estimate was a range, Brattle used the high end of the range to calculate the savings in Figure 18, which maximized the estimated savings. Concentric recreated the $1,180 million figure Brattle used as the "RTO/ISO Incumbent estimate of project cost" figure for total planning estimate costs but not the $833 million figure given we could not identify APSAs for the Wheeler Ridge, Spring, and Miguel substations.
Table 21: Summary of CAISO Transmission Solicitations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Type: Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project detail: 300 MVAr dynamic reactive power support element connecting to the Suncrest 230 kV bus. SVC or synchronous condenser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bid window: April 16, 2014 - June 16, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bidders:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC (“NEET West”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego Gas and Electric Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winner: NEET West, who offered a project construction cost cap of $42,288,000 in 2015 dollars, with operation and maintenance costs for the first five years of operation capped at $360,000 per year. NEET West signed an APSA with CAISO on May 7, 2015.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Winning Bid</th>
<th>CAISO Planning Estimate ($ million)</th>
<th>Project Cost in Approved Sponsor Agreement ($)</th>
<th>Winning Bid vs. High CAISO Planning Estimate (low-high%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gates-Gregg (delayed)</td>
<td>PG&amp;E / MidAmerican</td>
<td>115 – 145</td>
<td>157,021,766</td>
<td>-8 – 37%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imperial Valley Element</td>
<td>Imperial Irr. Dist.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14,283,122</td>
<td>-43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sycamore – Penasquitos</td>
<td>SDG&amp;E</td>
<td>111 – 221</td>
<td>129,975,759</td>
<td>-41% – 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaney to Colorado River</td>
<td>DCR Transmission</td>
<td>-300</td>
<td>241,805,391</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estrella</td>
<td>NextEra</td>
<td>35 – 45</td>
<td>24,539,000</td>
<td>-30 – 45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler Ridge</td>
<td>PG&amp;E</td>
<td>90 – 140</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suncrest</td>
<td>Next Era</td>
<td>50 – 75</td>
<td>42,288,000</td>
<td>-44% – 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring Shb. Morgan Hill</td>
<td>PG&amp;E</td>
<td>35 – 45</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Allen to Eldorado</td>
<td>DessertLink</td>
<td>144,000,000</td>
<td>147,000,000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel</td>
<td>SDG&amp;E</td>
<td>30 – 40</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Range</td>
<td></td>
<td>$935–1,820</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>$1,058</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brattle figure for winning bids</td>
<td></td>
<td>$833,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total winning bids w\out Wheeler, Spring, and Miguel</td>
<td></td>
<td>$756,913,038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. &quot;savings&quot; w\out Wheeler, Spring, and Miguel</td>
<td></td>
<td>3-26%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: |
| CAISO, Suncrest Valley List of Validated Project Sponsor Applications with Sufficient Information, August 5, 2015, p. 1. |
ISO Implementation Cost: $260,572


Delaney to Colorado River

*Project detail:* New 500 kV transmission line and associated series compensation between Delaney Substation and Colorado River Substation. Only the 500 kV transmission line and series compensation were eligible for solicitation. The facilities necessary at Delaney Substation and Colorado River Substation to interconnect with the project, including anticipated shunt reactors, were not eligible for solicitation per the CAISO tariff.

*Bid window:* August 19, 2014–November 19, 2014

*Bidders:* 
- DCR Transmission, LLC (A joint venture between Abengoa Transmission & Infrastructure and an affiliate of Starwood Energy Group Global, Inc.)
- California Transmission Development LLC (a wholly owned subsidiary of LS Power & Associates)
- NextEra Energy Transmission West LLC (a wholly owned subsidiary of NextEra Energy Transmission)
- TransCanyon DCR LLC in collaboration with Southern California Edison

*Winner:* DCR Transmission, LLC. According to CPCN filed with CPUC for the “Ten West”, the APSA had a cost cap of $241,805,391 and was signed December 1, 2015. Updated project cost estimates were $279,560,483 in 2020, provided in October 2016.


*Expected In-Service Date:* May 1, 2020

ISO Implementation Cost: $530,359

Estrella Project

*Need:* reliability
**Project detail:** new 230/70 kV substation approximately five miles east of the existing Paso Robles substation. Reliability-driven need to reinforce the 70 kV system to increase the reliability and mitigate thermal overloads and voltage concerns in the Templeton and Estrella areas. The Estrella Project includes a 230/70/12 kV substation, Estrella Substation, new 230/70kV and 230/12 kV transformers, and reconductoring and looping the existing transmission lines. Only the 230/70 kV transformer, 230 kV switchyard, and 230 kV termination structures were eligible for solicitation. The 230/12 kV transformer, 70 kV bus work and termination equipment, and modifications to existing facilities were not eligible for solicitation under the CAISO Tariff.\(^{135}\)

**Bid window:** April 16, 2014 – August 18, 2014

**Bidders:**\(^{136}\)

- Brookfield California Transmission, LLC (Brookfield CalTrans), an affiliate of Brookfield Asset Management, Inc.
- Golden State Transmission, LLC (Golden State), a joint venture company owned by Edison Transmission, LLC and Transource Energy, LLC
- NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC (“NEET West”)
- Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)

**Winner:** NEET West, which signed an APSA with a cost cap of $24,539,000 and a binding annual O&M cost cap for the first five years following commencement of commercial operation.\(^{137}\)

**ISO Implementation Cost:** $206,104\(^{138}\)

**ISO Project Cost Estimate:** both the solicitation portion and incumbent TO portions were estimated to cost between $35-$45 million.\(^{139}\)

**Proposed In-service Date:** May 2019

**Harry Allen to Eldorado**

**Need:** economics

**Project detail:** new 500 kV line between SCE’s 500 kV Harry Allen Substation and NV Energy’s 500 kV Eldorado Substations. Approximately 60 miles in length.\(^{140}\)

