COMPETITIVE TRANSMISSION
Experience To-Date Shows Order No. 1000 Solicitations Fail to Show Benefits


August 2022
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I. INTRODUCTION & EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The value of electric transmission is significant and well documented. Transmission infrastructure provides an essential link between the sources that generate electricity and the customers who expect a reliable and resilient source of power at a reasonable cost. Transmission enables production cost savings and emissions reductions, reduces losses, and increases access to lower cost generation resources for the benefit of customers.

As the power grid continues to transition to one that is increasingly reliant on intermittent resources to meet demand for clean power, the role of transmission in delivering the output from these renewable resources has never been more critical. Over a decade ago, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “Commission”) sought to spur transmission investment by promulgating Order No. 1000. Among other things, Order No. 1000 sought to open the transmission space to competitive bidding processes, under the assumption that these processes would encourage innovation and cost savings. Since that time, proponents of transmission competition have argued that significant cost savings can be achieved through competitive bidding processes; however, there has been very little real-world data on completed projects to validate these assertions.¹ Now, ten years later, this data is beginning to become available for analysis. As policymakers consider how to promote the development of needed transmission and all its associated benefits to customers, it is critical that the real-world experience with competitive transmission be brought to light.

As shown below, a review of competitive projects that are now in service or in advanced stages of development clearly demonstrates that Order No. 1000 competitive solicitations have not been successful in driving cost savings and have added delays to the development of transmission infrastructure. Competitive solicitations added as many as 1000 days to the development of transmission projects, and many experienced cost escalations, further questioning the value of competitive solicitations.

¹ Concentric’s report, “Building New Transmission” dated June 2019, showed that incumbent transmission owners have successfully controlled costs for transmission projects that they have undertaken.
Table 1: Case Study Cost Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Region’s Cost Estimate ($M)</th>
<th>Winning Bid Cost Estimate ($M)</th>
<th>Final Cost or Current Estimate ($M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empire State</td>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial Island</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>149.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff Coleman</td>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaney to Colorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suncrest</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>50-75</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Allen to Eldorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>120^2</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>202.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the critical question of whether transmission competition saves customers money, the results from key projects are now clear: in some cases, competitive project costs have escalated significantly against initial estimates provided in the selected proposals, as developers utilize exceptions to cost caps and guarantees to recover higher than expected costs. In other cases, final project costs for competitive projects appear in line with cost proposals from other submitted bids and initial planning estimates, raising questions about whether the competitive bidding process resulted in lower costs, particularly if the costs of administering the competitive processes and the costs of preparing the bids are factored in. Whereas, incumbent TOs have demonstrated the ability manage project costs effectively even without imposed price caps. The conclusions drawn here are based on publicly available information and the public reporting of final or projected-final project costs. In many cases, transparency on this data is limited.

The competitively bid projects examined here have experienced a range of challenges, including:

- Schedule adherence - several projects experienced significant scoping and schedule adherence challenges, due to route changes and other construction delays. Other projects experienced planning issues, significantly delaying in-service dates and far exceeding project deadlines, which carries a real cost in delayed benefits to customers. On average, the examined projects were delayed approximately a year beyond the required in-service date, as demonstrated below in Table 2. Three of the six case studies experienced delays to service of over a year, and two projects have run more than two years behind schedule.

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Table 2: CASE STUDY DELAYS TO SCHEDULE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>REQUIRED IN-SERVICE DATE</th>
<th>IN-SERVICE DATE</th>
<th>DELAY TO SCHEDULE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empire State</td>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>June 2022</td>
<td>July 2022</td>
<td>1 Month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial Island</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>April 2019</td>
<td>May 2020</td>
<td>1 Year 1 Month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff Coleman</td>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>January 2021</td>
<td>June 2020</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaney to Colorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>May 2020</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>2+ Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suncrest</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>June 2017</td>
<td>February 2020</td>
<td>2 Years 8 Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Allen to Eldorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>May 2020</td>
<td>August 2020</td>
<td>3 Months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Significant cost overruns - Several projects have experienced significant cost overruns due to factors which may have been foreseen (and potentially avoided) by experienced incumbent TOs, such as: regulatory delays, re-routing, and other environmental challenges. In some instances, cost containment provisions have offered little protection against cost increases due to the use of exclusions that allow developers to recover the costs of major cost escalations.

- New entry - While Order No. 1000's objectives include encouraging new developer market entry, the number of discrete developers competing in each ISO/RTO's competitive solicitations examined appears to have remained relatively constant even in recent solicitations. This suggests that FERC's desire to open the development of transmission infrastructure to a broader set of participants has not been fulfilled.

- Administrative costs - The costs associated with preparing bids submitted in the competitive solicitations are significant, as are the costs incurred by the ISOs/RTOs in administering these competitive processes.

- Operational performance issues – One project experienced a sustained derate since entering commercial operation, effectively limiting the transmission benefits that would have inured to the benefit of ratepayers had these derates been avoided. The Artificial Island reliability derate raises questions about project design and potential adverse incentives created by the solicitation process; however, the reasons for the derate have not been made public.

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4 PJM's initial in-service date was April 2019. Due to challenges throughout the process that are discussed in Section V, the project was suspended and rescaled. PJM's updated in-service date was June 2020.

5 The Delaney to Colorado River Project is expected to enter service in 2023, indicating an overall delay close to three years.
Reliability performance is a function of many factors and is not specific to non-incumbent developer status.

Given that the timely development of transmission is critical for meeting clean energy goals and improving system resilience, these case studies offer a clear indication that the competitive bidding of transmission development under Order No. 1000 has not provided the expected benefits.\(^6\)

The remainder of this report is organized as follows: this section includes an executive summary describing our findings from a review of competitive solicitations conducted to-date. Section II provides a background on federal policy related to transmission development. Section III provides a brief overview of competitive transmission solicitations to date. Section IV provides a brief discussion of how case studies were selected, and Section V provides detailed information on those six competitive transmission case studies. Section VI provides our findings and conclusions.

II. BACKGROUND ON FERC ORDER 1000

A. HISTORY
In 2011, the FERC issued Order No. 1000 in response to the growing challenge in the United States of planning for and constructing new transmission to keep pace with national and state energy policy priorities. Order No. 1000 addressed three fundamental reforms affecting transmission planning: regional transmission planning reforms, cost allocation reforms, and non-incumbent developer reforms related to the right of first refusal (“ROFR”). Regional transmission planning reforms involved designing regional planning processes that considered public policy, economic and reliability needs. Cost allocation reforms required each of the FERC-approved planning regions, including the six FERC-jurisdictional independent system operators (“ISOs”) and regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”), to develop methodologies to comply with certain principles by which costs for the projects identified in their transmission plans would be allocated to entities in the region based on a “beneficiary pays” approach. Finally, and importantly, Order No. 1000 removed incumbent transmission providers’ ROFR for a transmission facility selected in a regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation, subject to certain limitations. Under a ROFR system, incumbent utilities have the exclusive right to build, maintain and own transmission lines located within their service territory. The Order No. 1000 ROFR reforms applied only to regionally cost-allocated projects—local projects, for example, were exempted.

B. OBJECTIVES
Federal and state lawmakers and regulators have passed a host of laws and regulations in recent years with significant impacts on generation mix and future transmission needs. These policies have included the promotion of renewable energy, energy efficiency, and demand response. With the increasing role of renewables and customer-focused technologies, FERC acknowledged that existing orders regarding transmission did not provide regional planners adequate direction as to how to consider these new technologies. As a result, new transmission development was lagging behind need in many areas. Order No. 1000 attempted to update transmission planning to cope with these ongoing changes to the power industry and the energy regulatory landscape by setting forth several major new requirements. The objectives of Order No. 1000 are detailed on the FERC’s website:
Order No. 1000 is a Final Rule that reforms the Commission’s electric transmission planning and cost allocation requirements for public utility transmission providers. The rule builds on the reforms of Order No. 890 and corrects remaining deficiencies with respect to transmission planning processes and cost allocation methods. In addition to planning and cost allocation reforms, Order No. 1000 contained important reforms involving non-incumbent transmission developers as detailed below:

- Public utility transmission providers must remove from Commission-approved tariffs and agreements a federal right of first refusal for a transmission facility selected in a regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation, subject to four limitations: This does not apply to a transmission facility that is not selected in a regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation. This allows, but does not require, public utility transmission providers in a transmission planning region to use competitive bidding to solicit transmission projects or project developers.
- Nothing in this requirement affects state or local laws or regulations regarding the construction of transmission facilities, including but not limited to authority over siting or permitting of transmission facilities.
- The rule recognizes that incumbent transmission providers may rely on regional transmission facilities to satisfy their reliability needs or service obligations. The rule requires each public utility transmission provider to amend its tariff to require reevaluation of the regional transmission plan to determine if delays in the development of a transmission facility require evaluation of alternative solutions, including those proposed by the incumbent, to ensure incumbent transmission providers can meet reliability needs or service obligations.7

On April 21, 2022, the FERC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) that reiterated the objectives it sought to achieve under Order No. 1000:

Accordingly, we preliminarily find that, while Order No. 1000’s nonincumbent transmission developer reforms have a sound theoretical basis in requiring the elimination of all federal rights of first refusal for entirely new transmission facilities selected in a regional transmission plan for purposes of cost allocation, the remedy prescribed by Order No. 1000 failed to recognize that at least some of the most notable expected benefits from competitive transmission development processes (e.g., new transmission developer market entry, greater innovation in and potentially lower costs of transmission development) could be achieved or at least reasonably approximated through other means.8

8 FERC NOPR April 2022 RM21-17-000, para. 353.
As FERC considers potential revisions to the Order No. 1000 framework outlined in the April 21 NOPR, it is worthwhile to consider whether the “expected benefits from competitive transmission development processes” cited above have actually materialized. This, in turn, can help to guide the Commission’s efforts to implement a policy framework that results in the development of needed transmission infrastructure and associated benefits to customers. As described in detail below, the available case study data represents that competitive bidding for transmission has not delivered benefits to customers, and the costs and risks far outweigh any perceived benefit from this process.
III. EXPERIENCE WITH COMPETITIVE TRANSMISSION

A. US EXPERIENCE WITH COMPETITIVE TRANSMISSION PROJECTS

In implementing Order No. 1000, planning regions have adopted varying approaches to integrating the transmission planning process with the mandated competitive solicitation process. The design of the competitive solicitation process used by the California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”), the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (“MISO”), and the Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”) involves identifying specific projects that they conclude are needed to meet reliability, market efficiency, and public policy needs through the regional transmission planning process. A competitive solicitation and associated request for proposals (“RFP”) is then developed for projects meeting the specified criteria. Economic projects that were delayed due to Order No. 1000 competition represent a lost benefit to ratepayers due to that delay. The specific projects are put out for competitive bidding, with competition being largely limited to the construction and ownership of the project. The FERC refers to this model as a “competitive bidding” model.

Alternatively, the PJM Interconnection (“PJM”), ISO New England Inc. (“ISO-NE”) and the New York Independent System Operator (“NYISO”) use the transmission planning process to identify specific reliability, market efficiency, and public policy “needs.” The competitive process then allows bidders to specify proposed transmission projects that meet these needs. The FERC refers to this as a “sponsorship” model. Arguably, this model gives the competitive procurement process a greater opportunity to attract more innovative and cost-effective solutions to a transmission need that might not have been identified through a specific project first identified by the ISO/RTO and then subject to competitive procurement. However, NYISO and PJM have applied the sponsorship model quite differently. In principle, the PJM Regional Transmission Expansion (“RTEP”) planning process and the associated competitive “windows” provide a greater number of opportunities for incumbents and non-incumbents to compete for reliability and market efficiency projects as compared to the NYISO, which has designated only three large “public interest” needs for which competitive solicitations have been initiated.

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9 ISO-NE has had only one competitive solicitation to-date, which was held in 2020. This project has not yet begun construction.
In practice, the number of competitive solicitations that have been initiated has been relatively modest. Over the past decade, 25 competitive transmission projects have been carried out with approximately 75 discrete developers submitting over 800 proposals.\(^{10}\)

- CAISO has had ten competitive transmission projects awarded since 2017, with nonincumbent developers making up over 65% of discrete entities involved in both cases.
- NYISO received proposals from a higher percentage of incumbent developers for its 2020 NY AC Docket Project, while observing a majority of nonincumbents submit bids for its other two competitive solicitations in the past five years.
- MISO has conducted two competitive transmission projects since 2016, and the majority of proposals were submitted by nonincumbent transmission developers.\(^{11,12}\)

It is important when reviewing the competitive solicitations that have been conducted to-date to assess the number of non-incumbent transmission developers that have engaged in these processes. Since 2013, the number of discrete transmission developers in a given transmission planning region in any year has typically ranged from 3 to 6 entities. In 2016, the majority of the “incumbent proposals” received by NYISO were actually joint proposals between incumbent and non-incumbent developers.\(^{13}\) This statistic is not surprising, since developing and constructing electric transmission infrastructure is not for small or inexperienced organizations. These activities require substantial financial resources, technical human resources, and technical analytical resources. In addition, the competitive procurement processes are burdensome and time consuming. The technical capability of developers, as well as their financial resources, are critical to their success in the competitive solicitations and ultimately completing the development of transmission.