**Bid window:** January 30, 2015 - April 30, 2015.

**Bidders:**

\(^{135}\) CASIO, Estrella Project Sponsor Selection Report, March 11, 2015, p. 2.
\(^{136}\) CASIO, Estrella Project Sponsor Selection Report, March 11, 2015, p. 3.
\(^{137}\) NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC, Order on Participating Transmission Owner Tariff and Rate Incentives Proposal, and Establishing Hearing and Settlement Judge Procedures, 154 FERC ¶ 61,009 (Jan. 8, 2016) at note 12.
\(^{139}\) CAISO, Estrella Substation Project Description and Functional Specifications for Competitive Solicitation, June 26, 2014, p. 3.
• DesertLink, LLC (“DesertLink”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of LS Power Associates, L.P.
• Exelon Transmission Company, LLC, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Exelon Corporation
• NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC, an affiliate of NextEra Energy, Inc., in collaboration with Southern California Edison Company (NEET West/SCE)

Winner: DesertLink

ISO Implementation Cost: $434,703\(^{141}\)

ISO Project Cost Estimate: $144 million\(^{142}\)

Proposed In-Service Date: May 1, 2020

Notes on FERC Rate: According to an October 2017 formula rate filing with FERC (Docket No. ER17-135-000, et al.) DesertLink and CAISO executed an APSA on June 20, 2016. DesertLink agreed in the APSA with CAISO to limit recovery of capital costs to $147 million for the project, subject to certain conditions and exceptions. Pursuant to a settlement FERC certified in May 2018\(^{143}\), DesertLink has agreed to limit equity as a percentage of its capital structure to 50% and to limit the return on equity (“ROE”) included in its annual transmission revenue requirement (“ATRR”) to 9.8% inclusive of a 50 basis point adder for CAISO membership\(^{144}\). DesertLink also agreed in the settlement that the transmission line will be in service by May 1, 2020, and that the transmission revenue requirement cost cap used in winning the competitive bid ($147 million) will be adhered to.

Wheeler Ridge Junction

Need: reliability

Project detail: Build a new 230/115 kV transmission substation at Wheeler Ridge Junction as well as CDWR pumps, with a more reinforced 230 kV source from Kern PP. The facilities in the Wheeler Ridge Junction substation project that are eligible for solicitation are the 230 kV bus-work and termination equipment, and the 230/115 kV transformers. The 115 kV bus-work and termination equipment and modifications to existing facilities are not eligible for solicitation. For the interconnection of the existing 230kV lines to the Wheeler Ridge Junction substation, the incumbent PTO (PG&E) was responsible to bring the new transmission line extensions up to a point within 100 feet of the new substation fence\(^{145}\).

Bidders:

• Brookfield Transmission


\(^{143}\) Desert Link, LLC, Certification of Uncontested Settlement, 163 FERC ¶ 63,014 (May 24, 2018).

\(^{144}\) Id. at P 5. See also http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/General.aspx?id=5240.

• Golden State Transmission
• PG&E
• NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC

**Winner:** PG&E

**ISO Implementation Cost:** $151,179\(^{146}\)

**ISO Project Cost Estimate:** $90-140 million, including both the competitive and noncompetitive portions, to be between, produced June 2014.\(^{147}\)

**Proposed In-Service Date:** May 2020

**Miguel**

**Need:** reliability

**Project detail:** The reactive power support is required to provide continuous reactive power support with one of the following types of devices: SVC (Static VAR Compensator); STATCOM (Static Synchronous Compensator); or Synchronous Condenser. SDG&E will design, engineer, install, own, operate, and maintain the necessary equipment additions within Miguel substation.\(^ {148}\)

**Bid window:** April 16, 2014 - June 16, 2014

**Bidder:** San Diego Gas and Electric Company (“SDG&E”)

**Winner:** SDG&E

**ISO Evaluation Cost:** $15,056\(^ {149}\)

**ISO Project Cost Estimate:** $30-$40 million\(^ {150}\)

**Proposed In-Service Date:** June 1, 2017. Project completed.

**Spring Substation**

**Need:** reliability

**Project detail:** Construct a new 230/115 kV substation, Spring Substation, west of the existing Morgan Hill Substation. Install a new 230/115 kV 420 MVA transformer at Spring Substation. Loop the existing Morgan

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\(^{147}\) CAISO, Wheeler Ridge Junction Substation Project Description and Functional Specifications for Competitive Solicitation, June 16, 2014, p. 3.


Hill-Llagas 115 kV Line into the Spring 115 kV bus using a portion of the idle Green Valley-Llagas 115 kV Line right-of-way.

Bid window: April 16, 2014 - August 18, 2014

Bidders:

- NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC
- Brookfield California Transmission West, LLC
- Pacific Gas and Electric Company

Winner: PG&E

ISO Evaluation Cost: $165,912

ISO Project Cost Estimate: $35-45 million, produced June 2014

Proposed In-service Date: May 2021

Sycamore – Penasquitos

Need: policy

Project: 230 kV transmission line between SDG&E owned Sycamore and Penasquitos 230 kV substations.

Bid window: April 1, 2013 - June 3, 2013

Bidders:

- Abengoa T&D
- Elecnor, Inc
- SDG&E
- Trans Bay Cable LLC

Winner: SDG&E


Notes: The CAISO filed the initial APSA between SDG&E and the CAISO with FERC on August 11, 2014 in Docket No. ER14-2629-000. The CPUC issued its final certificate for the project on October 13, 2016, and it required the project to place the majority of the transmission line underground, whereas the CAISO specification assumed that the majority of the line would be placed above ground and in SDG&E’s existing rights-of-way.

152 CAISO, Spring Substation Project (Morgan Hill Area) Description and Functional Specifications for Competitive Solicitation, June 26, 2014, p. 3.
However, the CPUC certificate decision requires the SDG&E to underground the majority of the line, which increases the estimated cost to $260 million and extended the energization date to June 30, 2018.\textsuperscript{155}

\textit{ISO Project Cost Estimate}: $111-221 million, produced April 2013\textsuperscript{156}

\textit{Proposed in-service date}: Initial- May 2017, Revised- June 2018

\textbf{Gates-Gregg}

\textit{Need}: Reliability

\textit{Project}: The Gates-Gregg Project is a 230 kV transmission line that originates from the PG&E Gates Substation and terminates at the PG&E Gregg Substation. The Gates-Gregg Project includes the transmission line itself, all required work within the fence line of each substation is not included as part of the Gates-Gregg Project.