\(^{10}\) SPP Transmission Provider Public Reports, PJM Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee, NYISO Transmission Planning Need Reports, MISO Competitive Transmission Administration, CAISO Transmission Project Sponsor Selection Reports.

\(^{11}\) Department of Energy 2018 Transmission Data Review, p. 75.

\(^{12}\) MISO, Hartburg-Sabine Junction 500 kV Competitive Transmission Project Selection Report, November 27, 2018, p. 2.

\(^{13}\) Department of Energy 2018 Transmission Data Review, p. 75.
Figure 1: SUMMARY OF COMPETITIVE TRANSMISSION DEVELOPERS SINCE 2017

B. SUMMARY TABLE OF COMPETITIVE SOLICITATIONS BY U.S. REGION

Competitive solicitations have been conducted in every ISO/RTO across the United States. Below is a summary of competitive solicitations conducted to-date.

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14 Figure 1 Sources: PJM Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee, NYISO Transmission Planning Need Reports, MISO Competitive Transmission Administration, CAISO Transmission Project Sponsor Selection Reports.

15 SPP only identifies bidder information at board meetings and does not provide data in reports, so SPP has been excluded from Figure 1.
### Table 3: Competitive Solicitations by U.S. Region\(^{16,17,18,19}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>Year Awarded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sycamore to Penasquitos</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>SDG&amp;E &amp; Citizens</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Greg to Gates</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>PG&amp;E &amp; BHE &amp; Citizens</td>
<td>2013*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Suncrest Reactive Power</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>NextEra</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Estrella Substation</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>NextEra</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Miguel Reactive Power</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>SDG&amp;E</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Spring (Morgan Hill) Substation</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>PG&amp;E</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Wheeler Ridge Junction Sub.</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>PG&amp;E</td>
<td>2015*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Delaney to Colorado River</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>Abengoa &amp; Starwood</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Harry Allen to Eldorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>LS Power</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Round Mountain</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>LS Power</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Gates 500kV</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>LS Power</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Duff to Rockport to Coleman</td>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>Republic Transmission (LS Power)</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Hartburg-Sabine Junction</td>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>NextEra</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Boston 2028 RFP (Mystic)</td>
<td>ISO-NE</td>
<td>Eversource &amp; National Grid</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Thorofare Project</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>Transource WV</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Artificial Island</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>LS Power</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>AP South</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>AEP/Transource</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>PJM 2021 SAA NJ OSW</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>North Liberal to Walkemeyer</td>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Mid Kansas Electric Co</td>
<td>2016*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Wolf Creek to Blackberry</td>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>NextEra</td>
<td>2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Sooner-Wekiwa 345kV</td>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>Transource MO</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Minco-Pleasant Valley-Draper</td>
<td>SPP</td>
<td>NextEra</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Western NY (Empire State)</td>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>NextEra</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>NY AC Docket Segment A</td>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>LS Power &amp; NYPA</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>NY AC Docket Segment B</td>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>National Grid &amp; Transco</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Table 3 above, the CAISO accounted for almost half of the total competitive solicitations conducted to-date. On the other hand, only one competitive solicitation process has been conducted in ISO-NE since Order No. 1000 was implemented in 2011. In addition, almost half of the competitive solicitations to-date were performed in 2016 or earlier. Importantly, none of these

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\(^{16}\) Includes PJM open window projects that resulted in a non-incumbent winner.

\(^{17}\) SPP’s Butler-Tioga project has been excluded due to the withdrawal of the project prior to submission of proposals.

\(^{18}\) * Indicates projects that have been withdrawn or put on hold since selection.

\(^{19}\) This list does not include the numerous PJM open window solicitations.
competitive solicitations involved interregional transmission projects, which Order No. 1000 explicitly targeted to facilitate the future expansion of the transmission grid.

**Figure 2: COMPETITIVE SOLICITATIONS AWARDED SINCE 2012**

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20 Includes projects that have been withdrawn or put on hold since selection. See * noted projects in Table 3.
IV. APPROACH TO CASE STUDIES

In assessing whether the goals of Order No. 1000, as discussed in II, have been realized through the competitive solicitation process, it is important to conduct a thorough analysis of these processes to examine some real-world examples of competitive solicitations in practice. Below we describe the screening criteria applied to the complete list of competitive solicitations conducted to-date, and the competitive solicitations that passed the screening criteria and warranted an in-depth analysis.

A. SELECTION METHODOLOGY

In order to select a final list of competitive transmission projects on which to conduct an in-depth examination, Concentric began with a complete list of Order No. 1000 competitive solicitations and applied the following three screening requirements:

1. Projects awarded to non-incumbent transmission developers;
2. Projects that are in-service or under construction;
3. Projects with an estimated total capex greater than $50 M.

The first criteria screened for projects awarded to non-incumbent transmission developers. Proponents of the ROFR elimination under Order No. 1000 have argued that cost savings will be realized as a result of the entry of non-incumbent developers into the transmission space. For these claims to be accurately assessed, it is important to review competitive projects that have been awarded to non-incumbent developers who were responsible for developing the project. We assume that whether or not a project developed by an incumbent TO was awarded as part of a competitive solicitation, it would experience the same outcome related to cost and schedule adherence as compared to had it been constructed pursuant to a ROFR. For these reasons we first screened based on non-incumbent transmission developer status.

Secondly, it is important to examine only projects for which there is enough data to make informed determinations about the results of the competitive process. Much of the debate around Order No. 1000 competition has centered around claims and commitments made by winning developers before projects are actually developed and constructed. However, early-stage projects do not reveal any information about how much the project will ultimately cost, as further examined in the report. Examining projects that are in service or in advanced development provides the best opportunity at identifying the success or failure of competitive solicitations in achieving cost savings and filters out
projects that are too early in development to accurately draw conclusions about the benefits realized for customers.

Finally, we examined projects with an estimated cost of at least $50 million. We believe that the results of competition are more transparent and easier to observe across projects of a certain size, scope, and length of construction, and that these size determinants would be broadly represented through an initial cost threshold.

**B. Selected Case Studies**

The screening criteria discussed above yielded the six projects in the table below for which an in-depth analysis was conducted:

**Table 4: Selected Competitive Solicitations by U.S. Region**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>ISO/RTO</th>
<th>Responsible Developer</th>
<th>Estimated Cost &gt; $50M</th>
<th>In Service Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empire State</td>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>NextEra</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial Island</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>LS Power</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suncrest</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>NextEra</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaney to Colorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>Abengoa &amp; Starwood</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff Coleman</td>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>Republic Transmission (LS Power)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Allen to Eldorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>LS Power</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important to note that the in-depth analysis conducted involved the review of numerous documents and data points. Because the transparency and reporting requirements differ significantly across regions, it is challenging to compare and analyze costs. Nevertheless, we have used best efforts to report on data reviewed and document the sources of this data.
V. CASE STUDY REVIEW

A. EMPIRE STATE LINE

   i. Project Overview

   In 2015, NYISO recognized a public policy need for enhanced transmission in Western New York. Grid congestion had previously limited power flow in the region, preventing clean energy generation sites in Niagara and Ontario from delivering maximum output to the grid. The NYISO recognized the need for a transmission solution that would allow for increased deliveries from a major New York Power Authority ("NYPA") hydroelectric project and allow for increased renewable imports from Canada. Through the Public Policy Process in New York, the NYISO addresses transmission needs that are driven by public policy requirements identified by the New York Public Service Commission ("NYPSC"). In a July 2015 order, the NYPSC identified the relief of congestion in Western New York, including access to 2,700 MW from the Niagara hydroelectric facility and additional imports of renewable energy from Ontario, as a Public Policy Transmission Need.

   ii. Competitive Solicitation

   On November 1, 2015, NYISO issued a 60-day solicitation window to examine potential solutions for the identified Western New York transmission need. The NYISO received a total of 12 proposals from seven different developers. The twelve proposals represented costs ranging from $157 – $487M, as shown in Table 5 below.

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NYISO Staff developed a draft Western NY Report detailing the results of its analysis. The draft report was reviewed with stakeholders in five Electric System Planning Working Group (“ESPWG”) and Transmission Planning Advisory Subcommittee (“TPAS”) meetings and was revised and clarified based on stakeholder and developer feedback.

Pursuant to the NYISO Open Access Transmission Tariff (“OATT”), NYISO Staff then submitted the Western NY Report to the NYISO Board of Directors for its review and action. Based on its review, the Board selected NEETNY Project T014 to address the Western NY Need, finding that NextEra’s Project T014 was both the more efficient and more cost-effective transmission solution to address the Western NY Need based on its total performance across the selection metrics and scenarios. As the selected developer, NextEra is eligible to allocate and recover the costs associated with its Project T014 to the extent permitted under the NYISO OATT.

As outlined in the 2017 NYISO Selection Report, NEETNY proposed to construct two new 345kV substations, located in Elma and Royalton NY. The proposed Dysinger substation in Royalton was designed to become a transmission hub for Western NY, connecting seven separate 345 kV transmission lines and effectively reducing grid congestion. Additionally, NEETNY included the

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Table 5: Independent Third-Party Cost Estimates for Western NY Proposals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Independent Cost Estimate ($2017)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T006</td>
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<tr>
<td>T007</td>
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<tr>
<td>T015_Alt</td>
<td>$197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T017</td>
<td>$299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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development of a new 20-mile transmission line connecting the two new substations in their project proposal.

iii. **Project Cost & Timeline**

According to the Western New York Public Policy Transmission Planning Report, the cost of the Empire State Line was estimated at $181M. Throughout the course of the Western New York solicitation process, there was discussion regarding cost containment provisions and how they would be evaluated/considered by NYISO. According to a response by the NYISO (as reported in NEETNY’s comments), “[NYISO] will not consider cost containment in selection of more efficient or cost-effective Public Policy Transmission Project because such consideration is not provided for in its tariffs. OATT Attachment Y Section 31.4.8.2 states that ‘Actual project cost recovery, including any issues related to cost recovery and project cost overruns, will be submitted to, and decided by [FERC]. Cost containment mechanisms can provide benefits to customers, but the key here is what the NYISO has repeatedly made clear: that for this solicitation, it will not consider cost containment in its evaluation process. However, there is nothing to stop any developer from proposing a cost containment mechanism in its FERC formula rate filing.’”

In its formula rate proceeding, NEETNY committed to cap certain costs at $110.4M as part of a Settlement Proceeding, defined as the sum of the following: (A) the Capital Cost Bid, defined as the amount submitted by NEETNY in response to the NYISO’s solicitation on the Western New York Public Policy Transmission Need, but excluding Empire Third Party Costs; (B) contingency of 18% will be applied to the Capital Cost Bid; (C) the sum of the Capital Cost Bid and the contingency of 18%, multiplied by an inflation factor of 2.0% per year for the period of time from the submission in response to the NYISO’s Solicitation to the date that is one year prior to the Commercial Operation Date; and (D) Allowance for Funds Used During Construction (“AFUDC”).

Project construction began in March of 2021, and NEETNY adhered to all scheduling requirements as required by the NYISO. The line entered service on July 12, 2022, against an estimated in-service date of June 2022. Despite remaining largely on schedule, NextEra encountered significant cost

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overruns, describing “unforeseeable costs” of approximately $74M above the cost cap which NEETNY claims were excluded from the project cost containment mechanism. When all costs are considered, including those that were not part of the cost cap, NEETNY forecasts its 2022 end of year transmission plant in service as $219M. Including intangible plant and general plant, NEETNY’s 2022 end of year plant in service is forecasted as $249M.

iv. Challenges

According to documentation regarding the construction of the Empire State Line, NEETNY encountered cost overruns in the categories of regulatory delays, transmission line re-routing and tree clearing, wetland mitigation, and other environmental challenges. This led to cost escalations of approximately $74M above the cost cap, for which NEETNY is seeking full recovery for this cost due to exceptions in its cost cap. This represents a 67% cost increase above NEETNY’s project cost cap of $110.4M. The total projected EOY plant in service estimates of $249M represents a 38% increase above the solicitation cost estimate of $181M.

This cost increase offers a striking real-world counterexample to claims of cost savings from proponents of Order No. 1000 competition. Given the scale of this cost increase, policymakers should consider whether competitive processes result in realistic bids, or whether non-incumbent entities may simply seek to underbid the competition while relying on cost cap exceptions to ensure full recovery of actual costs down the road. Further, this example raises legitimate questions about whether these cost escalation factors would have been reasonably foreseeable by an entity with local knowledge and experience with the challenges to transmission development in this jurisdiction.