\textit{Window}: April 1, 2013 - June 3, 2013.\textsuperscript{157}

\textit{Bidders}:\textsuperscript{158}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Elecnor Inc.
  \item Isolux Infrastructure
  \item PG&E and MidAmerican Transmission
  \item Pattern Energy Group LP and the City of Pittsburg
  \item G2G ProjectCo LLC (Trans Bay Cable)
\end{itemize}

\textit{Winner}: PG&E and MidAmerican Transmission


\textit{ISO Project Cost Estimate}: $115 - $145 million\textsuperscript{159}

\textit{Proposed In-service}: Initially March 31, 2020, but now December 2022 per the CAISO 2017-2018 transmission plan.\textsuperscript{160}

\textit{Notes}: Per a filing on May 17, 2018 in Docket No. ER17-1628, CAISO requested an amendment to the APSA to revise the milestones so that the permitting and construction of the Gates-Gregg Project could be put on hold pending the results of the CAISO 2017-2018 transmission planning process. In reviewing the Gates-Gregg Project in the CAISO’s 2016-2017 Transmission Planning Process, due to a decrease in the forecasted load the Gates-Gregg Project may no longer be needed.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{156} CAISO, Sycamore-Penasquitos 230 kV Line Description and Functional Specifications Eligible for Competitive Solicitation, April 1, 2013, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{157} CAISO Transmittal Letter, Docket No. ER14-2347-000, July 1, 2014.
\textsuperscript{158} CAISO, Gates Gregg Selection Report, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{159} CAISO, Gates-Gregg 230 kV Description and Functional Specifications for Competitive Solicitation, April 1, 2013, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{160} CAISO, 2017-18 Transmission Plan, March 22, 2018, p. 155.
\textsuperscript{161} CAISO-Gates Greg Approved Sponsor Project Agreement, filed May 18, 2017 in Docket No. ER17-1628.
**Imperial Valley**  
*Need: policy*

*Project detail:* 230 kV collector substation (located approximately one mile north of the Imperial Valley (“IV”) substation) and a 230 kV transmission line connecting the collector substation to the IV substation.

*Bidders:*  
- Imperial Irrigation District  
- Abengoa Transmission & Distribution

*Winner:* Imperial Irrigation District

*Winning bid:* $14,283,122

*Notes:* CAISO filed the APSA with FERC on May 23, 2014 in Docket No. ER14-2033-000 and FERC accepted the APSA effective July 23, 2014. The APSA had cost cap of $14,283,122. The project began development in July 2013 and was originally scheduled for energization on May 15, 2015. CAISO received notice from the Imperial Irrigation District on November 24, 2015 exercising its right to terminate the APSA.

*ISO Project Cost estimate:* $25 million, produced 2013

*Proposed In-service Date:* January 2015

**MISO**  

**Duff-Coleman**  
*Need: efficiency*

*Project:* MISO initiated its first solicitation process in January 2016 when it issued an RFP for a market efficiency project known as the Duff-Coleman EHV 345 kV Competitive Transmission Project, a 345-kV transmission line connecting the Duff substation in southern Indiana to the Coleman EHV substation in western Kentucky.

*Bidders:*  
- Ameren Transmission Company of Illinois and PPL TransLink, Inc.  
- Duke-American Transmission Company, LLC  
- Edison Transmission, LLC  
- GridAmerica Holdings, Inc.
• ITC Midcontinent Development, LLC
• Midcontinent MCN, LLC
• NextEra Energy Transmission Midwest, LLC
• Republic Transmission, LLC
• Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company d/b/a Vectren Energy Delivery of Indiana, Incorporated and Public Service Enterprise Group, Inc.
• Transource Energy, LLC
• Xcel Energy Transmission Development Company, LLC.

Winner: Republic Transmission, LLC, a partnership between Big Rivers Electric Corporation and LS Power, with a bid of $49.8 million. Republic Transmission's bid included a “firm rate base cap” of $58.1 million, or $47 million in 2016 dollars. MISO stated that the firm rate base cap transfers escalation risk and administrative and general cost increase risk away from customers.

ISO Implementation Cost: $1,331,940

Notes: In March 2017 Republic Transmission petitioned FERC for certain transmission rate incentives related to the Duff-Coleman project, including: 1) deferred recovery of prudently incurred pre-commercial costs through creation of a regulatory asset; 2) full recovery of prudently-incurred costs if the project is abandoned for reasons beyond Republic's control; 3) use of a hypothetical capital structure consisting of 55% debt and 45% equity until the project achieves commercial operation; and 4) 50 basis point adder to Republic's return on equity ("ROE") for participating in a RTO, subject to the overall ROE cap accepted by MISO. The Commission approved Republic's request for incentives with certain restrictions in October 2017, including the establishment of a regulatory asset for pre-commercial costs.

ISO Project Cost Estimate: MISO estimated project cost was $58.9 million.

References:
**Hartburg Sabine**

*Project:* 500 kV line known as Hartburg-Sabine Junction. The MISO scoping level estimated project cost was reported as $122.4 million.\(^{171}\)

*Bidders:*

- Avangrid Networks, Inc.
- EasTex TransCo, LLC
- GridLiance Heartland, LLC
- ITC Midcontinent Development, LLC / Hunt Transmission Services, LLC
- Midwest Power Transmission Arkansas, LLC
- NextEra Energy Transmission Midwest, LLC
- Transource Energy, LLC
- Verdant Plains Electric, LLC
- Xcel Energy Transmission Development Company, LLC

*Winner:* NextEra Energy Transmission Midwest won the solicitation with a project implementation cost capped at $114.8 million. NextEra submitted an estimated annual transmission revenue requirement of $95.0 million.\(^{172}\) The transmission revenue requirement will be capped only for the first ten years of the project’s service life. Other NextEra cost caps include an ROE cap of 9.8%, an equity ratio cap of 45%, and caps on O&M for the first ten years of the project’s rate recovery.

*ISO Evaluation Cost: $1,137,240\(^{173}\)*

**PJM**

PJM has conducted many solicitations for new projects since implementing Order No. 1000.\(^{174}\) PJM indicated in a May 2019 presentation that the RTO incurred $447,717 to evaluate 2016 Proposal Windows 1, 2, and 3 and $1,230,402 to evaluate the 2016/17 long term proposal window and Window 1 in 2017 proposals.\(^{175}\) The Brattle Report only estimates cost savings for the Artificial Island solicitation.

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\(^{171}\) MISO, Hartburg-Sabine Selection Report, November 27, 2018, p. 5.
\(^{172}\) MISO, Hartburg-Sabine Selection Report, November 27, 2018, pp. 5-6.
\(^{175}\) PJM, *Cost Containment Status and Next Steps* (May 16, 2019) at p. 20, [https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/pcc/20190516/20190516-item-08-cost-containment-status-and-next-steps.ashx](https://www.pjm.com/-/media/committees-groups/committees/pcc/20190516/20190516-item-08-cost-containment-status-and-next-steps.ashx)
Artificial Island

PJM, which uses a sponsorship model to comply with Order 1000, does not produce planning-level estimates of the transmission needs it issues solicitations for. As such, the Brattle Report uses a PSE&G bid as a "reference cost" to estimate the cost savings from the Artificial Island solicitation. Concentric identified the sources of the two figures Brattle used to estimate the savings, which Brattle claims were 60%, associated with the solicitation process. The table below summarizes these sources.

### Brattle Report Artificial Island Cost Estimate Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>&quot;Differences in Competitive Bids and Initial Cost Estimates&quot;</th>
<th>RTO/Incumbent Estimate of Project Cost ($M)</th>
<th>Winning Competitive Bid ($M)</th>
<th>&quot;Cost Advantage&quot; of Winning Bid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brattle Figure 13</td>
<td><strong>PJM Artificial Island White Paper, July 2015 at 12, referencing PSE&amp;G’s Project P2013_1-7E “New Freedom – Deans 500 and Salem-Hope Creek 500 kV lines</strong></td>
<td><strong>$692</strong></td>
<td><strong>$280</strong></td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The source of Brattle Report’s figure for the Incumbent cost estimate is PSE&G project # P2013_1-7E.176

Bidders that provided supplemental responses:177

- Dominion High Voltage (2013-1-1A)
- Dominion High Voltage (2013-1-1C)
- Transource (2013-1-2B) (also has a “Redacted Public Power Proposal”)
- Northeast Transmission Development (2013-1-5A)
- PSE&G (2013-1-7K)
- Virginia Electric and Power Company
- First Energy Corporation
- Pepco Holdings, Inc and Exelon Corporation
- Atlantic Grid Holdings LLC
- PSE&G

Winner: LS Power.

Notes: See the Artificial Island Case Study in Section 4.1 of this report.

Ap South

Need: Market Efficiency 2014/15 Long Term Proposal Window178
**Winner:** Project 9A - Transource Energy (an AEP affiliate), with integration work completed by BG&E and Allegheny Power. PJM released the results of its assessment where it determined that Project 9A offered the highest cost-benefit ratio. The PJM Board approved staff’s recommendation on August 2, 2016. PJM executed a Designated Entity Agreement with Transource Energy on November 2, 2016.

**Notes:** The proposed capital cost for Project 9A was $269,073,000, with upgrades on incumbent TO systems bringing the cost to $340.6 million. PJM reevaluated Project 9A in four times (September 2017, February 2018, September 2018, and November 2018) and continued to find a favorable cost-benefit ratio. The updated capital cost during a third re-evaluation that found the project continued to have a favorable cost-benefit ratio, was $372.23 million.

**Proposed In-Service Date:** 2020

### NYISO

NYISO has a sponsorship model and has carried out two solicitations – Western NY and AC Transmission. NYISO does not publicly release the winning bids but instead publishes project cost estimates produced by the independent consultant Substation Engineering Co.

#### Western NY Public Policy

**Need:** Policy

**Project:** build a power line that would allow for increased deliveries from a major New York Power Authority hydroelectric project and bring in renewable imports from Canada.

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180 PJM, Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee Market Efficiency Update, presented to the TEAC on June 9, 2016, p. 5.


182 PJM, Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee Market Efficiency Update, presented to the TEAC on June 9, 2016, p. 3.

Bidders:

Table 2-3: Proposed Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location (County/State)</th>
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<tr>
<td>NRG Dunkirk Power</td>
<td>Dunkirk Gas Addition</td>
<td>OPP02</td>
<td>OPPP</td>
<td>ST</td>
<td>Chautauqua, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America Transmission</td>
<td>Proposal 1</td>
<td>T005</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Niagara-Erie, NY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America Transmission</td>
<td>Proposal 2</td>
<td>T007</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Niagara-Erie, NY, Wyoming, NY</td>
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<td>North America Transmission</td>
<td>Proposal 3</td>
<td>T008</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Niagara-Erie, NY, Wyoming, NY</td>
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<td>North America Transmission</td>
<td>Proposal 4</td>
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<td>PPTP</td>
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<td>National Grid</td>
<td>Moderate Power Transfer Solution</td>
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<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC</td>
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<td>High Power Transfer Solution</td>
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<td>NYPx/NYSEG</td>
<td>Western NY Energy Link</td>
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<td>AC</td>
<td>Niagara-Erie, NY, Wyoming, NY</td>
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<td>NextEra Energy Transmission New York</td>
<td>Empire State Line Proposal 1</td>
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<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Niagara-Erie, NY</td>
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<td>NextEra Energy Transmission New York</td>
<td>Empire State Line Proposal 2</td>
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<td>PPTP</td>
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<td>Niagara-Erie, NY</td>
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<td>Exelon Transmission Company</td>
<td>Niagara Area Transmission Expansion</td>
<td>T017</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Niagara-Erie, NY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PPTP = Public Policy Transmission Project  
OPPP = Other Public Policy Project  
ST = Steam Turbine  
AC = Alternating Current Transmission

Independent Third-Party Cost Estimates for Western NY proposals:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Independent Cost Estimate: 2017 $M</th>
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<tr>
<td>T006</td>
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<td>T007</td>
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</table>

Winner: NextEra Energy Transmission New York, Inc., ("NEETNY") Empire State Line Project 1 (T014). The project includes a new Dysinger 345 kV substation, a new East Stolle 345 kV 17 switchyard, and a 345 kV line connecting Dysinger and East Stolle substations, with a 700 MVA 345 kV phase angle regulator at the Dysinger switchyard. All facilities will predominantly use existing rights-of-way.