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31 In general, publicly available information about final costs is not always readily available or transparent, and is often released on a delayed-basis. These figures are derived from public information that was available at the time of this report.
B. ARTIFICIAL ISLAND

i. Project Overview

PJM identified system performance and voltage issues in the “Artificial Island” area surrounding the Hope Creek and Salem nuclear units in New Jersey during its 2012 and 2013 transmission planning cycle. The transmission stability issue recognized in 2012 led PJM to open a two-month competitive solicitation window on April 29, 2013. After major scoping changes and schedule delays discussed below, LS Power was ultimately selected to construct a 3-mile-long transmission line beneath the surface of the Delaware River to a new substation in Delaware (responsible for construction of both line and substation).

ii. Competitive Solicitation & Schedule

On April 29, 2013, PJM issued a problem statement and opened a 60-day proposal window to address the Artificial Island issues. Seven discrete developers submitted 26 separate proposals with cost estimates ranging from approximately $100M to $1.55 billion for a wide array of projects including, but not limited to, greenfield transmission lines, new substations, system reconfigurations, and dynamic reactive devices.32 PJM conducted a solicitation and awarded a winner. However, PJM underestimated the cost of integration work at the terminus PSE&G substation. PJM’s revised estimates raised the estimated total cost,33 and this cost increase, in part, led the PJM Board to

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33 PJM, Transmission Expansion Advisory Committee Artificial Island Recommendations to the PJM Board, PJM Staff White Paper, April 5, 2017, p. 4.
suspend the project in August 2016 and direct PJM staff to conduct a more comprehensive analysis. During the reevaluation, PJM staff eliminated certain project elements (including the construction of a Static VAR Compensation device) to lower costs, amended its RFP to reflect the elimination of these project elements and changed the terminus point of the new line from the Salem Substation to the Hope Creek Substation.\(^{34}\) On April 6, 2017 the PJM Board lifted the suspension on the Artificial Island project and approved PJM staff’s recommendation to retain LS Power as the developer of the revised Artificial Island 230 kV transmission line under the revised project scope and route.\(^{35}\) The LS Power project that was ultimately awarded was substantially different from both the PSE&G project that was initially recommended by PJM Staff in 2014 and the PJM Board-approved project in 2015 that was awarded to LS Power.

iii. Cost

The major components of the Artificial Island project, including LS Power’s 230 kV submarine transmission line across the Delaware River entered service in 2020 (“Silver Run”), while final upgrades on the Hope Creek Substation were completed in the spring of 2021.\(^{36}\) LS Power reported total project costs of $149.5M. This total reflects an end of year transmission rate base total of $156.1M for its portion of Artificial Island, less exclusions and other costs. It also reported an adjusted construction cost cap of $166.3M according to the terms of its Designated Entity Agreement, with approximately $20M of escalation allowed above the $146M baseline cost cap estimate.\(^{37,38}\)

iv. Challenges

The Artificial Island competitive solicitation process exemplifies many of the ways that competitive solicitations can slow down and otherwise complicate the development of transmission infrastructure. Nearly eight years elapsed between the time that PJM identified the need (2013) and the Silver Run Line entered service (2020). The competitive process itself was extremely lengthy (four years, 2013-2017), with PJM changing the scope and the award of the RFP in the process.

Perhaps more importantly, Silver Run has had performance issues since entering service in 2020. On June 10, 2021, the line tripped due to a submarine cable failure. The line was returned to service on

\(^{34}\) PJM Press Release, PJM Board Lifts Suspension of Artificial Island, April 6, 2017.
\(^{35}\) PJM Board letter to PJM Stakeholders, April 6, 2017. This letter also noted the cost allocation issues associated with the project.
\(^{36}\) PJM Inside Lines, Artificial Island Project Nears Completion, April 2, 2021.
\(^{37}\) Silver Run Electric LLC, 2021 Annual Updated True-Up, Attachment 4 Rate Base; WP4 – Cost Commitment, July 1, 2022.
\(^{38}\) Silver Run Electric LLC Designated Entity Agreement, Schedule E, Section 1.2(b) & 1.2(d).
June 18, 2021 with reduced ratings, with PJM noting that LS Power plans to repair the damaged cable during a scheduled outage in the fall of 2022. On April 27, 2022, the line was rerated to near-original, though somewhat reduced, capacities. PJM again noted that LS Power still plans to repair the damaged cable during a scheduled outage in the fall of 2022, after which it is projected to return to its original ratings.\textsuperscript{39}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARTIFICIAL ISLAND – SILVER RUN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final Cost: $149.5M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase over Cost Cap: $0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost cap escalation provisions allow for nearly $20M of escalation above original cost cap estimate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Artificial Island competitive solicitation process was arduous, highlighting shortcomings with PJM’s competitive bidding process. The Silver Run line entered service in 2020 but soon thereafter tripped offline and has undergone significant derates for much of 2021 and 2022.

C. **Duff Coleman**

i. **Project Overview**

The Duff-Coleman Project is a new single circuit 345 kV transmission line between the existing Duff substation, located in southern Indiana, and the existing Coleman substation located in northern Kentucky. The project is expected to span between 30 and 35 miles within Dubois County, Indiana, Spencer County Indiana, and Hancock County, Kentucky.

The Duff-Coleman Project was approved by the MISO Board of Directors in December 2015 as a Market Efficiency Project (“MEP”) in its 2015 MISO Transmission Expansion Plan (“MTEP”). MISO determined that the project was needed to strengthen the 345 kV backbone in the MISO Central Region and would provide more than $1 billion in estimated benefits to the region. As part of MISO’s

\textsuperscript{39} PJM Special Notes, April 27, 2022, and January 11, 2022. \url{https://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/etools/oasis/special-notices}
planning process, MISO performs an extensive congestion study that identifies areas with need for congestion relief and projects that can best provide relief. A project providing congestion relief is approved as a MEP if it: a) has a benefit to cost ratio of at least 1.25; b) has an estimated cost of greater than $5M; and c) has a voltage of 345 kV or higher for more than 50% of the estimated project on a cost basis. MISO estimated that the Duff-Coleman Project would have a total cost of $67M, consisting of $59 M for the competitive portion of the 345 kV transmission line, $5M for upgrades at the Coleman EHV substation, and $3M for upgrades at the Duff substation. The analysis completed in MTEP 15 found that the project would provide significant economic benefits with a benefit to cost ratio of 16.1 to 1, far exceeding the 1.25 to 1 benefit to cost ratio required for designation of a 345 kV transmission project as a Market Efficiency Project.

ii. Competitive Solicitation

In January 2016, MISO initiated its first competitive solicitation process, issuing an RFP for the 345 kV transmission line spanning 31 miles across two states. A total of 11 proposals for the Duff Coleman Project were submitted to MISO from 11 discrete developers. Project proposals were subject to MISO's four evaluation criteria, including: i) cost and design; ii) project implementation; iii) operation and maintenance; and iv) transmission planning participation. Following an extensive review of all applications, MISO ultimately selected Republic Transmission, LLC (“Republic Transmission”), a joint venture between LS Power and Hoosier Energy, and Big Rivers Electric Corporation (“Big Rivers”) to construct and own the project.

iii. Costs & Timeline

Republic Transmission was chosen by MISO to build the Duff Coleman transmission line with a bid of $49.8M against a MISO estimated project cost of $58.9M. As noted in the MISO Selection Report, Republic Transmission included a number of rate concessions in its proposal. Among those concessions were: (i) a Total Rate Base Cap of $58.1M; (ii) a Return on Equity (“ROE”) cap at the lesser of 9.80% inclusive of incentives or the MISO region-wide base ROE plus an RTO participation adder; (iii) a Schedule Guarantee under which the ROE would be reduced if the Schedule Guarantee was not met; and (iv) an Equity Percentage Cap of 45%. On June 28, 2017, MISO and Republic

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40 The substation work was non-competitive and assigned to the incumbent TOS.
43 MISO Duff-Coleman Selection Report, December 20, 2016, p. 3.
executed the Amended and Restated Selected Developer Agreement ("SDA") incorporating the rate concessions. Republic Transmission placed the project into service on June 11, 2020, approximately six months before MISO's deadline of January 1, 2021.

iv. Challenges

The Duff-Coleman project faced no significant construction challenges. It is important to note that there is no requirement in either Indiana or Kentucky, the states through which this project was constructed to obtain a Certificate of Need or Route Permit before beginning construction. This drastically simplifies the construction process and reduces the risk of project delays. In addition, according to the MISO records, there were changes to the contractors used for land acquisition services and construction services. Further, the point of interconnection at both the Duff and Coleman substations changed. Neither of these changes resulted in a delay in schedule.

Regarding project cost, Republic provided an updated cost estimate of $54.2M when the project was placed in service in 2020, with the final costs coming in close to the highest project bid of $55.7M. While the final cost estimate did not exceed Republic's rate base cap, this updated cost is closer to MISO's initial planning level estimate. Republic's final cost of $54.2M is also notably greater than the $48.8M median cost estimate value among all bidders before accounting for inflation. This raises questions about whether any benefit was derived from the competitive solicitation, or whether Republic simply delivered a final project cost comparable to what would have been delivered by an incumbent transmission owner.

45 MISO Change Order Log and Current Appendix A, p. 1
46 MISO, Duff-Coleman Quarterly Status Report, June 11, 2020 expenditures to-date.
47 Big Rivers Electric Corporation acquired the portion of the Duff-Coleman project located in Kentucky and will recover any incremental additional costs from ratepayers.
Table 6: Duff-Coleman Proposed Cost Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposal ID</th>
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<td>110</td>
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<td>111</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DUFF COLEMAN

Final Cost: $54.2M
Percentage Above the Median Bid: 11%

There is no requirement in either Indiana or Kentucky, the states through which this project was constructed, to obtain a Certificate of Need or Route Permit before beginning construction. This drastically simplifies the construction process, reduces the risk of project delays, and mitigates the risk of cost overruns. Republic’s final cost estimate was above the median bid estimate (before accounting for inflation), indicating little benefit from the solicitation.

D. Delaney to Colorado River—“Ten West Link Project”

i. Project Overview

During the 2013-14 Transmission Planning cycle, CAISO determined an “economically-driven” need for the Delaney-Colorado River Transmission Project to complement reinforcements needed to address the retirement of the SONGS nuclear plant. The Delaney-Colorado River Transmission

Project entailed building an approximate 125-mile 500kV line between the Delaney substation and the existing Colorado River substation and would complete a second contiguous circuit from the Palo Verde to Devers substations. The project offered immediate economic and capacity benefits, as well as incremental import capacity benefits of 200 to 300 MW from Arizona, which would be used to support area deliverability issues and ultimately complement more significant transmission reinforcements being considered at the time to support higher levels of renewable generation in development.

ii. Competitive Solicitation
To find a cost-efficient and high-quality solution for the Delaney-Colorado River Transmission Project, the CAISO began a competitive solicitation process in 2014. The bid solicitation period ran for 90 days, from August 19, 2014, to November 19, 2014.49 Upon closing the three-month-long application window on November 19, 2014, CAISO had received five proposals from five discrete developers in the region. DCR Transmission, LLC (“DCR Transmission”), a joint venture between Starwood Energy Group Global, Inc. and Atlantica Yield PLC, was ultimately chosen by CAISO to lead the Ten West Link Project along with partner Abengoa Transmission and Infrastructure (“ATI”).

iii. Costs & Timeline
The Ten West Link Project was estimated to cost $300M.50 According to the Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”) filing Order by the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) for Ten West Link Project, the Approved Project Sponsor Agreement (“APSA”) between DCR Transmission and CAISO established a cost cap of $241,805,391.51 Updated project cost estimates from 2016 were $279,560,483, representing overruns of the cost cap previously agreed upon in the 2015 APSA.52,53

Due to several challenges, including a route change and a change in in-serve date, the November 2021 CPCN noted a $389M estimate for the Ten West Link Project, over $148M above the cost cap and previous project cost estimates.54 According documentation in the CPCN proceeding, the Bureau of

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51 CPUC, Decision Granting DCR Transmission, LLC a CPCN for the Ten West Link Project, November 4, 2021, at p. 64.
Land Management ("BLM") routinely extended the anticipated dates for completion of the draft Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") and final EIS for a variety of reasons including a federal furlough and the need for additional information from the applicant. The cost cap was increased to reflect the updated cost estimate, subject to review by the CPUC of actual costs incurred to ensure reasonableness and prudency and to challenge them as appropriate at the FERC proceedings.

iv. Challenges

When CAISO began the competitive solicitation process for the Ten West Link project, the new transmission line spanning from California to Arizona was expected to be in-service no later than May 1, 2020. Yet, through a route change and delays to construction caused by regulatory delays and investigation of alternative line routes, the Ten West Link Project has still not entered commercial operation, although it recently received approval to begin construction.55 According to DCR Transmission in an Application for a Certificate of Environmental Compatibility, the project underwent a total of four years assessing community outreach, environmental impact, and engineering design when examining an alternative route proposed by the BLM.56 Updated in-service estimates show that the Ten West Link Project is expected to be in-service by 2023.57 With detailed knowledge of local regulatory processes and challenges, an incumbent TO might have been positioned to anticipate regulatory challenges and other complications that led to delays.

E. **Suncrest**

   i. **Project Overview**

In 2014, the CAISO recognized a policy-based need for dynamic reactive power support linked to the Suncrest 230 kV bus to support the state’s Renewable Portfolio Standard. The CAISO determined that the retirement of the SONGS nuclear facility and projected increases in renewable generating capacity in the Imperial Valley would cause loading and voltage stability issues in the transmission system in the area of the existing Suncrest Substation.