Notes: NEETNY filed an application with the New York State Public Service Commission in August 2018 for a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need to build, operate, and maintain the Empire State Line Project. NEETNY also made a filing with FERC to establish the architecture for a formula rate and requested ROE adders, which FERC approved in November 2017.

Proposed in-service date: June 2022.

AC Transmission

Need: Policy

Project: Two new 345-kV transmission lines to address persistent transmission congestion at the Central East (Segment A) electrical interface and Upstate New York/Southeast New York (UPNY/SENY, or Segment B).

Window: February 29, 2016 - April 29, 2016

Bidders: Six Developers submitted 16 project proposals

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189 NYISO, AC Transmission, AC Transmission Public Policy Transmission Need Viability and Sufficiency Assessment, September 16, 2016.
### AC Transmission Proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developer</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Grid / Transco</td>
<td>New York Energy Solution Seg. A</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Grid / Transco</td>
<td>New York Energy Solution Seg. B</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment B</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NextEra Energy Transmission New York</td>
<td>Enterprise Line: Segment A</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment A</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NextEra Energy Transmission New York</td>
<td>Enterprise Line: Segment B</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment B</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NextEra Energy Transmission New York</td>
<td>Enterprise Line, Segment B-Al</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment B</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>North America Transmission / NYPA</td>
<td>Segment A +765 kV</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America Transmission / NYPA</td>
<td>Segment A Base</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>North America Transmission / NYPA</td>
<td>Segment A Double Circuit</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment A</td>
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<tr>
<td>North America Transmission / NYPA</td>
<td>Segment A Enhanced</td>
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<td>AC Transmission</td>
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<td>North America Transmission / NYPA</td>
<td>Segment B Base</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
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<td>Segment B</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>North America Transmission / NYPA</td>
<td>Segment B Enhanced</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment B</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
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<td>ITC New York Development</td>
<td>TNYPP1-IA AC Transmission</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>TNYPP1-IB AC Transmission</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>AC Transmission</td>
<td>Segment B</td>
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<td>AwenGrid</td>
<td>Connect New York Recommended</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>HVDC</td>
<td>Segments A and B</td>
<td>1000 MW</td>
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<tr>
<td>AwenGrid</td>
<td>Connect New York Alternative</td>
<td>PPTP</td>
<td>HVDC</td>
<td>Segments A and B</td>
<td>1000 MW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GlidePath</td>
<td>Distributed Generation Portfolio</td>
<td>OPPP</td>
<td>Generation</td>
<td>Orange, Ulster, Putnam, Greene, NY</td>
<td>112 MW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PPTP: Public Policy Transmission Project  OPPP: Other Public Policy Project

Source: NYISO, ESPWG/TPAS Presentation, September 26, 2016.\(^{190}\)

### Third party estimate of AC Transmission Proposal Costs

#### Table A-3: Cost per MW Ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Segment B Independent Cost Estimate (2018 SM)</th>
<th>Incremental U/PNY/SENY (MW)</th>
<th>Cost per MW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T027+T019</td>
<td>$479</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>0.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T027+T022</td>
<td>$373</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>0.233</td>
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<tr>
<td>T027+T023</td>
<td>$424</td>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T027+T029</td>
<td>$422</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T027+T030</td>
<td>$441</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>0.276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T027+T032</td>
<td>$536</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results show that T019 has the lowest Cost per MW ratio of all the Segment B projects.

Source: NYISO, AC Transmission, Revised Draft Report Addendum.\(^{191}\)

### Winners:

**Segment A:** NYISO staff recommended and the NYISO Board approved Project T027, a joint proposal by North America Transmission and the New York Power Authority to construct a double-circuit 345-kV line from Edic to New Scotland.

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\(^{190}\) NYISO, AC Transmission, AC Transmission Public Policy Transmission Need Viability and Sufficiency Assessment, September 26, 2016, p. 10.

\(^{191}\) NYISO, AC Transmission Public Policy Transmission Planning Report Addendum, Draft, February 20, 2019, p. 11.
Segment B: NYISO staff recommended a joint proposal by North America Transmission and the New York Power Authority (project T029). However, the NYISO Board revised the NYISO staff’s selection for Segment B, and selected a competing proposal by National Grid and New York Transco (project T019). The NYISO Board determined that project T019 “demonstrated superior performance across a broader range of metrics when compared to Project T029 and the other proposed Segment B projects, including, significantly, providing additional transfer capability across the UPNY/SENY transmission interface.”

SPP

To date, SPP’s integrated transmission planning process has only recommended one project for solicitation, a 21-mile 115 kV line from North Liberal to Walkemeyer Station. SPP hires a third-party industry expert panel to review proposals for new transmission projects.

Walkemeyer

Bidders: The Walkemeyer solicitation had 11 total proposals with costs ranging from $17.1 million to $7.5 million.

Winner: Mid Kansas Electric Company, with a total project cost of $8.3 million. All other project bidders remain confidential. The Walkemeyer project was canceled in June 2016 due to declining load.