The proposed project included two primary components: (1) an SVC facility, to be located approximately one mile east of the existing Suncrest Substation, and (2) a 230kV transmission line from the proposed SVC facility to the existing substation. The proposed SVC facility would produce and consume reactive power and would interconnect with Suncrest Substation via the approximately one-mile-long 230kV transmission line. The 230kV transmission line would be installed primarily underground, beneath an existing private road, with the last approximately 300 feet of the transmission line transitioning above-ground via a riser pole and an intermediate pole to connect with the existing substation. The proposed SVC facility would be approximately 6 acres in total size and would be located on an area previously used as a construction staging and materials storage area during construction of Suncrest Substation (completed in 2012).
ii. **Competitive Solicitation**

A project bid solicitation window was opened for two months in the spring of 2014. The CAISO received two proposals for the Suncrest project, one from Horizon West Transmission, LLC ("Horizon West") and one from San Diego Gas & Electric ("SDG&E"), the incumbent substation owner. Horizon West was formerly known as NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC ("NEET West"), as seen in documentation from earlier stages of the project.

Horizon West was formerly known as NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC ("NEET West") as seen in documentation from earlier stages of the project.

The CAISO described both entities as highly qualified with viable solutions, leading to a lengthy comparative analysis to determine selection. SDG&E did not require a CPCN for the Suncrest Project, whereas Horizon West did. The CAISO evaluated the bids and selected Horizon West as the winning project sponsor, primarily due to Horizon West’s cost proposal, which included a binding construction cap and robust cost containment measures limiting the amount for which Horizon West would seek cost recovery. Horizon West, still under the name of NEET West at the time, signed an Approved Project Sponsor Agreement with CAISO on May 7, 2015.

iii. **Cost & Timeline**

The Suncrest Project began construction in early 2019. The construction process was estimated to take approximately a year. The Suncrest Project entered service in 2020. Assuming 2% per annum inflation escalation on the 2015 cost cap, 2021 net transmission plant costs exceeded the inflation-adjusted cost cap by approximately 14%.

Horizon West offered a project construction cost cap of $42,288,000, with operation and maintenance costs for the first five years of operation capped at $360,000 per year.

CAISO provided an initial cost estimate range of $50-75M for the Suncrest Project, as stated in the 2014 Sponsor Selection Report. Once Suncrest entered service in 2020, final transmission plant in service for the project were determined to be roughly $48M per its 2020 formula rate filing, falling slightly below the initial CAISO-estimated range. Horizon West's 2021 FERC formula rate filing showed a transmission plant in service of $53M, within CAISO’s initial estimated cost estimate.

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58 NextEra Energy Transmission West, LLC, or NEET West, changed its name to Horizon West Transmission, LLC.
62 Horizon West Transmission, Annual Actual 2020, Attachment 2, Line 5.
range. The 2021 formula rate filing also recorded an unamortized regulatory asset of $14M in rate base.

iv. Challenges

CAISO awarded the Suncrest Project to Horizon West in January of 2015 and established a required in-service date for Suncrest to be no later than June 1, 2017. However, the CPUC did not issue a CPCN until October 2018, after citing numerous deficiencies in the initial Horizon West application and issuing a Deficiency Letter. Thus, the project did not begin construction until early 2019, and entered service in 2020, three years later than CAISO’s deadline.

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**SUNCREST**

Final Cost: $53M
Cost Cap Exceedance: 14%

This project was awarded in January of 2015 with a required in-service date of June 2017. The project did not enter service until 2020 and exceeded its cost cap by 14%.

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F. HARRY ALLEN TO ELDORADO

i. Project Overview

During 2013-14 transmission planning, CAISO identified an "economically-driven" need for a new 500 kV transmission line between Southern California Edison’s (“SCE”) 500 kV Harry Allen and NV Energy’s Eldorado Substations and opened a three-month bid solicitation window on January 30, 2015, running through April 15, 2015. The 60-mile-long transmission line begins just south of Las Vegas, crossing through eastern suburbs and ending in the desert terrain to the north of the city.

ii. Competitive Solicitation

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63 Horizon West Transmission, Annual Actual 2021, Attachment 2, Line 15.
64 Horizon West Transmission, Annual Actual 2021, Appendix III, p. 1.
During the solicitation window, CAISO received proposals from a total of three discrete developers. Following an extensive review of each sponsor’s application, CAISO selected Desert Link, a subsidiary of LS Power, over Exelon Transmission and NextEra.

iii. Cost & Timeline

CAISO estimated final project costs for the Harry Allen to Eldorado transmission line of approximately $144M in the Project Sponsor Selection Report. According to an October 2017 formula rate filing with FERC (Docket No. ER17-135-000, et al.), DesertLink and CAISO executed an APSA on June 20, 2016. DesertLink agreed in the APSA with CAISO to limit recovery of capital costs to $147M for the project, subject to certain conditions and exceptions. Pursuant to a settlement FERC certified in May 2018, DesertLink maintained a plan from their 2016 project proposal to limit equity as a percentage of its capital structure to 50% and to limit the return on equity (“ROE”) included in its annual transmission revenue requirement (“ATRR”) to 9.8% inclusive of a 50 basis point adder for CAISO membership. Desert Link also agreed in the settlement that the transmission line would be in service by May 1, 2020, and that the transmission revenue requirement cost cap used in winning the competitive bid ($147M) would be adhered to.

Despite the application of a cost cap for the Harry Allen to Eldorado transmission line, DesertLink indicated a final cost of $202.4M for the project. Cost exclusions of $57.7M are behind this overrun in spending; Desert Link explained costs related to “Gross Plant in Service” and “Unamortized Regulatory Asset” were responsible for the developer exceeding estimates. These costs are allowed to be recovered by DesertLink in their revenue requirement.

iv. Challenges

DesertLink remained on schedule for the majority of the project, yet CAISO’s in-service deadline of May 1, 2020, was not met; the line entered service on August 12, 2020. The project cost, not including excluded costs, was $144.7M as compared to a cost cap of $147M. However, excluded costs were quite significant, as has been seen across a number of the competitive solicitations. In this case,

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68 Desert Link, LLC, Certification of Uncontested Settlement, 163 FERC ¶ 63,014 (May 24, 2018).
70 Desert Link, LLC, Certification of Uncontested Settlement, 163 FERC ¶ 63,014 (May 24, 2018), p. 5.
71 DesertLink, DesertLink Rate Year 2020 Annual Update, July 1, 2021.
excluded costs totaled $57.6M, or 39% of the binding cost cap. DesertLink is seeking cost recovery of and on the total project cost of $202.4M.