ISO Project Cost Estimate: $17.5 million

ISO Evaluation Cost: $522,196

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192 NYISO, Notice of Board of Directors’ Decision on Approval of AC Transmission Public Policy Transmission Planning Report and Selection of Public Policy Transmission Projects (April 8, 2019) at 4.
193 Industry Expert Panel Recommendation Report, RFP-000001 (Walkemeyer - North Liberal 115kV) April 12, 2016, p. 4, Table 1.
194 SPP 2016 Q3 Quarterly Project Tracking Report, p. 7.
195 SPP, MOPC Report to Board of Directors / Members Committee, April 28, 2015, slide 51.
196 SPP Strategic Planning Committee – Order 1000 Workshop Meeting Minutes (July 7, 2016), p. 1.

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APPENDIX D: COST CAPS

Cost caps have been included in multiple ISO/RTO solicitation proposals and comprise a broad range of containment measures. The following provides an overview of bidders’ proposed cost caps in each RTO or ISO that held solicitations.

CAISO

HENRY ALLEN TO ELDORADO (DESERTLINK)\(^\text{197}\)

Incentive rate treatments:

- Deferred recovery of prudently incurred pre-commercial costs through creation of a regulatory asset
- Full recovery of prudently incurred costs if the project is abandoned for reasons beyond DesertLink’s control
- Use of a hypothetical capital structure consisting of 50% debt and 50% equity until the project achieves commercial operation
- 50-basis point RTO Participation adder subject to the overall ROE not exceeding the ROE cap commitment in DesertLink’s Project proposal (9.8%)\(^\text{197}\)

MISO

DUFF-COLEMAN (REPUBLIC TRANSMISSION)

- “Firm rate base cap” of $58.1 million, or $47 million in 2016 dollars\(^\text{198}\)
- MISO discussed that the firm rate base cap transfers escalation risk and administrative and general cost increase risk away from customers.

FERC RATE INCENTIVES:\(^\text{199}\)

- Deferred recovery of prudently incurred pre-commercial costs through creation of a regulatory asset;
- Full recovery of prudently incurred costs if the Project is abandoned for reasons beyond Republic’s control;

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\(^{197}\) DesertLink, LLC, Order on Transmission Owner Tariff and Formula Rate Proposal, Establishing Hearing and Settlement Judge Procedures and Dismissing Request for Rehearing, 161 FERC ¶ 61,126 (October 31, 2017). Note, not all CAISO project cost caps are discussed herein.

\(^{198}\) Duff-Coleman Selection Report, December 20, 2016, p. 38

\(^{199}\) Republic Transmission, LLC, Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Order, 161 FERC ¶ 61,036 (October 6, 2017).
• Use of a hypothetical capital structure consisting of 55% debt and 45% equity until the project achieves commercial operation, which ratio is consistent with Republic’s commitment and accepted by MISO; and
• 50-basis point adder to Republic’s ROE for participating in a RTO, subject to the overall return on equity cap (inclusive of incentives) Republic committed to as part of its project proposal submitted to and accepted by MISO.200,201

Other proposals offer cost caps such as caps on ROE, capital structure, implementation costs, O&M costs, inflation rate assumptions, and other rate concessions.

**HARTBURG-SABINE (NEXTERA ENERGY TRANSMISSION MIDWEST)**

Project implementation cost capped at $114.8 million202

Estimated annual transmission revenue requirement of $95.0 million or $11 million below the median estimate, capped for the first 10 years of project’s recovery lifetime.203

ROE cap of 9.8%, an equity ratio cap of 45%, and caps on O&M for the first ten years of the project’s rate recovery.

Other proposals' cost caps included caps on total implementation cost, foregoing AFUDC, foregoing CWIP, a line route changes from the Texas siting authority, ROE and equity ratio caps, and caps on annual transmission revenue requirement and O&M expenses that range from 5 years to 40 years.204

**SPP**

**WALKEMEYER (MID KANSAS ELECTRIC COMPANY)**

• The Walkemeyer project was canceled in June 2016 due to declining load.
• Cost containment ability and experience metric was considered in evaluation of each RFP

Other proposals included various cost cap provisions such as total cost caps, ROE and equity ratio caps, and rate base caps. The proposals also included a mix of provisions for cost overrun pass-throughs such as capitalized property taxes.

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201 Republic Transmission, LLC, Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Order, 161 FERC ¶ 61,036. Docket No. EL17-52-000. (October 6, 2017). Republic argued that the requested incentives “are narrowly tailored to the risks faced in the development and construction of the Project and will allow Republic to attract the capital necessary to move forward with the Project in the most efficient and cost-effective manner.” The FERC approved Republic’s request for incentives with certain restrictions in October 2017, including the establishment of a regulatory asset for pre-commercial costs.
202 MISO, Hartburg-Sabine Selection Report, November 27, 2018, p. 5.
203 MISO, Hartburg-Sabine Selection Report, November 27, 2018, p. 5-6.
204 Hartburg-Sabine Selection Report, November 27, 2018, p. 20.
**APPENDIX D: COST CAPS**

**WESTERN NEW YORK PUBLIC POLICY**

- FERC ROE incentives
- NYISO did not take cost caps into account in its selection process noting it is not required by Order No. 1000.

**AC PUBLIC POLICY TRANSMISSION NEEDS**

- NYSPC highly encouraged cost containment incentives, noting that the developer should share in some portion of cost overruns should they occur. Similarly, the developer should share in any cost savings should they occur.

**PJM**

**ARTIFICIAL ISLAND (NORTHEAST TRANSMISSION DEVELOPMENT)**

- Northeast Transmission Development received FERC-approved ROE, debt/equity structure, abandonment recovery, and cost containment provisions.
- Construction cost cap subject to certain exemptions.

**AP SOUTH (TRANSOURCE)**

- Project cost cap of $197.1 million, with an annual 3% compounded escalation adjustment to account for inflation as measured from the bid submission date of February 27, 2015 and the Project In-Service Date in 2020.
- FERC-approved ROE plus incentives on the costs incurred for the Project up to the Estimated Project Cost;
- FERC-approved ROE on the costs incurred for the Project above the Estimated Project Cost, but shall forego any return on equity incentives approved by FERC (including the RTO participation adder) for the project cost portion that exceeds the Estimated Project Cost; and
- Cap on actual equity content of no greater than 50% for the Project, once permanent financing is in place.
  - Transource shall be granted relief from this commitment if the capital market conditions do not remain normal and the Transource Subsidiaries do not have the ability to finance these transmission projects with the proposed capital structure.