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**HARRY ALLEN TO ELDORADO**

**Final Cost:** $202.4M  
**Cost Cap Exceedance:** 39%

The excluded costs for this project were significant, totaling $58M or 39% above the binding cost cap.
VI. FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS

Our review of individual Order 1000 projects reveals that the competitive process has not delivered the benefits to customers that were expected. As the FERC has noted, “the remedy prescribed by Order No. 1000 failed to recognize that at least some of the most notable expected benefits from competitive transmission development processes (e.g., new transmission developer market entry, greater innovation in and potentially lower costs of transmission development) could be achieved or at least reasonably approximated through other means.”72 It is not evident that lower costs and greater innovation have been realized on a broad scale through the implementation of Order 1000. In fact, project selection criteria that emphasize low costs may run counter to the goals of innovation via new solutions.

As noted previously, competitively bid projects have seen a range of successes and challenges in terms of schedule adherence. The Delaney to Colorado River Project has experienced significant schedule adherence challenges via a major route change and other construction delays. Related challenges arose for Suncrest; despite the need having been identified in 2014, the CPUC did not approve the decision for the project until October 2018, and the project did not enter service until 2020, three years later than CAISO’s deadline. Additionally, one of the most significant expenditures was time. Time is an important consideration because delayed project development denies customers the benefits of transmission investments, such as reduced congestion costs or increased reliability. The time, money and resources these solicitations require should not be overlooked because delays in awarding projects and ISO/RTO costs and resource burdens lessen any benefits otherwise realized by customers. For each solicitation examined, Table 7 shows the time between the date the project need was first identified, final ISO/RTO Board approval of the winning bidder, and the year the project entered or is expected to enter service. The time between identification and award date is significant, with the shortest timeframe being approximately 9.5 months (Suncrest). The shortest time frame between when a need was identified and a project’s in-service date was approximately four and a half years (Duff Coleman). Incumbents and non-incumbents alike can be subject to project delays for various reasons, however the time added by the Order No. 1000 competitive process is a cost to customers in either case.

72 FERC ANOPR, Docket No. RM21-17-000, April 21, 2022, p. 277-78.

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### Table 7: Case Study Solicitation Timelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>ISO/RTO</th>
<th>Need Identified Date</th>
<th>Solicitation Awarded Date</th>
<th>Days between Need Identification and Selection</th>
<th>In Service Date</th>
<th>ISO Required In-service Date</th>
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<td>Artificial Island</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>Fall 2012</td>
<td>7/29/2015</td>
<td>950+</td>
<td>May 2020</td>
<td>April 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaney to Colorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>7/15/2014</td>
<td>7/10/2015</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>2023</td>
<td>May 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of the efficiency of the Order 1000 solicitation process and removing the ROFR to make way for non-incumbent developers, there remain a limited number of developers active in the competitive transmission space. This is likely due to the fact that owners and operators of transmission infrastructure must possess important and specific levels of expertise, be able to attract capital, manage risk, and make long-term operating commitments. Bidders incur significant costs to prepare bids and participate in competitive solicitations, as do RTO/ISOs to manage those solicitations. New entrants must also be able to stay the course to ensure the long-term reliability of the infrastructure being developed. The stated objective of encouraging new developer market entry does not appear to have been achieved. The number of developers participating in each of the solicitations examined have remained relatively constant, and the number of discrete winning bidders has been limited.

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73 PJM’s initial in-service date was April 2019. Due to challenges throughout the process that are discussed in Section V, the project was suspended and rescoped. PJM’s updated in-service date was June 2020. Silver Run Electric entered commercial operation on-time. We note the delays associated with the Artificial Island process overall.
Table 8: Case Study Solicitation Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>ISO/RTO</th>
<th>Solicitation Awarded Date</th>
<th>#Bidders</th>
<th>Average Bid ($M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empire State</td>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>10/17/2017</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial Island</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>7/29/2015</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suncrest</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>1/6/2015</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaney to Colorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>7/10/2015</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff Coleman</td>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>12/20/2016</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Allen to Eldorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>1/11/2016</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Building transmission infrastructure, particularly large greenfield projects, involves a dynamic set of technical, economic, and regulatory assumptions that affect schedule and cost. Transmission developers review and report cost estimates throughout the project development cycle and the precision of these cost estimates differs by stage and increases as the project progresses from the conceptual stage to the design, engineering, and construction stages. Cost uncertainties are typically beyond the developer’s control – regardless of whether or not the developer is a non-incumbent. Given these uncertainties, transmission project developers frequently include contingencies or exclusions in their capped costs or cost guarantees. Proponents of competition have tended to ignore this aspect of bids by highlighting the initial bid estimates for selected projects. However, there is now concrete evidence that exceptions to cost caps have been used to pass through cost increases to customers, while allowing the bidder to claim a “low” cost in order to win the project.

The projects examined do in fact reveal cost overruns in the categories of regulatory delays, transmission line re-routing, wetland mitigation, and other environmental challenges. Harry Allen to El Dorado (DesertLink) and Empire State lines are two that experienced the most significant cost overruns of approximately 38%.

Not all projects will exceed their cost caps, as evidenced by the Duff Coleman example. However, the Duff-Coleman project costs are roughly equal to the average of other submitted bids. This raises questions about whether the competitive process, even when it does not result in cost escalations above caps, results in any actual cost savings for customers. This question should also be considered...
in the context of the broader direct and indirect costs of competition, and the delays imposed by the process.

It is important to note however that a simplistic and narrow focus on whether solicitations result in cost savings ignores the broader and important considerations of benefits associated with historical models of transmission ownership and management of transmission systems. These benefits represent possible opportunity costs of competitive solicitations in terms of the foregone benefit of time and resources devoted to the myriad of issues facing the industry, which must be considered in addition to the direct costs, benefits, and uncertainties of the solicitations held to-date.

The following provides a high-level summary of anticipated costs versus final project costs.

**Table 9: Case Study Cost Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Region’s Cost Estimate ($M)*</th>
<th>Winning Bid Cost Estimate ($M)</th>
<th>Final Cost or Current Estimate ($M)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Empire State</td>
<td>NYISO</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial Island</td>
<td>PJM</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>149.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duff Coleman</td>
<td>MISO</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaney to Colorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>32574</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suncrest</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>50-75</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry Allen to Eldorado</td>
<td>CAISO</td>
<td>12075</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>202.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the case studies reviewed in this paper, Order No. 1000 competitive solicitations have not delivered innovation, cost savings, or timely development of transmission. As FERC considers reforms to its transmission planning and cost allocation policies, it is important to consider the real results of competitive processes to-date, compared against claims of significant cost savings. In short, the experience to-date with real projects contradicts these arguments.76 The timely development of transmission is critical for meeting clean energy goals and capturing significant economic benefits for customers, and results to-date indicate that the Order No. 1000 competitive framework may be a hindrance to these goals and does not appear to provide particular value in advancing them.

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76 Additionally, full operational experience with competitively-developed facilities is not yet known, however more information will be revealed over time as operational experience grows and the effective maintenance of these facilities can be more easily measured.