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APPENDIX E: ORDER NO. 1000 BACKGROUND

In July 2011, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued a final rule entitled *Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities*. The Commission subsequently clarified and revised the Order No. 1000 requirements in Order No. 1000-A in May 2012 and Order No. 1000-B in October 2012. It is important to understand the scope of FERC’s Order No. 1000 reforms, specifically what they did and did not require with respect to transmission planning. Regarding transmission planning, Order No. 1000 required public utility transmission providers, such as Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) or Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”), to:

- Participate in a regional transmission planning process that produces a regional transmission plan;
- Amend its Open Access Transmission Tariff (“OATT”) to describe procedures to consider transmission needs driven by public policy requirements established by local, state, or federal laws or regulations in the local and regional transmission planning processes;
- Remove federal ROFRs from Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and agreements for certain new transmission facilities; and
- Improve coordination between neighboring transmission planning regions for new interregional transmission facilities.

Order No. 1000 also established regulations related to allocating the costs of new transmission facilities selected through a regional planning process to subregions of a planning region (e.g., zones). However, these cost allocation requirements are not the focus of this report and are not discussed herein. Order No. 1000 also required that the regional transmission planning process result in a regional transmission plan that satisfies the transmission planning requirements set forth in Order No. 890: 1) coordination; 2) openness; 3) transparency; 4) information exchange; 5) comparability; 6) dispute resolution; and 7) economic planning.

The Order No. 1000 requirements were never intended to open all new FERC-jurisdictional transmission facilities – or some arbitrary percentage of them – to solicitation. Rather, the Order No. 1000 requirements

209 Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public Utilities, 141 FERC ¶ 61,044 (October 18, 2012) (Order No. 1000-B).
210 This report refers to the requirements promulgated in Order No. 1000, as clarified in Order Nos. 1000-A and 1000-B, collectively as “Order No. 1000 requirements” or “Order No. 1000”. Distinctions are only made for purposes of citation. Order No. 1000 Summary.
211 Order No. 1000 at PP 146, 151. These transmission planning principles are explained in Order No. 890 (Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,241, order on reh’g, Order No. 890-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,261 (2007), order on reh’g, Order No. 890-B, 123 FERC ¶ 61,299 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 890-C, 126 FERC ¶ 61,228, order on clarification, Order No. 890-D, 129 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2009)).
were discretely focused on a subset of new transmission facilities. Specifically, Order No. 1000’s transmission planning requirements require public utility transmission providers to adopt transparent and not unduly discriminatory criteria for selecting new transmission facilities in a regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation.\(^{213}\) As such, the Order No. 1000 requirements only applies to transmission facilities that meet all three of the following requirements:

- new facilities (i.e., not upgrades to existing facilities)
- selected as part of a regional transmission plan (as opposed to a local plan)
- allocated regionally (i.e., not allocated solely within a single zone).

The three requirements are discussed in turn below. In promulgating the Order No. 1000 requirements, the Commission determined it was necessary, in certain circumstances, to eliminate the federal right of first refusal ("ROFR") afforded to incumbent transmission owners from FERC-jurisdictional tariffs and agreements to ensure the selection of new transmission facilities through the regional planning process for purposes of cost allocation does not impede a nonincumbent transmission developer’s participation in regional transmission planning.\(^{214}\) Practically speaking, removing the federal ROFR from FERC-jurisdictional tariffs and agreements (e.g., ISO/RTO tariffs or TO participation agreements) permitted nonincumbent transmission developers to propose alternative solutions in the regional transmission planning process. The Order No. 1000 requirements only apply to certain transmission projects, and the ISO/RTO tariffs that the Commission ultimately approved to comply with Order No. 1000 requirements retain an incumbent TO’s federal ROFR for other transmission projects. The transmission projects that are subject to the Order No. 1000 requirements – new facilities that are selected in a regional plan with costs that are allocated regionally – are discussed below.

**New transmission facilities**

Order No. 1000 applies to new facilities, not upgrades. As such, the Order No. 1000 requirements only eliminated the federal ROFR from FERC-jurisdictional tariffs and agreements for new transmission facilities selected in a regional plan for purposes of cost allocation.\(^{215}\) Accordingly, incumbent TOs retained a federal ROFR for upgrades to their own transmission facilities.\(^{216}\) For example, the Commission stated that the Order No. 1000 requirements:

> [D]o not affect the right of an incumbent transmission provider to build, own and recover costs for upgrades to its own transmission facilities, such as in the case of tower change outs or reconductoring, regardless of whether or not an upgrade has been selected in the regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation. In other words, an incumbent transmission

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\(^{213}\) See e.g., Order No. 1000-A at P 415 and Order No. 1000-B at P 59.

\(^{214}\) See e.g., Order No. 1000 at PP 261, 320. See also Order No. 1000 at P 261.

\(^{215}\) Order No. No. 1000-A at 415. See also Order No. 1000-B at P 41.

\(^{216}\) The NYISO tariff and agreements did not contain any federal ROFRs and thus were not required to modify any ROFR pursuant to Order No. 1000 requirements.
provider would be permitted to maintain a federal right of first refusal for upgrades to its own transmission facilities.\textsuperscript{217}

In Order No. 1000-A, the Commission clarified that an upgrade is an “improvement to, addition to, or replacement of a part of, an existing transmission facility” and does not refer to an entirely new transmission facility.\textsuperscript{218}

**Facilities selected in a regional transmission plan**

ISO/RTO transmission planning involves both a local aspect, which generally occurs within a given incumbent TO’s distribution service territory, and a regional aspect related the integrated operation of the local distribution service territories within a larger planning region (e.g., ISO/RTO). As noted above, the Order No. 1000 requirements only applied to new transmission facilities that are selected through a regional transmission plan for the purposes of cost allocation. As such, Order No. 1000 did not require ISOs/RTOs to eliminate an incumbent TO's federal ROFR to construct local transmission facilities, where the Commission defined a “local transmission facility” as a "transmission facility located solely within a public utility transmission provider's retail distribution service territory or footprint that is not selected in the regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation.”\textsuperscript{219}

The Commission explicitly recognized the fact that incumbent TOs must comply with reliability standards and have an obligation to serve customers. Accordingly, the Commission affirmatively stated that the Order No. 1000 requirements were not intended to disrupt a TO’s local planning processes:

> We clarify that our actions today are not intended to diminish the significance of an incumbent transmission provider’s reliability needs or service obligations. Currently, an incumbent transmission provider may meet its reliability needs or service obligations by building new transmission facilities that are located solely within its retail distribution service territory or footprint. The Final Rule continues to permit an incumbent transmission provider to meet its reliability needs or service obligations by choosing to build new transmission facilities that are located solely within its retail distribution service territory or footprint and that are not submitted for regional cost allocation.\textsuperscript{220}

Order No. 1000 did not create a categorical exemption from eliminating a jurisdictional federal ROFR for reliability projects selected through the regional planning process.\textsuperscript{221} However, the Commission stressed the importance of the incumbent TO’s responsibility to maintain reliability in its service territory. Specifically, Order No. 1000 states that “nothing herein restricts an incumbent transmission provider from developing a local transmission solution that is not eligible for regional cost allocation to meet its reliability needs or service obligations in its own retail distribution service territory or footprint.”\textsuperscript{222}

\textsuperscript{217} Order No 1000 at P 319. See also Order No. 1000-A at P 426.  
\textsuperscript{218} Order No. 1000-A at P 426.  
\textsuperscript{219} Order No. 1000 at P 63.  
\textsuperscript{220} Order No. 1000 at P 262.  
\textsuperscript{221} Order No. 1000-A at P 428.  
\textsuperscript{222} Order No. 1000 at P 329.
The Commission also recognized that reliability issues may need to be addressed quickly and that, “one function of the regional transmission planning process is to identify those transmission facilities that are needed to meet identified needs on a timely basis and, in turn, enable public utility transmission providers to meet their service obligations.” For example, Order No. 1000 required public utility transmission providers to have procedures in place in the event that a transmission project selected through the regional planning process experienced development delays that could threaten an incumbent TO’s obligation to meet its reliability needs or service obligations.

The Commission also recognized the need to satisfy reliability requirements in a timely matter in the Order No. 1000 compliance orders it issued for the six jurisdictional ISOs/RTOs. As discussed further below in the Order 1000 compliance section of this Appendix, the Commission has accepted ISO/RTO tariff provisions that retain, in certain circumstances, an incumbent TO’s federal ROFR to construct a transmission project in that TO’s service territory if a given project is needed by a certain date for reliability purposes.

For example, when the Commission approved PJM’s Order No. 1000 compliance filing to designate the incumbent TO as the transmission developer of “Immediate Need Reliability Projects,” which are projects needed in three years or less. The Commission stated “We agree with PJM that there may be instances in which it may not be feasible to hold a competitive solicitation process to solve a reliability violation. Thus, to avoid delays in the development of transmission facilities needed to resolve a time-sensitive reliability criteria violation, we find that it is just and reasonable to include a class of transmission projects that are exempt from the competitive solicitation.”

**Projects with regionally allocated costs**
The Commission Order No. 1000 requirements only apply to new transmission projects that are selected through a regional planning process and for which the costs will be allocated to more than one zone. The Commission clarified in Order No. 1000-A that Order No. 1000 “does not require elimination of a federal right of first refusal for a new transmission facility if the regional cost allocation method results in 100% of the facility’s cost being allocated to the public utility transmission provider in whose retail distribution service territory or footprint the facility is to be located.” In Order No. 1000-A the Commission further clarified that the phrase “selected in a regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation” “excludes a new transmission facility if the costs of that facility are borne entirely by the public utility transmission provider in whose retail distribution service territory or footprint that new transmission facility is to be located.” The Commission also clarified in Order No. 1000-B that the act of selecting a new transmission facility in the

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223 Order No. 1000 at P 264.
224 Order No. 1000 at P 329. See also Order No. 1000-A at P 428.
225 ISO/RTO Order No. 1000 compliance orders, which occurred over several iterations, are available here: https://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/trans-plan/regional.asp?csrt=917136660019168714
226 PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 142 FERC ¶ 61,214 (March 22, 2013) at P 247.
227 Order No. 1000-A at P 423.
228 Order No. 1000-A at P 423.
regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation triggers the applicability and attendant requirements of Order No. 1000. Accordingly, transmission facilities that are not selected through a regional planning process (e.g., selected through a local planning process) and facilities that are selected through a regional planning process but not for purposes of regional cost allocation are not subject to Order No. 1000 requirements.

**ROFR and rights-of-way granted by others**

FERC only has jurisdiction over ROFRs, to the extent they exist, in FERC-jurisdictional tariffs and agreements. However, an incumbent TO may have a ROFR to construct a transmission project within its service territory that is granted by a state or local authority. The Commission clarified in Order No. 1000-A that the requirement to eliminate a federal ROFR in certain circumstances does not preempt state law because the Order No. 1000 requirements are "focused on Commission-jurisdictional tariffs and agreements, and are not intended to preempt state or local laws or regulations." With respect to rights of way in particular, the Commission explained that Order No. 1000 requirements are "not intended to alter an incumbent transmission provider's use and control of its existing rights-of-way" and that the requirements do not "grant or deny transmission developers the ability to use rights-of-way held by other entities, even if transmission facilities associated with such upgrades or uses of existing rights-of-way are selected in the regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation."

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229 "[O]nce a new transmission facility is selected in the regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation, it is no longer a local transmission facility exempt from the requirements of Order Nos. 1000 and 1000-A regarding the removal of federal rights of first refusal." Order No. 1000-B at P 52.

230 Order No. 1000-A at P 379.

231 Order No. 1000 at P 319.

232 Order No. 1000 at P 319.